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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1: Theme, issues and questions 
When a care home for nineteen people with dementia was first opened four 
years ago, the entrance door was left unlocked. “The residents are tenants 
living in their own home, and should be able to come and go as they please”, 
was the advice given by the local dementia-team. “And anyway, it is illegal to 
lock the doors”, the coordinator and nurse in charge at the care home tells me. 
The coordinator talks about her experiences with what she calls ‘the open 
doors policy’. This conversation arises when I ask her about the code lock at 
the entrance door, of inquiring whether any other alternatives had been tried 
out or considered. “The result [of the ‘open doors policy’] was that just about all 
the residents wandered off, and some of them had real trouble finding their 
way back. But usually the staff managed to find them”. It was a turbulent time, 
the coordinator recalls, as much time and effort was spent running around the 
neighbourhood, looking for missing residents. “And once a female resident 
went missing for more than ten hours. The police were called for, and an aerial 
search was conducted by helicopter. Fortunately she was found in relatively 
good shape”. However, after this incident the neighbours had had enough, 
according to the coordinator. “They reported me to the police for failing to 
provide necessary care”, she tells me. In the process that followed the 
coordinator tried to get a clear answer from the local authorities as to what she 
was supposed to do. “Do whatever is necessary” was their response. And in a 
matter of days a code lock was installed.
The above story serves to locate this thesis in the tension-filled dilemmas of everyday 
dementia care practice. First of all it raises issues about good dementia care, which 
is what this thesis is all about. What is good dementia care? And how is it achieved?
These are the leading questions and issues that run through the chapters of this 
thesis.
Further, in going back to the above story, the question of how to achieve good care - 
is closely related to the issue of technology; to entrance doors, code locks and (in 
some instances) helicopters. However, technologies are not purely technical. This 
10
thesis is based on an understanding of technology as containing three layers of 
meaning: 
 First there is the level of physical objects or artefacts (…). Second, 
 ‘technology’  may refer to activities or processes (…). Third, ‘technology’ can 
 refer to what people know as well as what they do.1
This means that attention is also directed at practices involving technology, such as 
locking (or not locking) the entrance door. Similarly, the relation between technology 
(in the broadest sense) and care is a major concern of this thesis. What is the role of 
technology in dementia care? And how, exactly, does technology contribute to good 
dementia care? The objective is twofold: first, to investigate how good care is 
constituted, with an emphasis on technology’s role in this process, and, second, to 
explore and bring out the significance of everyday care practice. These two concerns 
are interrelated in the sense that insight into technology’s role in the constitution of 
good care can only be gained by paying close attention to everyday care practices. 
Further, these everyday practices are considered as ethical in the sense that they are 
about trying to do good and to realize certain values in practice.
In addressing questions of good care and everyday ethics, my intention is to tell a 
different story than the negative one that can be seen to dominate mass media 
constructions and discussions about dementia care in Norway today.2 I will argue 
                                           
1 Bijker et al, 1987: 3-4. Also Bijker and Law, 1992: 7-8; and MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999 have a 
similar definition. 
2  These constructions and discussions paint a picture of a care sector in deep crisis as the elderly and 
people with dementia are not provided with the necessary care services. Important issues in these 
discussions are the apparent lack of nursing home beds or home-nursing resources and undignified 
care conditions. A new term called ‘stop-watch-care’ has been introduced by the mass media to 
describe the more recent focus on efficiency in home based care. The use of coercion in care is 
another central theme that is discussed. Below is a small number of examples selected from recent 
newspaper headlines on elderly/dementia care in Norway. In this thesis I will use brackets [ ] when I 
cite or refer to Norwegian texts or documents that I have translated into English. In this way I 
distinguish my translations from formal translations. [Fired for doing too much for the elderly] (feature 
article in VG (Norwegian National newspaper) on a home helper who refused to work according to the 
stop-watch. 18.12.2005: pp. 1 and 8-9); [Stroke-victim Rosa (88): Thrown out of nursing home] 
(feature article in VG, 15.09.2006: pp. 1 and 6-7); [More stop-watch-care for the elderly] (feature article 
in Dagsavisen, 24.11.2005: pp. 1 and 6-7); [Norwegian health-care violates the law again and again] 
(feature article in Aftenposten (Norwegian National newspaper) on the state of elderly/dementia care 
in the Oslo-region, 02.07.2005: p. 6); [Håkon’s last month’s became a nightmare] (feature article in 
Agderposten (Norwegian Regional newspaper) on the lack of care services provided for Håkon, 87 
years old and suffering from dementia, 28.12.2005: pp. 1 and 4-5); [The elderly allowed to shower 
every second week] (feature article in Dagsavisen about nursing home care, 27.03.2006: pp. 6-7). 
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that these constructions, which emphasize the shortcomings of current services, 
needs to be nuanced. However, this does not mean that I dispute the need for 
improvement, or that I fail to recognize the many problems within dementia care 
services. So when I have chosen to focus on good dementia care, it is because
have a different agenda: to tell another - and equally important - story that need
 I 
s to 
ia
first
re, this text is written in a manner that should make 
it accessible to non-academics.
n
ology is in use. This fieldwork took place between December 2003 
Alarm
                                                                                                                                       
be voiced.
Drawing on theoretical resources from the interdisciplinary and academic field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), as well as on empirical studies of dement
care practices, this thesis aims to bring technology into dementia care discourse, 
studies and politics in Norway. An equally important goal is to contribute to a more 
empirically-oriented approach to technology and care. As the target audience is 
of all policy makers, health-care professionals and others who work with or are 
engaged in issues of dementia ca
The further contexts of this thesis: 
This study which is based in Norway is partly located in the context of the introductio
of smart home technology to dementia care in the mid 1990s, although most of the 
empirical material stems from more recent fieldwork in different care homes where 
smart home techn
and June 2005.
Since 1995 a number of municipalities have implemented smart home technology in
their dementia care services. The use of smart home technology integrates alarms 
and monitoring devices, such as door alarms, bed alarms and heat detectors. 
signals are transmitted through a smart home infrastructure to an in-house or 
community carer. The smart home infrastructure is often connected to a computer
These issues are also debated among care professionals, for example in the Norwegian journal 
‘Demens’ (Dementia): [Coercion in Norwegian elderly care] (article reporting on a survey on the extent 
of use of coercion in Norwegian nursing homes, published in Demens, vol. 5/nr. 1, 2001: pp. 7-9); 
[Disquieting], (Interview with the Minister of Social Affairs with regards to law proposal on the use of 
technology in dementia care, published in Demens, vol. 4/nr 3. 2000: pp. 5); [Electronic surveillance: 
OK – or maybe not?] (Editorial comments on a decision made by the Ministry of Social Affairs to allow 
the installation of an alarm system in a nursing home, published in Demens, vol. 4/nr. 3, 2000: pp.6; 
[Each case must be assessed separately] (Interview with the Minister of Social Affairs with regards to 
use of technology in dementia care, published in Demens, vol. 4/nr. 3, 2000: pp. 7). 
12
monitor as well as to a carer’s telephone or pager. This makes it possible for the 
carer to monitor the whereabouts of the person with dementia, even when attending 
to other patients. The use of this technology offers an excellent opportunity to study
the more extensive relations between technology and dementia care. Further, the 
introduction of smart home technology to dementia care has put issues of tec
and care on the public agenda, and has influenced Norwegian care-policy in 
important ways. Policy, which impinges on care practices, is in this thesis expressed 
through legal do
hnology
cuments, ethical guidelines, government reports and excerpts from a 
 I have been engaged in issues of technology, disability and care 
for many years.3
d the 
public debate.
This thesis is also shaped by my previous work and interests. As an occupational 
therapist with experience in home-based care, and later when responsible for policy
in the field of governing the distribution of ICT-based technical aids at the National 
Insurance Agency,
For more than a decade I have been particularly interested in issues of smart home 
technology, dementia care and ethics, as mirrored in both previous research an
present thesis.4 In my capacity of policy-maker during the past decade, I have 
worked with issues of smart home technology and different aspects of public service
provision both on the national as well as on a Nordic level. My primary concern has 
                                           
3 The National Insurance Agency (Rikstrygdeverket) is responsible for the distribution of technical aids
for the disabled and elderly in Norway, through an extensive network of Regional Centers. The role
the National Insurance Agency is to give Directives and advice for the distribution of tech
 of 
nical aids in 
rway. The National Insurance Agency became from 2004 a part of the NAV system in Norway: 
c
bate
n
r hand, 
, H. ’Overvåking eller trygghet? En studie av 
ogi i omsorgen for aldersdemente’ Hovedoppgave i sosiologi, Institutt for sosiologi og 
s
No
ooperation between social welfare and unemployment services under one umbrella.    
4 I addressed the issue of smart home technology and dementia care in my master’s thesis, which 
presents an analysis of a public debate in the Norwegian media on the introduction of smart home 
technology in dementia care in 1996. Further I contrasted the opinions expressed during this de
with excerpts from interviews with next-of-kin and carers from a group home for people with dementia. 
As a student I was not given access to be present in the care home. The aim was to trace the 
negotiations with regards to smart home technology in dementia care. According to the participants i
the media debate, this technology was ‘surveillance’. The next-of-kin and carers, on the othe
interpreted this technology as ‘security’. See Thygesen
teknol
amfunnsgeografi, Universitetet i Oslo, februar 1998.  
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been with the establishment of ethical guidelines and procedures for the use of smart 
tes a 
without
een
s
 dealing 
ng that although the carers followed the 
                                         
home technology in the care setting.5
In this thesis I refer to this use of legal regulation and ethical principles as ‘the 
principle-based approach’, or ‘principle-based ethics’. The term as I use it deno
rational understanding of ethics. Principle-based ethics is closely interrelated to 
bioethics, with an understanding of care based on the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence and social justice.6 It is however the principle of autonomy that is made 
primary in contemporary bioethics.7 Autonomy is here understood as a capacity of 
individuals; to be able to act and decide on matters that concerns the person 
the interference of others.8 The principle of beneficence refers to the promotion of 
individual well-being, while the principle of social justice addresses issues of 
distribution and allocation of care services.9 Within this perspective, conflict betw
the different principles is dealt with through the development of rules and strategie
to guide professional action and public choice.10 In my work with guidelines and 
procedures for the use of smart home technology in care, the aim was to provide 
health-care practitioners and municipalities with practical tools for implementing 
technology in care and hence for ensuring the right use of the technology. However, I 
increasingly found this principle-based approach to be an inadequate tool in
with the dilemmas of everyday care, and particularly dementia care. The introductory 
story illustrates this point by showi
5 See for example Thygesen og Skattum. ’Hjelpemidler og etikk’ [Technical aids and ethics], 2001; 
Laberg, Aspelund og Thygesen. ’Smart home Technology. Planning and management in municipal 
services’ (English version), 2005; and Bjørneby, Thygesen og Laberg. ‘Veileder i smarthusteknologi. 
Introduksjon til teknologi som bygger ned funksjonshemmede barrierer’  [Guide to smart home 
technology. An introduction to a technology that contributes to reduce disabling barriers], 2002.  
6 Beauchamp and Childress (1983). 
7 Struhkamp, 2004: 18. See also Verkerk (1999). 
8 Beauchamp and Childress, 1983: 59-61.  
9 Beauchamp and Childress, 1983: 148-149; 183-217; Moody, 1992: 22.  
10 Moody, 1992: 32. I will address the issue of bioethics and principle-based ethics more thoroughly in 
Chapter 6, ‘Dementia Care as Creative Ethics’. See in particular section 6.2, ‘Bioethics and dementia 
care: Good care as a process that can be rationalized’.
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established legal rules and prevailing professional advice, the result was neglect - or 
ary care. 
th four primary 
, or 
 and that this is achieved 
mes an issue of 
failing to provide necess
Four primary concerns: 
My previous work and professional background has left me wi
concerns that have largely shaped this thesis. Although three of the concerns are 
specifically related to principle-based ethics, this thesis is not primarily intended as a 
criticism of principle-based ethics. The aim is, instead, to focus on and highlight the
alternatives in order to contribute to improve dementia care.
1. Normativities and ethics in practice. My objective is to study good care, without
any preconceived ideas of what this is or how it is achieved. So, in contrast to 
principle-based bioethics, no assumption is made that good care is only
even primarily, about promoting individual autonomy,
through the application of legal rules, procedures and principles. Instead I am 
interested in investigating the values (or goods) that are involved in everyday 
care practices, what values/aims carers seek to achieve, how they are 
achieved and the role of technology in this process. 
2. Identifying other goods. Another objective is to identify what principle-based 
ethics has marginalized through its strong focus on individual autonomy as the 
goal of care. My interest is in investigating what other types of goods are 
valued in everyday care and the relations between these different goods.  
3. Constructive handling of everyday dilemmas. In the introductory narrative, the 
principle-based approach creates a dilemma that is difficult to resolve in 
practice. The question of whether to lock the doors beco
autonomy/individual freedom. Yet it becomes clear that allowing for individual 
freedom is also highly problematic, as it leads to neglect (or failure to provide 
necessary care). A central concern of this thesis is to investigate and make 
visible how these dilemmas are overcome in practice.
15
4. A constructive understanding of technology. Throughout my years of working 
with issues of technology and care I have been struck by the tendency to treat
studying technology as negotiable and different depending on the context.
 interested in exploring the role 
 in 
s
nd
shows
r
nes a future where care is ‘cost-efficient’, ‘individual’, ‘home-like’ and ‘private’. 
technology as an issue that people are either ‘for’ or ‘against’. The question for 
me is how to approach, understand and handle technology in a more 
constructive manner, without having to choose one or the other. This means 
It is as a result of these concerns that I am
technologies play in dementia care, and to investigate how good care is constituted
everyday care practice.
1.2: The organization of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, including this introductory chapter. While 
chapter two presents and discusses the theoretical tools and resources used in this 
thesis, chapter three gives an account of the methods I have used. Chapters four to 
eight empirically and thematically explore and analyse issues of dementia care. 
Chapter four describes how smart home technology emerged in dementia care in 
Norway as ‘part-and-parcel’ of the care flat as a new and non-institutional care arena. 
Since an important aim is to portray the context in which the new technologies 
emerged, policy documents, government reports, and other relevant written material 
are drawn into the analysis.  The starting point of this investigation is the assumption
that smart home technology is not a neutral entity but comes with a social agenda a
a scenario for a new future. The question then arises: What is this future is that is 
written into the new technology? And, following on from this: What are the roles a
relations of the different actors involved in the imagined future? The analysis 
that this is a future where the number of people above the age of 80 is expected to 
increase sharply, with the availability of carers remaining at today’s level. The result 
is a care crisis as current care services will collapse. Smart home technology is 
introduced as a new actor to care, as a solution to the projected care crisis.
This technology is further analysed as it was constructed at the Tjeldveien care flat, 
the first ‘real life’ smart home in dementia care in Norway. Through the analysis, fou
different aspects of the scenario are specified. The argument is that Tjeldveien care
flat defi
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Further, and through the mobilization of the notion of ‘script’, the Tjeldveien care 
is analyzed as to what specific patient roles, carers and care relations it defines. In 
my analysis I have paid particular attention to the tension between these propose
roles.
Further, in chapter five, the assumptions and positions on technology of current 
policy on technology and care are analysed and compared with empirical studies of 
dementia care practices. The analysis shows that current health-care policy and 
debate is dominated by a deterministic understanding of technology. Technology is 
seen as a given entity that works on society, and as separate from, and potentially in 
opposition to, human care. The use of technology in care is hence framed as an 
issue of control, as a question of how to secure that technology is used in the right 
way, in order to ensure good care. However, empirical data based on fieldwork 
(observations and interviews) demonstrates that technology is inseparable from care. 
flat
d
Technology and care work together in a mutual relationship, where the different 
t is 
d
 process. However, the best 
entities influence and shape each other in specific ways. Further, the specific 
constellation of humans and technology enact different values. The crucial poin
that the issue of how technology relates to care is situated, context dependent an
empirical.
Chapter six and seven use this empirical approach to address normative questions 
and issues. The key questions are: What is good dementia care and how is it 
achieved? Drawing on fieldwork observing dementia care practices the focus of 
chapter six is on demonstrating how care can be understood as an ongoing and 
creative process of trying out different care arrangements. This process is ethical in 
the sense that a number of values are involved. The argument is that good care is 
about the constant work of weighing and balancing the different values, with an aim 
of sustaining the person. And that this is often an implicit
arrangements for sustaining the person are not given but needs to be decided in 
context. This means that good care is not a rational process with a given hierarchy of 
goods. Instead, whether or not care is good depends on the actual (in the meaning
embodied or lived) situation or context. 
Chapter seven, building on the insights of chapter six, addresses issues of how the 
person is sustained in everyday dementia care practice. Here, and again drawing on 
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empirical data from fieldwork, five different tactics of good care are identified 
analyzed.  The argument is that carers constantly alternate between
and
 the different 
as dynamic and situated. This means that the carers need to be extremely flexible, as 
ey handle a constantly shifting set of tactics. In this way, I will argue, good 
with a strong prescriptive ethics. 
guments of this thesis and then moves on 
to discuss, very briefly, the implications of this knowledge for policy and practice. 
tactics in order to sustain the person. Further, in this process different realities and 
relations are mobilized. The implication is an understanding of good dementia care 
th
dementia care is hardly consistent 
Finally, chapter eight sums up the main ar
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Chapter 2
Theoretical tools and resources
2.1: Introduction 
In addressing issues of technology and good care, this thesis draws on a body of 
work from the academic field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), which 
incorporates several different approaches in studying the relationship between 
science, technology and society. In this chapter I will give a concentrated and 
selective account of the field, highlighting particular issues and concepts that I will 
develop and use in the chapters to come. 
The first part of this chapter provides a brief introduction to STS, focusing on shared 
assumptions and the context of its emergence. In addition I introduce the notion of 
‘practice’, which is central to this thesis. Part two specifically addresses issues of 
technology. The focus is on how to approach and think about technology as open 
and negotiable rather than given and fixed, as well as how to conceptualize the 
constitution of technology and care.
The analysis is developed further in part three, which introduces and discusses 
theoretical tools and resources drawn from Actor Network Theory (ANT). First a 
relational understanding of technology and care is proposed based on the 
understanding of agency as a relational effect. Agency is, then, not limited to human 
actors. This notion of ‘non-human agency’ opens up a new set of issues and 
questions in relation to the understanding of technology and care, as the role of the 
material context is moved into the foreground of attention. A further issue is how to 
understand the relationship between technology and human relations. If technology is 
19
open and negotiable, how then is it possible to conceptualize the obduracy of 
objects?
An important focus of this thesis is how to deal with complexity in everyday care 
practices. This concern is closely linked to the issue of normativity and ethics. The 
question is how to study good care, not as something that is pre-determined or given, 
but as an outcome of specific constellations of humans and technologies. And 
further; what are the implications for policy and everyday care practice that there 
seems to be many and possibly conflicting goods in dementia care? These 
questions, which raise issues of politics and intervention, are concerns that have 
influenced my choice of theoretical tools and resources.
PART I: THE STS FIELD 
In this section I will give a brief and selective introduction to STS. The aim is to give 
an overview and context for the more in-depth presentations and discussions of 
theoretical tools and resources in sections two and three of this chapter.
2.2: A brief overview 
2.2.1: The STS field: shared assumptions
The various approaches within Science and Technology Studies have a common 
focus on the ‘seamless web’ of technology and society.11 As this metaphor 
expresses, science and technology are understood as inseparable parts of a tightly 
woven web of social, political, economic, legal and ethical relations. The argument is 
that science and technology are not privileged forms of rationality outside of or 
transcending the social and contextual, but social practices that are shaped by and 
entangled with the complexities that make up our societies. In order to best 
understand technological development, legal, political, economic and social aspects 
must be drawn in and considered.12 Thomas Hughes’ historical account of Thomas 
A. Edison’s development of electric lighting is one example of how, in this 
interdisciplinary field, the development and introduction of technological artefacts are 
                                           
11 Bijker et al, 1987: 10. 
12 Bijker et al. (1987); MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985/1999); Berg and Mol (1998); Mort (2002). 
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analysed as part of the complex web of the social.13 Hughes’ point is that the 
success of electric lighting was not solely a technological achievement, but a r
Edison’s ability to incorporate social, economic and legal aspects as well. In other 
words, electric lighting was not a fixed and immutable technology that was introduced 
into society. Instead it was inseparable from, and shaped by the needs, interests and 
limits of society. The argument is that technologies are never purely technical - and 
accordingly, the social never purely social. The term ‘sociotechnical’ was later 
introduced by Bruno Latour; a central figure in STS, in order to capture this 
heterogeneity of the social world.
esult of 
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This notion of the ‘seamless web’ implies a break with determinist understandings of 
technology. Technology is no longer treated as a ‘black-box’ or a predictable entity of 
which the inner workings and content have become naturalized or taken for 
granted.15 Technological development is thus not perceived not as a linear, stepwise 
and research-internal process, but as a complex, relational and heterogeneous 
process that may - and often does - take many different directions.16
Another common feature of the STS field is the understanding of knowledge, facts 
and technologies as produced, in contrast to the notion that knowledge and artefacts 
are determined by nature.17 Here it is useful to distinguish between two different 
schools of thought: the Edinburgh school and the Bath school.18 Both schools have 
influenced STS in important ways. However, their focuses and concerns differ 
slightly. The Edinburgh school sees social interests as the causes behind both true 
and false knowledge claims. These claims are understood as being socially shaped, 
since particular outcomes are held to benefit a certain individual or group. The focus 
13 1987. 
14 1987. Latour’s notion of the ‘sociotechnical’ closely resembles John Law’s notion of ‘material 
heterogeneity’ (Law, 1994: 2). 
15 Sismondo, 2004: 97. 
16 Bijker et al. (1987). 
17 Bijker et al, 1987: 3. 
18 The Edinburgh school is associated with (among others) David Bloor, Barry Barnes and Donald 
MacKenzie, while the Bath school is associated with Harry Collins, Trevor Pinch and Andrew Pickering 
(among others). 
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of enquiry is often scientific controversies with an emphasis on historical 
approaches.19
The Bath school, on the other hand, introduced the notion of science as ‘socially 
constructed’, with no assumptions of underlying social interests. Instead knowledge is 
seen as carefully managed and constructed through negotiations. The emphasis of 
the Bath school is on studies of knowledge, and more particularly on how knowledge 
is produced. This is done through micro/case-study based empirical studies of 
‘science-in-the-making’. The goal is to understand unfinished knowledge, rather than 
knowledge that had already been judged by history and become black-boxed.20
The argument is that the intellectual and political merit of STS lies in knowledge of 
details of the particular ways in which knowledge and technology is shaped or 
formed, and on the light these details throw on the nature of both society and of 
technology, in the particular outcomes that result and in the opportunities for action to
improve those outcomes.21 This empirical turn can also be seen as a movement 
away from a focus on explanations towards studies of how technologies take specific 
shapes. These studies were influenced by anthropological methods which implied a 
focus on local and provisional variations.22 The achievement of such studies, 
according to Bruno Latour, is a new relationship between historical detail and the 
grand picture.23
A third shared feature of the STS field is the emphasis on empirical case-studies in 
the form of ‘thick descriptions’ as a consequence of opening up science and 
technology studies to the methods and resources used by historians of technology.24
The use of empirical case-studies increased the awareness of situated change and 
local differences.25 This focus on local variations and local contexts marks a break 
                                           
19 Sismondo, 2004: 46. 
20 See for example Asdal et al., 2007: 14; Pickering (1992) and Latour (1987).  
21 MacKenzie and Wajcman; 1999: xvi (my emphasis). 
22 Latour (1988). 
23 Ibid: 174. For a more thorough account of my use of methods, see Chapter 3.  
24 Bijker et al., 1987: 7. 
25 Asdal et al., 2007: 19. 
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with the then dominant influences of technological philosophy and its theories of 
autonomous technology.26 And with the economic and social determinism of 
Industrial Sociology.27
2.2.2: The context of the emergence of STS
STS is a relatively new idiom that was first used towards the end of the 1980s. This 
section contains a brief, situated and partial account of the precursors to STS. In 
particular, I have chosen to focus this account on the influence of the Sociology of 
Science, and the later emerging Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and 
Radical Science (RS) movement. Other contiguous traditions, such as innovation 
studies are not included in this brief account.28
The Sociology of Science, one of the most important sources of inspiration for the 
later development of STS, is particularly associated with the work of Robert Merton 
(1910-2003). Merton was interested in the social organization of science and in how 
to achieve true or unbiased knowledge. According to Merton, scientific knowledge is 
distinct and separate from other kinds of (social) knowledge, as it is based on its own 
(internal) logic. Merton’s understanding of science was based on empiricist and
positivist assumptions implying that observations should be unbiased and 
representative, and that theories should be logical and consistent with one another 
and with observation.29
Merton was writing at a time when the regimes of Adolph Hitler (in Nazi Germany) 
and Joseph Stalin (in the former Soviet Union) tried to use science for political ends. 
During the 1930s and 1940s the propaganda of Nazism and Stalinism, under the 
auspices of totalitarian regimes, led to the killing of millions of people. Merton argued 
that the political agendas of totalitarian regimes were incompatible with scientists’ 
capacities for unbiased observation and critical thinking. The result of such 
interference was that science became distorted (or false). Merton’s argument was 
                                           
26 Such as the works of Winner (1977) and Ellul (1954/64).
27 Industrial Sociology is also known as Labour Process Studies. 
28 Other histories of the field have also been written that include these other traditions. See for 
example Edge (1995) and Enebakk (2005).
29 Law, 2005: 16. 
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that science needed protection from these distorting social and political influences.30
In other words, anything that interferes with science is illegitimate, as it detracts from 
the proper empirical and logical basis of truth. The key to Merton’s theory of the 
social structure of science lies in the ‘ethos of science’, the norms of behaviour that 
guide appropriate scientific practice.31 Norms are institutional imperatives, in that 
rewards are given to community members who follow them, and sanctions are 
applied to those who violate them.32 When these norms are in place, objective (or 
true) knowledge will be achieved. True science, then, is only entangled with logic, 
with facts, and with methods for determining the facts.33
By the end of the 1960s, scientism, or the belief in science as a neutral and privileged 
form of knowledge, was criticized and challenged from different positions. Out of this 
critique a radically relativistic and new Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) 
emerged, drawing on resources from history, sociology, philosophy and 
anthropology. SSK was primarily associated with the social science units at the 
Universities of Edinburgh and Bath, but similar groups were established at other 
universities and in other countries, including France, the Netherlands, Germany and 
the USA.34 This academic programme aimed at investigating and conceptualizing 
how science actually works and progresses - not in theory, but in practice. Thomas 
Kuhn’s work on the structure of scientific revolutions was a particularly important 
resource for this tradition.35
Kuhn challenged the then dominant ideas of science as an ongoing and progressive 
process of accumulating knowledge.36 Science does not accumulate knowledge in a 
linear manner, Kuhn argued, but moves instead from one more or less adequate 
                                           
30 Law, 2005: 16. 
31 Most important in this ethos are the four norms that Merton first described in the article ‘The 
Normative Structure of Science: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized 
scepticism’ (Merton, 1942).  See Sismondo, 2005: 20.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Law, 2005: 17. 
34 Asdal et al., 2007: 13. 
35 Kuhn (1962). 
36 Sismondo, 2004: 7. 
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paradigm to another.37 The implication is that science is perceived not as tracking the 
truth, but as creating different partial views that can be considered to contain truth 
only to people who hold these views.38
Within SSK, Kuhn’s work was used as a basis for understanding science and 
scientific knowledge as a culture that is shaped by social and economic interests. In 
this way SSK sought to provide an alternative and scientific critique of positivism and 
scientism.39 It was in this context that ‘the strong programme’ was developed, in 
which the principle of symmetry was central.40 The symmetry principle stated that not 
only scientific successes should be investigated, but also failures; and - just as 
important - this should be done using the same methods, terms and analyses. The 
argument is that both successes and failures are social products, generated by the 
same kinds of factors. Thus the principle of symmetry represents a break with the 
idea that only false scientific knowledge needs sociological explanations. This is 
because truth does not inhere in knowledge, but is instead seen as attributed.41
Taking a symmetrical approach makes it possible to study how the distinction 
between dualisms such as true and false knowledge are constructed and used in the 
first place.42 However, the principle of symmetry has also been criticized from various 
positions, first of all because it is seen to adhere to a radical form of relativism.43
Since all claims of truth are treated as equally problematic, SSK has been criticized 
for epistemological relativism. And for being prevented by these theoretical 
commitments from problematizing issues of power and politics.44
SSK research has also been criticized by the ‘French school’ within SSK for 
swapping a natural realism with a social realism, as they start from a closed definition 
                                           
37 Ibid: 14. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid: 8. 
40 David Bloor, 1976. 
41 Law, 1994: 10 (my emphasis). 
42 Ibid. 
43 See for example Enebakk (2005). 
44 Moser, 2003: 172. 
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of the social and then use this repertoire as an explanation of nature.45 Such studies, 
Michel Callon and Bruno Latour argue, put the social sciences in a privileged position 
and naturalize the social by withdrawing it from further investigation.46 According to 
Callon and Latour, the result of such studies is another form of privileged knowledge 
that is no better than its opposite; scientism.47
Another important source of inspiration for the STS field was the Radical Science
(RS) movement. Like SSK, RS criticized the belief in science as a privileged and 
neutral form of knowledge. However, RS, drawing on Marxist resources, focused on 
understanding the underlying political, economical and social forces that shape the 
development of science and technology.48 The political and social context was one of 
growing concern with how science and technology was involved in war, conflict and 
oppression. Science was seen as a tool in the hands of the powerful that was used to 
reproduce existing power structures, institutions and social relations. The use of 
napalm, a flammable substance developed at American universities and used by the 
US forces against civilians in the Vietnam War, was one such controversial issue that 
undermined confidence in science as a neutral and progressive force. Another 
example was the detection of DDT and other pesticides in the food chain.49
According to RS, the liberating potential of scientific rationality will be inhibited until 
the capitalist system is replaced by a new and primarily socialist system, with 
different values and social relations.50 SSK’s stance on symmetry was rejected and 
criticized by the RS movement on the basis of the relativism that it entailed. The 
focus of RS was macro-studies of class and race. The aim was to achieve better 
                                           
45 Callon and Latour (1992). The ‘French school’ refers to a radical form of constructivism which is first 
of all associated with Madeline Akrich, Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law. This school, which 
influenced what was to become Actor Network Theory, argued for extending the principle of symmetry 
to include everything. By deconstructing social science’s own categories, all knowledge claims are 
treated equally and explained using the same terms (Law, 1994: 9-12; Asdal et al., 2001: 27).     
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Asdal et al., 2001: 14. 
49 Asdal et al., 2001: 15. 
50 Ibid. 
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science by taking the position of the weaker part, such as workers and ethnic 
minorities, and producing knowledge in their interest. 
Feminist studies are a third source of inspiration for the STS-field.51 Like the RS 
movement, science and technology were seen as biased, as serving men and the 
powerful’s interests by legitimizing a system where women are oppressed and 
exploited. The question was how feminists could contribute with a new and different 
knowledge. One of the strategies was to bring forward their repressed voices elicit 
the knowledge from women’s lives and experiences.52
According to STS scholar David Edge, the SSK tradition represented the most 
important resource for the emergent STS field:
The scholarly thrust that it represents has helped to shape and mould many 
subsequent fruitful innovations: micro-scale ethnographic studies of laboratory 
practice; the analysis of scientific rhetoric and technical discourse (…) . All of 
this can be seen as stemming from SSK’s initial urgings.53
However, other authors argue that there is a risk of overfocusing on SSK’s influence. 
They point out that although SSK has mapped out many of the premises for STS by 
opening up the field in new ways, all along there have been strong undercurrents and 
critics that have shaped the directions of the field.54
 Having given a brief and partial account of the context of the STS field, I would like 
to introduce the notion of ‘practice’. The notion of ‘practice’ is an important concept in 
most of the different approaches accommodated within the STS field. As ‘attending to 
practices’ is a core issue of this thesis, the notion of ‘practice’ forms a basis for my 
arguments.
                                           
51 This influence of feminism on STS is contested from different positions. See for example Ingunn 
Moser, 2007: pp 329-349. 
52 Sandra Harding and Cynthia Cockburn’s work are two examples feminist work that can be seen to 
have influenced what was to become the STS field. See for example Harding (1986/1991) and 
Cockburn (1985/1999).  
53 Edge, 1995: 7. 
54 Asdal et al., 2001: 30. 
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2.2.3: Reality as constituted through practice
The notion of ‘practice’ comes from and is central to various backgrounds and 
approaches, including ethnomethodology, anthropology, Foucauldian work and 
symbolic interactionism.55 The argument is that social life and realities, their ordering 
and the knowledge and representations of them are constituted in and through 
practice.56 One example of how realities are constituted in and through practices is 
given by Cynthia Cockburn in her study of male power and the dominance of the 
compositors in the UK printing industry.57 Cockburn’s study offers important insights 
into how material practices, such as the appropriation of muscle, capability, tools and 
machinery by men, are an important source of women’s subordination. Indeed, 
Cockburn emphasizes, these practices are part of the process by which females are 
constituted as women.58
In her analysis, Cockburn distinguishes between two different kinds of practices, the 
socio-material and the physical, and shows how the accumulation of bodily 
capacities, the definition of tasks to match them, and the selective design of tools and 
machines converged in such a way as to constitute men as capable and women as 
inadequate.59 In the story of the compositors, the socio-material practices emerged in 
the shape of trade unions and their interests and strategies. Cockburn shows how the 
trade unions deployed all the material and ideological tactics they could muster in 
resistance to the initiatives of capital, and capitals efforts to introduce new technology 
and cheap labour, including women. This was accomplished primarily by limiting 
access to the composing process and its equipment. Cockburn’s argument is that 
men’s socio-political power enabled them to extend their physical capabilities to 
control of the composing process, with the result that women’s participation in 
composing work was kept to a minimum.60
                                           
55 Moser, 2003: 47. 
56 Ibid. 
57 1985/1999. 
58 Cockburn, 1999: 181. 
59 Ibid: 190. 
60 Ibid: 185. 
28
The article provides important insights into sex-gender relations by showing how men 
dominate women within and outside both family-relations and economic production, 
by a combination of material and ideological means.61 Moreover, the study 
exemplifies how a reality and relations are brought into being and are sustained in 
day-to-day material practices.
Another important article is Susan Leigh Star’s study ‘Power, technology and the 
phenomenology of conventions. On being allergic to onions’.62 In this article Leigh 
Star criticizes STS for its tendency to take the position of the executive (or the 
powerful) in producing accounts of reality. These studies shed light on the world from 
the side of the powerful. As the focus is on the powerful actors’ efforts to build 
positions of power, much of the work is attributed to the central figure and the amount 
of invisible work that is done to maintain and stabilize these positions is not 
acknowledged.63 Leigh Star studies this process of position-building from below, from 
the location of the marginalized. Her point is that we all have different positions in 
different settings. However, it is not given in the ‘order of things’ which positions are 
strong and which are weak. From the vantage point of the weak it is possible to see 
better how different positions of power work, Leigh Star argues. The important lesson 
is that ‘it might have been otherwise’.64
The understanding of reality as constituted in and through practice is of central 
importance for my studies of technology and dementia care, first of all as it 
emphasizes the effort, the doing involved in constituting dementia care. In dementia 
care much of this doing tends to become invisible, as it is often not articulated and 
acknowledged in discourses on care. Secondly, the notion of practice as a material 
heterogeneous accomplishment stresses the importance of ‘things’ (or non-humans) 
in the process of reality production.65 Dementia care is constituted and sustained 
through (often mundane) everyday practices, and these practices are always 
                                           
61 Ibid: 194. 
62 1991.
63 Ibid: 29. 
64 Ibid: 38. 
65 The notion of ‘non-humans’ will be discussed in pt. 2.4.2. 
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material. So this thesis, which attends to practices, is an empirical study of how good 
care is made in everyday creative care practices.
PART II: THEORETICAL RESOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING AND DEALING 
WITH TECHNOLOGY 
In the early to mid 1980s there was a shift within SSK and RS from a preoccupation 
with science and knowledge production towards an increased interest in technology. 
This ‘turn to technology’ is associated with the development of different approaches 
to studies of technosocial change. In the following I will give a brief account of these 
developments. The account serves first of all as a context and background for my 
development and use of the notion of ‘mutual shaping’ as a way of understanding 
and conceptualizing the mutual constitution of technology and human care.
2.3: From Social Constructions to Actor Networks 
Bijker et al.’s 1987 book ‘The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology’ introduces three different 
approaches to studies of sociotechnical change.66 These three approaches were: 
Large Technical Systems (LTS), Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT). For reasons of convenience, I have chosen to use the 
divisions that were made in this book in this brief overview of the STS field. 
First I will briefly describe the LTS and SCOT approaches, distinguishing between the 
‘Bath-school’ dominated SCOT-approach and the ‘social shaping’ approach that is 
more closely linked to the ‘Edinburgh-school’. I will then move on to introduce the 
notion of ‘mutual shaping’ as a central concept in this thesis.  
ANT will be dealt with in greater detail in Part three of this chapter, as it has been the 
major source of inspiration and influence for my understanding and work on the 
issues of technology and dementia care. 
2.3.1: Large Technical Systems (LTS)
The LTS approach is first of all associated with Thomas Hughes, a historian of 
technology. Hughes studied the development of different technological systems at 
                                           
66 Bijker et al., 1987. Another very influential book at the time that describes this shift is ‘The social 
shaping of technology’ (MacKenzie and Wajcman (eds.), 1985/1999). 
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the turn of the twentieth century in the USA. At this time several new inventions were 
developed into larger technical systems, including Bell and the development of the 
telephone as well as Edison and the electric lighting. Hughes’ argument is that these 
technologies need to be understood in terms of a systems metaphor, as 
technological systems.67 The point is that technologies encompasses not only the 
technological artefact as such, but also the inventor, the laboratory and the society. 
For example, the technological systems that made it possible to develop the 
telephone (or electric lighting) consist of a number of artefacts, organizations (such 
as industrial companies and financial institutions or banks), research organizations, 
government authorities, legal regulations and natural resources. The reality of 
technological development is in fact one of messy complexity.68
Thomas Hughes and the LTS approach are accredited with the notion of the 
‘seamless web’. This metaphor of ‘the seamless web’ is important in my studies as it 
emphasizes the thorough entanglement of dementia care. Another important 
contribution of the LTS approach is a focus on materiality and the material context.
2.3.2: Social Construction of Technology (SCOT)
The SCOT approach was developed by Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch in the early to 
mid 1980s, by extending recent work in SSK to the case of technology.69 As SSK 
analysed the content of scientific knowledge, and treated knowledge as socially 
constructed, the SCOT approach analysed not only the uses of technology, but also 
the content and the formation of technology.70
Bijker and Pinch adapted SSK’s ‘empirical programme of relativism’ and focused on 
the same three stages of explanation. These stages were ‘interpretative flexibility’, 
which showed how scientific facts (or technology) are open to various interpretations, 
‘emergence and closure’, which showed how scientific facts (or technology) were 
stabilized or closed, and, thirdly, showing how this related to the ‘wider social milieu’. 
                                           
67 Hughes (1987).  
68 Bijker et al, 1987: 11. 
69 Ibid: 1. 
70 SCOT is first of all associated with the Bath school of SSK, stressing the social construction of facts 
and artefacts. 
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Bijker and Pinch applied these principles to a series of empirical studies. One 
example was their study of the bicycle. The study showed how the different actors 
that were involved participated in the negotiations and controversies around what 
was to become the bicycle. Technologies are not given or pre-determined, but result 
from negotiations, hence interpretative flexibility. The argument is that technologies 
move through a process from being open and flexible to become ‘closed’ and fixed or 
stabilized.   
In addition to this stance against technological determinism, Bijker and Pinch’s 
contribution is important for providing intellectual resources and tools for opening up 
and investigating how the social is part of technological development. However, the 
SCOT approach has been criticized by Marxist and Feminist sources for its lack of 
attention to issues of power. Issues such as conflict between groups, structures of 
power and consequences of different technological choices for the distribution of 
power in society, are not addressed.71 Yet it is important to note that the SCOT 
approach has changed during the past twenty years, first of all through exchange and 
close dialogue with the other approaches that make up the STS field.72
2.3.3: Social shaping of technology
The social shaping approach, which grew out of studies of technological development 
and work processes in the mid 1980s, is mainly associated with the ‘Edinburgh-
school’. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, both closely identified with the social 
shaping approach, co-edited of the book ‘The social shaping of technology’.73 Like 
SCOT, this approach represents a break with the dominant deterministic 
perspectives on technology, in particular with the structural determinism of industrial 
sociology, and its one-sided focus on technology as having effects (or impacts) on 
society. The point made by MacKenzie and Wajcman is that technology not only 
shapes society but is itself shaped by society.74 Hence the focus of enquiry should 
also be directed at studies of how social interests and values are built into 
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technology, which is seen to incorporate political agendas. The aim of studies is to 
define possibilities for influencing the technological developments and their social 
consequences in order to intervene in the design and shaping of the technology 
before it becomes closed and stabilized. This insight is achieved through historical 
and empirical micro-orientated case studies, for example through detailed studies of 
local variations and differences in how a technology achieved specific shapes and 
consequences in various contexts.75 In this way the social shaping approach 
addresses issues and relations of power. 
This focus on social interests and issues of power separates the social shaping 
approach from social constructivism (SCOT). The SCOT approach did not address 
issues of underlying power relations or socio-economic dynamics that may limit the 
available choices and flexibility of technological development. These, and other 
issues related to the wider social context of technological development, are of central 
importance within the social shaping approach.76
This sensitivity to issues of power is of key importance to my investigations into smart 
home technology and the context of dementia care. The social shaping approach has 
been important for my work in two distinct ways. On the one hand it has given me 
insight into the openness and flexibility of technological development through its 
emphasis on the context of technological development. And further, it has provided 
tools and resources for exploring how the values and interests that are built into 
technologies, which in the next instance have consequences.     
2.3.4: The mutual shaping of technology and care 
A prime concern of this thesis is to conceptualize the mutual constitution of 
technology and social relations. This is an aspect that the original notion of ‘social 
shaping’ neglects, according to MacKenzie and Wajcman.77 The point is that smart 
home technology is not only shaped and formed by human care, human care is also 
formed by this technology. The question is how this mutual constitution of technology 
and care can be conceptualized.
                                           
75 Asdal et al, 2001: 21. 
76 MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999: 22. 
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This issue is pivotal in my work. One concept that was considered but later rejected 
was the notion of ‘co-production’. Co-production is a term used by STS scholars such 
as Hans Harbers to conceptualize how the external and internal; science, technology 
and society, develop together.78 Science and technology is understood neither as 
given outside society nor as socially constructed. Rather, it is co-produced with the 
social and the cultural, in the same historical processes, Harbers argues.79 The 
emphasis is on one process of construction, as a process with a stable outcome. 
In addressing the question of the mutual constitution of technology and care 
however, the notion of co-production is problematic, as it pre-determines a distinction 
between human care and technology. This makes it difficult to conceptualize or 
explain their mutual constitution without diverting to the categories of technology and 
human care. In order to avoid these associations, I use the term ‘mutual shaping’ of 
technology and care. The term ‘mutual shaping’ emphasizes the conception of 
technology and care as an intertwined phenomenon. My use of the term is inspired 
by Anne-Jorunn Berg, who uses ‘mutual shaping’ to conceptualize the relations 
between technology and gender.80 This means that technology and care, like 
technology and gender, can be understood as a mutual relationship that is woven 
together in and through everyday practices. This use of ‘mutual shaping’ has close 
connotations to the notion of the ‘seamless web’; i.e., an understanding  of 
technology and science as inseparable parts of a tightly woven web of social, 
political, legal and economic relations.81
The notion of ‘mutual shaping’ gives rise to different answers to the question of who 
acts in this process of mutual constitution, and – going one step further – to the 
question of what is meant by action and agency.82 Within SCOT and the social 
shaping approach, technology is mostly treated as an instrument in human hands, 
                                                                                                                                       
77 MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999: 23. 
78 Harbers (2005). The notion of ‘co-production’ was developed by Sheila Jasanoff in co-operation with 
Brian Wynne. See Wynne (1996) and Jasanoff (2004). 
79 Harbers, 2005: 13. 
80 1996: 2. 
81 Hughes (1987). 
82 Harbers, 2005: 14. 
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and is conceptualized as dependent on human goals, intentions, interests, or power 
relations. At the same time, and in close dialogue with these traditions, a material 
semiotic approach to science and technology studies developed, called Actor-
Network-Theory (ANT). 
As ANT has been a major source of inspiration and influence for my understanding of 
and approach to the issues of this thesis, this approach will be dealt with in greater 
detail than the other approaches within the STS field. 
PART III: ACTOR NETWORK THEORY (ANT) 
In the following, I will give a selective overview of ANT, highlighting in particular the 
concepts and resources that will be expanded on and developed in the chapters to 
come. I have chosen to organize the account into four sections. First, I introduce ANT 
as a relational approach, emphasizing its semiotic influence and understanding of 
reality as effects of specific (material) relations rather than as pre-determined or 
stable categories. I then go on to discuss the notion of ‘agency’ that this thesis is 
based upon. In the second section, under the heading ‘early ANT’, my focus is 
specifically on technology studies. Here I introduce the notion of ‘scenario’ as a tool 
to conceptualize the socio-political context in which new technologies emerge. The 
scenario is further specified through the mobilization of the notion of ‘script’.    
I then move on to account for ‘recent ANT’ with a focus on issues of complexity and 
multiplicity. First I introduce the notion of ‘enactment’ which maintains that realities 
are enacted in and through practices. I then discuss the notion of ‘arrangements’ 
which is a central concept in this thesis. Further, I address the issue of coherence 
and order by drawing in the notion of ‘modes of ordering’.  
The final section addresses issues of normativity, politics and intervention. Here the 
term ‘empirical ethics’ is introduced as it provides a framework for dealing with issues 
of normativity and ethics from within practices. Further, the notion of ‘articulation’ is 
mobilized, as a tool to bring to light the significance of everyday care practices.
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 2.4: General concepts and theoretical resources 
2.4.1: A relational approach
ANT draws on semiotic resources. Semiotics, which comes from linguistics, treats 
meaning as an effect of relations between signs.83 These signs have no meaning 
outside their relation to other terms or signs, or the structure of the text or the 
communication as a whole. ANT extends this relationality of semiotic linguistics 
beyond language, discourses, texts and signs to other entities.84 In particular, the 
materiality of relations is stressed. ANT represents a material semiotics in which 
facts, nature and objects are not treated as fixed or ‘given’ entities outside culture or 
society. Instead they are understood as effects of interactions, relations and order-
building.85
The development of early ANT is most closely associated with Madeleine Akrich, 
Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law.86 Michel Callon’s ‘Domestication of the 
Scallops and the Fishermen at Saint Brieuc Bay’ is one important example of how 
nature is studied as a relational effect.87 Callon’s contribution is a case study of a 
scientific controversy regarding why the population of scallops was reduced in Saint 
Brieuc Bay in France. In this study he demonstrates how different actors such as 
researchers, fishermen, fishermen’s organizations and scallops get enrolled in a 
network of connections and oppose enemy forces that threaten these alliances. This 
network is stabilized through a process of translation, where central actors, including 
the team of researchers engage to translate the other allied actors’ aims, interests, 
identities and possibilities of action into their own. The study shows how this process 
of translation gives the researchers a privileged position in the network. Reality is, 
Callon argues, a result of such activities of building networks of alliances, tough 
negotiations, persuasions and translation. 
                                           
83 Moser, 2003: 26. 
84 And a number of other post-structuralist semiotics as developed by Michel Foucault. 
85 Moser, 2003: 26-27. 
86 Asdal et al, 2007: 23. 
87 Callon (1986). Other important work is Latour’s study of the Pasteurization of French agriculture 
(1988), and his work on ‘non-modernity’ (1993). 
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In order to gain new knowledge about scallops, the researchers needed to mobilize 
both nature and society. They needed to build a network where the fishermen and 
the scallops could become allies, with common interests and goals. The study 
reveals, however, that this network collapsed in the end. This was first of all due to 
the scallops refusing to play the part assigned to them: to anchor themselves. And, in 
time, as the fishermen would no longer wait with harvesting, this caused the network 
to collapse. 
Callon’s study is an important illustration of how different entities are produced and 
maintained through continuous processes of translation and transformations in 
networks of connections. John Law characterizes these complex processes of 
translation and transformation as ‘heterogeneous engineering’.88 Laws argument is 
that these processes are materially heterogeneous in character; i.e., they involve the 
simultaneous shaping of the material and the social world.89 But, the question 
remains: if reality, facts and technologies are relational effects and have no status 
outside their own continued production, how then do objects, artefacts and 
technological practices stay in place? And why do they take the form and shape that 
they do?90 The point made by Law is that the form and stability of technologies are 
seen as a function of the interaction of heterogeneous elements, as these are 
shaped, assimilated and fixed in place in a network.91
2.4.2: Agency
Drawing on its semiotic resources, ANT extends the principle of symmetry into 
ontology, into what there is.92 This radical extension of the principle of symmetry 
means that everything deserves explanation and, more particularly, to be approached 
in the same terms.93 “What there is and how it is divided up should not be assumed 
                                           
88 Law, 1987: 113. 
89 See also Sismondo, 2004:59.  
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91 Law, 1987: 113. See also Latour (1988a). 
92 Law, 2004: 102. 
93 Law, 1994: 9-10. 
37
beforehand”, Law points out.94 This means that agency is not seen as an inherently 
human capacity. Instead “actors are entities, humans or otherwise, that happen to 
act. They are not given, but ... emerge in relations”, Law maintains.95 The argument 
is that an agent is a patterned network of heterogeneous relations or an effect 
produced by such a network.96 This means that humans, technology and nature can 
all be elements in materially heterogeneous networks, and have the role of actor.97 A 
technology or a text is a heterogeneous network that participates in the social. What 
counts as a person is similarly seen as an effect generated by a network of 
heterogeneous, interacting materials. In this way ANT refuses to make distinctions in 
kind between humans and human agency on the one hand, and objects on the 
other.98 This is where ANT parts with traditional sociological approaches.
This refusal to make a priori distinctions between human and non-human agency has 
caused ANT to be accused of playing the game of ‘epistemological chicken’.99 In 
their response to these accusations, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour point out:
                                           
We have never wished to accept the (…) very distinction between what is 
natural and what is social and the fixed allocation of ontological status that 
goes with it. We have never been interested in giving a social explanation of 
anything, but we want to explain society, of which the things, facts and 
artefacts, are major components. (…) Our general symmetry principle is thus 
not to alternate between natural realism and social realism, but to obtain 
nature and society as twin results of another activity, one that is more 
interesting for us. We call it network-building (…) or material practice.100
For my studies of smart home technology and dementia care, the notion ‘non-human’ 
agency is important for several reasons. First of all, the very notion of ‘non-humans’ 
is important, signifying as it does a broad understanding of technology. This means 
that the focus is not just on the technological artefacts as such but on materialities,
94 Ibid. See also Akrich (1992a) and Callon (1986/1987). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Law, 1992: 3. 
97 Akrich (1992). 
98 Law, 1992: 2.  
99 See Collins and Yearly (1992). 
100 Callon and Latour, 1992: 348-349. 
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and that the material context is moved into the foreground of attention. In my studies 
of dementia care, it became apparent that a range of materialities, such as beds, 
locks, alarm cords and the shape of buildings were central actors in shaping care. 
Consequently, attention was shifted from one artefact (smart home technology) to a 
material context that has been more or less taken for granted.  By allowing me to 
explore how these materialities are actors in the process of shaping care, the notion 
of ‘non-human’ agency has opened up for important new insights and 
understandings.
In addition, and as a consequence, the notion of ‘non-human’ agency is important as 
it shows that technologies are not just an object ‘in and of themselves’. Instead 
technologies are understood as practices that involves objects. This understanding of 
technology implies a radical shift away from a focus on technology ‘in and by itself’ 
towards its uses in practices or action. 
2.5: Early ANT: studies of the construction of facts and technologies 
Early ANT was concerned with the construction of scientific facts, technologies and 
objects. The aim of these studies was to show that facts, nature and technologies are 
not given in the order of things, but are instead collective or social entities that 
emerge in and through relations.101 The issue of power was addressed by 
investigating how the introduction of new facts, objects and technologies produces, 
shifts, structures and stabilizes power relations.102 These early studies explained how 
science made some actors big and strong, by mobilizing non-human and human 
allies, and through distribution and delegation of agency and force into more durable 
materials.103
2.5.1: Scenarios
One example of early ANT work that particularly addresses issues of how social 
aspects and power are built into technologies is Michel Callon’s study of the 
development and introduction of an electric car (VEL) in France during the late 1960s 
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and early 1970s.104 In this study Callon shows how the development of the VEL 
involved the construction of a ‘scenario’ that defined not only the technoscientific 
issues to be solved, but also social, economic and political considerations. This 
heterogeneity and complexity is present not only at the end of the innovation process, 
Callon argues, but is a characteristic of the whole process.105 In a series of 
publications the engineers working on the VEL project determined not only the 
precise characteristics of the vehicle they wished to promote, but also the social 
universe in which the vehicle would function, by predicting the disappearance of the 
internal combustion engine, and the rise of electrochemical generators, and by 
ignoring traditional costumers so as to satisfy users who had new demands.106 These 
scenarios defined not only the social and technical history, but also the new roles and 
positions of the other actors involved. Within the VEL scenario, for example, Renault 
was assigned a different role in French society. It was expected to mobilize its 
expertise from the production of traditional automobiles to assemble the chassis and 
make car bodies.107 Callon’s argument is that all new technologies come with these 
kinds of scenarios that define and assign new roles and positions to different actors. 
A heterogeneous actor-network is built. The particular actor-network of the VEL 
project involved not only humans but also accumulators, fuel cells, electrodes, 
electrons, catalysts and electrolytes.108
But what was the future of the automobile in France in the 1970s? As pointed out by 
Callon, the bottom line for the engineers involved in the VEL project was to be right:
to be able to prove by the commercial success of their innovation that French society 
was evolving the way it claimed it was.109 For three years, the engineers involved in 
the VEL project believed that they were right, Callon tells us, until things slowly 
started to go wrong. First the catalysts refused to play their part in the scenario 
prepared by the VEL-project engineers, and as a consequence the potential mass 
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market disappeared virtually overnight.110  At the same time, Renault was successful 
in establishing an alternative scenario for the future of the automobile in France. The 
tables were turned. 
These studies can be seen as typical examples of early ANT: Geared towards 
studying the productivity of science and technology, these studies focused on 
strategic actors and the building up and stabilization (or collapse) of networks.111 This 
early work of ANT has been criticized, particularly by feminists, for being too 
managerial and Machiavellian.112 The focus of the studies was on strong - often male 
– actors who were at the centre of the networks. ANT was accused of seeing the 
world only from the side of the powerful, and of helping to legitimize their power.113
This early work of Callon, and in particular the insights and tools provided in the study 
of the VEL-project, has been important for this thesis. The understanding of new 
technologies as coming with a ‘scenario’ is significant, as it gives me an analytical 
tool for exploring the socio-political context in which both the care homes (as a new 
arena of dementia care) and the smart home technology were developed and 
introduced. The argument is that these technologies are not neutral tools or 
instruments that are applied to dementia care; they are in fact political entities. 
It is important to note that in drawing on this work from early ANT I use these 
resources differently from Callon in his study of the VEL project. First of all, my focus 
is not on ‘management’ or the study of powerful actors. Instead I have mobilized 
these resources in a new context: into studies of everyday care, and focusing on 
other, less powerful actors. 
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2.5.1: Scripts
In a similar vein the notion of ‘scripts’ was developed by Madeleine Akrich as a tool to 
conceptionalize how the social is ‘written into’ technology:114
{W}hen technologists define the characteristics of their objects, they 
necessarily make hypotheses about the entities that make up the world into 
which the object is to be inserted. Designers thus define actors with specific 
tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, 
and they assume that morality, technology, science, and economy will evolve 
in particular ways. A large part of the work of innovators is that of ‘inscribing’ 
this vision of the world in the technical content of the new object. I will call the 
end product of this work a ‘script’.115
Akrich uses the analogy of a film script to conceptualize how the script defines who 
the actors are, the actors’ roles and responsibilities, the distribution of tasks and the 
different actors’ needs and interests.116 Importantly, the presumptions are not only 
about the individual character of the different actors, but also about the environment 
in which the technology will be used.117 The analogy to the film metaphor is useful, 
Akrich argues, because it shows that technological scripts, like film scripts, are not 
static but leave a margin of freedom to those who use the technology.118 A script may 
also change during implementation. For example, the actors may not accept the roles 
that are assigned for them by the script. In chapter five (‘Technology and dementia 
care’), I will present an example of how a technological script was changed that 
illustrates the existence of mechanisms of adjustment and negotiation between the 
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user as imagined by the designer and the real user.119 The user interacts with the 
pre-inscribed, but not ready-made artefact in a relationship that can be characterized 
as a dialogue.120
 Akrich studied how the scripts are negotiated and translated when a technology 
travels from one context to another. One such study was on the transfer of a 
briquette machine from Sweden to Nicaragua.121 Her argument is that a technology 
is no longer the same when it is moved into another context, because the 
connections (or relations) – which are both technical and social – are new and 
different. In this study Akrich traces the negotiations that ensued when the 
sociotechnical relations around it started to change as new actors entered the scen
The ‘transfer’ of the briquette machine from Sweden to Nicaragua is thus a s
networks: of materially heterogeneous networks involving both human and non-
human actors. The argument is that these networks can be imagined as scripts that 
prescribe the roles the machine expects the other elements in the network to play.
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The work of Akrich sheds light on the effort and the work that is involved in buildin
and maintaining these networks. Networks are understood as processes or 
achievements, and not as relations or structures that are ‘given’ or finally stabiliz
the order of things. 
The notion of ‘scripts’ makes it possible to study how the technology influences (or 
attempts to influence) the behaviour of its users.123 A key issue is determining who 
the user of a given technology is. In the case of smart home technology in dementia 
care, it is often the carers that are the active users of the technology in the sense that 
the carers, at any given time, have an overview of which alarms are activated and are
able to intervene when necessary. The residents, on the other hand, are constitu
as passive users of the smart home technology, as the alarms are built into the 
119 Akrich (1993). This study is only available in French. However John Law has given a through 
analysis of the article in ‘Traduction/Trahesion: Notes on ANT’ (1997). My reference to this study is 
thus based on Law’s analysis.  
120 Berg, 1996: 38. 
121 Akrich (1993). 
122 Law (1997).  
123 Willems (unfinished). 
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infrastructure of the building and are activated automatically according to pre
criteria. As a result, the residents are often unaware of the existence of the 
technology.
-defined
125
n, and gave 
rise to valuable insights into the ambivalence of the new phenomenon.  
 an increased interest in 
126
’
nd dealing with complexity is a key 
issue in chapter six and seven in this thesis.
                                           
124 Further, the notion of ‘script’ is a useful tool for exploring issues of 
technology and values. The script makes visible values about how dementia care 
should be, thereby highlighting the normative aspects of technology. The issue of 
values and ethics is central to this thesis.
However, the notion of ‘script’ also has its limitations. In this thesis I investigate not 
merely a single artefact (or technology), but the more complex phenomenon ‘smart 
home technology in dementia care’. This phenomenon consists of a constellation of 
two different technologies: the care home and the smart home technology. As these 
two technologies come with separate and somewhat opposing scripts, performing a 
script analysis was demanding and difficult to handle in practice. However, doing so 
brought the tension between the two scripts to the forefront of my attentio
2.6: Recent ANT: a concern with issues of complexity and multiplicity 
In more recent ANT, the focus has changed from studying strategic network building 
towards dealing with issues of multiplicity and complexity. In addition there has been 
a shift in concern from the production of facts and objects to
issues of medicine/health-care, everyday life and users.
I have found this literature, which is inspired by feminist engagements with STS, 
useful for the tools it provided for thinking about and exploring issues of ‘difference
and ‘order’ in dementia care. Understanding a
124 I will explore these issues in chapter four of this thesis (‘The emergence of smart home technology 
in dementia care’). 
125 See in particular chapter six (‘Dementia care as creative ethics’) and chapter seven (‘Sustaining the 
person: Re/articulating multiple versions of good dementia care’). 
126 Annemarie Mol, a philosopher and ethnographer who has written extensively on matters of 
medicine and health-care, is a central figure in this shift. Other important names are Vicky Singleton, 
Ingunn Moser and Jeannette Pols. See for example (Mol 1998/2000/2008; Singleton 1998/2007; 
Moser 2003/2006; Pols, 2004). 
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2.6.1: Attending to practices: enactment 
This thesis is about attending to everyday dementia care practices. It is about how 
dementia care is done, focusing particularly on the ‘role’ smart home technology and 
other non-humans play in these practices and interactions. Building on the tools and 
resources I have already presented, I now move on to address the issue of practice 
more thoroughly. The question that arises is how to conceptualize what happens in 
the processes of reality-making. Drawing on the work of Annemarie Mol, I mobilize 
the notion of ‘enactment’.127
It is possible to say that in practices objects are enacted. This suggests that 
activities takes place – but leaves the actors vague. It also suggests that in the 
act, and only then and there, something is - being enacted.128
Following on from this, dementia care is, in my work, understood as being enacted - 
as being brought into being in a continuing process of production and re-production. 
In the words of John Law:
Enactment and practice never stop, and realities depend upon their continued 
crafting – perhaps by people, but more often (...) in a combination of people, 
techniques, texts, architectural arrangements, and natural phenomena.129
As practices are dynamic and unstable, so too are the realities that they create. 
However, as Ingunn Moser points out, this does not imply that everything flows and 
anything goes.130 Many things remain the same; they are enacted and re-enacted in 
the same way to the extent that they become naturalized and appear to be given.131
                                           
127 The notion of ’enactment’ is closely related to that of ’performance’, which is associated with the 
work of Judith Butler (1990). Judith Butler, a prominent American post-structuralist and philosopher, 
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2.6.2: From networks to arrangements
Compared to the metaphor of the actor-network that was used in early ANT work, the 
notion of enactment is considerably less fixed. Realities do not just evolve in 
‘networks’: in fixed and stable relations, critics argued.132 Instead, this process of 
reality-making is considered to be much more precarious and complex.133
The notion of the ‘hybrid collective’, as introduced by Callon and Law, offers an 
alternative to the earlier and more static metaphors of ‘technosocial systems’ and 
‘networks’, making it possible to investigate how differently configured arrangements 
make different forms of subjectivity, distributions of agency and relations between the 
elements of which the collective is composed.134 The point is that although a 
‘collective’ does not denote a fixed apparatus, neither is it totally open. It enables one 
to take into account the role of materials in the structuring of social life and 
practices.135 In chapter six the notion of ‘arrangements’ is used to explore this 
collective of humans and technologies.136
Dementia care practices are seen to involve different ‘arrangements’ composed of 
entities, such as humans, beds, walking aids, alarm cords, records, locks and food. 
Rules and regulations are also involved, as well as local care-budgets and national 
care plans. These are all elements of the same heterogeneous practices, which 
indicates that practices or agency is not limited to humans only, but to all the different 
elements in the arrangement or collective. It is the particular association between the 
different entities that matters and that makes certain kinds of care possible.137
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2.6.3: Discourse, modes of ordering and tactics
In using the notion of ‘modes of ordering’ I draw on the work of John Law.138 Law’s 
argument is that there are a number of different strategies (or orderings) at work at 
any given time that allow for a certain kind of coherence to emerge. These orderings 
are patterns that arise in our interactions with the world, and are hence embodied, 
enacted, articulated and expressed (although not necessary explicitly) in materials 
and relations.139 This means that their character is empirical and contingent. In this 
way Law distinguishes ‘modes of ordering’ from the notion of ‘discourse’ in its 
Foucauldian meaning. In the following, and before I go on to account for Law’s term 
‘modes of ordering’, I will briefly elaborate on what is implied by ‘discourse’.
‘Discourse’ refers to large-scale patterns that are performed in the networks of the 
social.140 According to Michel Foucault, discourses are recursive. This means that 
they generate and are generated in the same processes. There is hence no ‘reality’, 
no actor nor anything ‘behind’. Instead, discourses are productive in the sense that 
objects, subjects, knowledge, powers and distributions of powers are generated and 
regenerated through the recursive process.141 An important point is that discourses 
structure what it becomes possible to know and how it can be known within certain 
historical periods. One of Foucault’s aims was to show how this was done in local, 
situated practices and settings.142
In Foucault’s understanding of discourse the recursive processes of reality-making 
also involve materiality, including objects and practices. However, in later discourse 
analysis, priority is generally given to the linguistically discursive: to analysis of texts 
and words.143 In this thesis, however, I use the notion of ‘discourse’ in the 
Foucauldian meaning, as strategies in materially embedded practices.144
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One of John Law’s criticisms of ‘discourse’ is that these patterns tend to become 
‘larger than life’. “Discourse is all. There is no escape”, Law points out.145
{T}ypically, in his {Foucault’s} writing, the discourses are already in place. 
They generate instances, and as they do so they reproduce themselves. But 
Foucault doesn’t tell stories about how they might come to perform themselves 
differently – how they might come to reshape themselves in new embodiments 
or instantiations. And neither do we learn much about how they might interact 
together when they are performed or embodied.146
‘Modes of ordering’ can be understood as a down-scaling of Foucault’s notion of 
‘discourse’.147 Unlike discourses it is possible to draw orderings out and demonstrate 
how they work empirically. In his studies of the Daresbury Laboratory, a large science 
laboratory in Britain, Law identifies four different ‘modes of ordering’.148 These are 
enterprise, administration, vision and vocation. Each of these modes of ordering 
defines and performs a certain version of agency. An important point is that these 
different modes of ordering do not exist outside their own enactment. Instead they 
are tools for understanding the multiplicity of ordering. The notion of ‘mode of 
ordering’ is an invitation to study how ordering is done, generated, embodied, 
expressed and represented in different material forms.149 At the same time it is 
important to note that the modes of ordering are never complete.150 Instead they will 
reorganize and change as they interact with each other, creating complex effects.151
A central concern is thus to study how they differ, overlap, pass each other by, 
interact, are transported, translated, reorganized, changed and disappear or ‘face 
extinction’.152 These are all empirical questions. 
In this thesis I use the notion of ‘modes of ordering’ as a tool for understanding and 
handling the multiplicity of ordering dementia care. In my analyses of everyday 
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dementia care practices, different patterns of intervention were discerned. However, 
as some of these patterns were not as materially embedded as what is implied by the 
notion of ‘modes of ordering’, I decided to deploy the notion of ‘tactics’ to index these 
forms of intervention in everyday dementia care. So although my use of ‘tactics’ 
strongly resembles ‘modes of ordering’, there is also a distinction. The use of ‘tactics’ 
as opposed to ‘modes of ordering’ does, admittedly, have its drawbacks. Although 
both terms are strongly linked to ‘strategy’, these associations are particularly strong 
with relation to ‘tactics’. When I have chosen to use this term, it is a result of careful 
consideration. Other terms were also considered but rejected in this process. The 
term ‘logics’ was rejected as it gave associations to ideals - to something that is 
intellectual and consistent. The notion of ‘repertoires’ was also proposed but later 
rejected, as it seemed to imply that there were several different patterns within each 
repertoire.
2.6.4: Complexity and multiplicity
From the preceding discussion it is evident that ANT is concerned with issues of 
complexity in practices. But what is complexity? And how is complexity to be 
understood and dealt with? Annemarie Mol and John Law address these questions in 
the introductory chapter to the book ‘Complexities. Social Studies of Knowledge 
Practices’.153 They write that,
Complexity (...) is if things relate but don’t add up, if events occur but not within 
the process of linear time, and if phenomena share a space but cannot be 
mapped in terms of a single set of three-dimensional coordinates.154
One way of dealing with complexity is by simplifying it, to reduce a complex reality 
into what fits within a simple scheme. However, these simplifications, Mol and Law 
point out, tends to ‘forget’ about the complex.155
According to Mol and Law, different practices produce not only different perspectives 
but also different realities. Multiple realities.156 The argument is that the trope of the 
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single order (as ‘strategy’ or ‘frame of understanding’) that reduces complexity starts 
to lose its power when order is multiplied: when order turns into orders.157 “This is 
because various ordering-structures do not always reinforce the same simplicities or 
impose the same silences”, Mol and Law point out.158 The different ordering 
structures may thus work – and relate – in different ways. In Mol’s studies of the 
practices of lower limb atherosclerosis in a Dutch hospital, she shows that the 
multiple enactments of the disease are not closed off from one another: 
It is one of the great miracles of hospital life: there is different atherosclerosis 
in the hospital but despite the differences between them they are connected. 
(...) Even if it is multiple, it also hangs together.159
The question to be considered is how different realities hold together. Mol’s study 
shows that this requires a lot of coordination work. The different realities hold 
together, Mol argues, not because their coherence precedes the knowledge 
generated about them, but because the various coordination strategies involved 
succeeds in reassembling multiple versions of reality.160 Mol’s point is that the 
different enactments of atherosclerosis are not different perspectives of a single 
disease (or reality), nor are there many different and separate/unrelated realities. 
Instead, they interfere with one another, revealing partial connections.161 This means 
that as different realities coexist, what is reduced in one may be crucial in another. As 
Law and Mol point out, the question is no longer ‘Do we simplify or do we accept 
complexity’, but a need to determine which simplification or simplifications to attend 
to and create.162 And, as this is done, to pay attention to what these simplifications 
foreground as well as to what they relegate into the background.163
By applying these tools and insights in my studies of dementia care, the different care 
practices are understood as complex. The care practices are complex in the sense 
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that they may take different forms within one site: for example, different carers enact 
different forms of care, and a single carer may engage with many forms of care 
practices in different situations. Following on from this, I will argue that these different 
care practices do not exist in a vacuum, but interfere with each other in complex 
ways, sometimes clashing, sometimes shading into each other and sometimes 
reinforcing one another. However, exactly how they interfere is difficult to predict, as 
this depends on local specificities. A central aim of this thesis is to articulate this 
complexity and multiplicity. In particular, I pay attention to how different technologies 
are part of this complexity. 
2.7: The turn to normativity and ethics 
The question of how research can (or should) be normative is a much-debated issue 
within STS.164 Through its adaption of the principle of symmetry (explaining true and 
false beliefs the same way), STS is widely regarded as being normatively crippled, 
according to Hans Harbers.165 This is because, Harbers writes, the principle of 
symmetry with its descriptive, causally explanatory, third-person perspective prevents 
it from addressing issues of truth and values.166 However, these critics approach 
knowledge in an epistemological way, in the sense that knowledge is considered as a 
matter of reference, Harbers points out.167
On the other hand, ANT offers other theoretical tools and resources in addressing 
issues of normativity and ethics. The argument is that if reality is enacted in and 
through a variety of practices rather than given, then reality itself is multiple. An 
implication of this shift, according to Annemarie Mol, is that the ontological becomes 
political.168 This means that realities are open and contestable, and that politics is 
deeply entrenched in normative issues and questions, such as what the good life 
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might entail.169 Further, Mol points out, there is a recognition that “like ontology, the 
good is inevitably multiple: there is more than one of it”.170 In sum, this implies that 
the concern is no longer with epistemology, or with questions of how to find the truth. 
Instead the concern is ontological; with what there is and with what realities to make.
The approach to normativity that I mobilize in this thesis is ‘empirical ethics’ as for 
instance developed by Jeannette Pols.171 In her studies of good care in long-term 
psychiatry in the Netherlands, Pols developed a specific style of ethnography-
informed ethics. This means that the characteristics of good care are explored in an 
ethnographic manner, by observing how nurses and patients try to shape good care 
in their daily life and work.172 According to Pols, this form of empirical ethics is about 
asking ethical questions, such as ‘what is good care?’ somewhere, inside the 
practices that are studied:173
The aim is to articulate how ideals of good care are enacted in day-to-day 
caring situations by analysing the relations between activities, events, routines, 
things and talk about practice.174
What constitutes good care is not defined beforehand. This style of empirical ethics is 
important as it offers an alternative approach to ethical issues:
{T}his style of empirical ethics aims not merely to describe practice, but neither 
does it aim to judge it. The aim is to interfere in the practices studied by 
opening up implicit notions of good care for (self) reflection. Thus this style of 
empirical ethics does not restrict itself to describing what others think is good, 
but neither does it impose its own norms in the form of judgements. Instead it 
questions norms and ideals by articulating and unravelling ‘goods’ hidden in 
activities and routines.175
There are two aspects of this form of empirical ethics that are of particular relevance 
to my studies of smart home technology and dementia care practice. Through an 
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ethnographic analysis of how good care is done in everyday dementia care, different 
forms of good are made explicit. A central aim of my study is to make visible the 
many values that are enacted in everyday dementia care practice. Secondly, as the 
different goods are made explicit, their effects, possibilities and limitations may be 
discussed. Thus it may be possible to ask: Is this what we actually want? And in 
doing so – to interfere with attempts at improving care.176 And this is precisely what I 
aim to do in this thesis: by unravelling and acknowledging everyday care practices 
and the different forms of good they enact, I intend to open up for new discussions 
about dementia care practice and policy and the consequent implications.
In drawing on these theoretical insights and resources, the question that is raised is 
how this study into the complexity and multiplicity of dementia care can interfere in 
order to produce alternative and better care-realities.177 For this task I mobilize the 
notion of ‘articulation’.
2.7.1: Articulation 
The notion of ‘articulation’, which is borrowed from Donna Haraway, has been 
particularly useful in my investigations of smart home technology and dementia 
care.178 According to Haraway, every empirical study is an articulation of a certain, 
situated way of knowing. Articulations are hence partial and non-innocent, as they 
connect some things and not others. The aim of articulation is to make stories heard 
that are pushed away by dominant discourses, in this way allowing hidden or 
oppressed stories to be told.179 However, articulations are not limited to verbal 
articulations.
In this thesis, I use ‘articulation’ in order to intervene in dementia care policy. What I 
seek to do is to articulate everyday practices that are largely taken for granted in 
dementia care, particularly to highlight the role of technology in these practices. The 
aim is to make the significance of these often mundane practices become visible. 
                                           
176 Ibid: 149-155. 
177 Law, 2004a: 3.
178 1991. 
179 The term ‘articulation’ is also used by Jeannette Pols in her studies of ‘good care in long-term 
psychiatry’. See Pols (2004). 
53
These practices are thereby acknowledged as essential, as what constitutes care 
and as ethics-in-practice. This means that I am concerned with telling a different story 
(or, rather, stories) of dementia care than what is highlighted in dominant discourses 
about dementia care in Norway today.180 These are stories that seek to shift the 
focus from a preoccupation with legal regulations, rules and guidelines as measures 
for ensuring ‘good’ dementia care, to an acknowledgement and awareness of how 
different forms of ‘good’ care are brought into being through everyday care practices, 
with technologies as an integral part of these practices. 
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Chapter 3 
Issues of methodology and methods
3.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I will give an account of the methodological and practical aspects of 
this study. The aim is to present the sources of data I have used and to give the 
reader insight into methodological issues and choices, as well as the process of how 
I worked with my data. In particular, I will elaborate on how I obtained my data, the 
process of analysis and on the specificities of this thesis, followed by reflections on 
my role as researcher and health professional. Finally, I will briefly address research 
ethical issues. 
3.2: The methodological basis of this thesis 
This thesis is a study of dementia care practice. Specifically, the question is: What is 
good dementia care. Further, I am interested in how technology, such as smart home 
alarms and monitoring devices, is part of everyday dementia care practices. This in 
turn gives rise to the question of what values are achieved through these practices.
In addressing these questions and issues, this thesis rests on the assumption that 
reality is enacted through practices and that these practices always involve different 
materials. As there is no given or outside reality, reality does not precede practices 
but is instead seen to emerge as a part of them. In sum, this means that any reality 
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(or, realities) can only be brought into being, sustained or allowed to wither away in 
day-to-day practices.181 And this includes care practices. 
The question, then, is how to achieve insight into this web of care practices? The 
complexity of the questions and issues, I will argue, demands an in-depth approach 
based on observation. There are several reasons for this. An important aim of this 
thesis is to gain insight into practices that are not necessarily articulated or reflected 
upon; in other words, to show the significance of practices that may be taken for 
granted in dementia care. Moreover, the theme ‘technology and dementia care’ and 
issues of good care are unusual and difficult to express or concretize. I am interested 
not only in the different actors’ views and experiences with one particular technology, 
but in how technologies (or materialities) in the broadest sense are part of and form 
care practices. This is a complexity that it is not easy for insiders in particular to 
articulate.
Another important issue is how to get insight into the relations between the person 
with dementia and technology in everyday care. On the one hand, some of the 
technology, such as smart home alarms and monitoring devices, is invisible as a part 
of the infrastructure of the care homes. The fact that these alarms are activated 
automatically by the residents performing everyday tasks such as getting out of bed 
at night or switching the hotplates on, also makes the technology difficult to 
conceptualize. These difficulties are further reinforced by the dementia illness, as 
impaired cognitive functioning may limit verbal and written communication. This 
means, in sum, that being present, observing and participating is necessary in order 
to gain insight into the specific relations of technology and dementia care. 
3.3: Multi-sited ethnography  
The method used is called ‘multi-sited ethnography’.182 Doing ethnography involves 
fieldwork, where observation, participation and structured/non-structured
conversations and interviews are equal important sources of data. Multi-sited 
ethnography means doing fieldwork in different locations. These locations that are 
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chosen on the basis of assumed relevance for the study. Four different care homes 
for people with dementia form the empirical basis for this thesis. In this section I will 
first give a brief account of the methodological assumptions that ‘ethnography’ is 
based upon.
In an article on ethnography in medical research, Per Kristian Hilden and Anne-Lise 
Middelthon, give an extensive introduction to the use of ethnographic methods.183
According to Hilden and Middelthon, today’s ethnographic research relies on four 
main girders. 
First of all, ethnographic research is holistic, Hilden and Middelthon argue, in the 
sense that they assume that human experiences are meaningful in systematic, 
although not necessary coherent ways.184 These systems of meanings are context- 
specific. A second assumption is that a range of human experiences and knowledge 
is silent, embodied and not articulated. Instead, certain experiences and types of 
knowledge are taken for granted and are thus not subject for reflection.185 Getting 
access to such systems of meaning requires, Hilden and Middelthon point out, that 
the researcher position her/himself in a situation where it is possible to observe what 
is going on. Verbal communication is not enough.186 A final assumption is that it is 
not possible to know beforehand how different phenomena are linked, or wh
phenomena are relevant for the research. In doing ethnography, then, the focus is on 
problem-definition, on the development of perspective and frames of understanding, 
and on being able to revise them in the process of the study.
at
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This method yields what Clifford Geertz calls ‘thick descriptions’.188 The use of 
ethnographic fieldwork for thick descriptions denotes that the focus is directed at the 
dynamic question of how. This means that the data is investigated and interpreted, 
first of all in relation to process, with the aim of enhancing understanding and 
contextual explanations. The story does hence become important. In this way the 
four field sites (as care homes) serve to locate this thesis in a specific context of 
knowledge-practices. 
It is the active, engaged and visible researcher that is the ideal in this form of 
research, as doing ethnography involves acquiring close familiarity with the reality 
that is being studied. Whether the research is valid and reliable depends here first of 
all on the dialogue with and the judgment of those being studied, as well as the 
evaluation of the work by other researchers.189
3.4: Ethnographic practices
The following section provides a more detailed account of the ethnographic practices 
involved in obtaining data for this thesis. The main sources of data are fieldwork, 
interviews and different forms of written material, each of which is described 
separately.
3.4.1: Fieldwork
Fieldwork was my main source of data for this study. For one and a half years, from 
December 2003 until June 2005, I did fieldwork in four different care homes for 
people with dementia. I visited these care homes a total of thirty-eight times during 
this time-span.  
Selection of fieldwork-sites
The care homes were selected because they offered opportunities for observing 
dementia care. Three of the care homes were group homes for people with dementia, 
where a dementia diagnosis was a prerequisite for residency. In one care home, the 
residents were elderly, and a number of people were suffering from dementia, but a 
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diagnosis was no prerequisite. A second criterion for selection of the care homes was 
the availability of smart home technology, such as alarms and monitoring devices. In 
order to find suitable field sites I consulted former colleagues working with issues of 
smart home technology and care, as well as an unofficial overview of smart home 
sites in Norway compiled by the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs in 
collaboration with the Norwegian Centre for Telemedicine.190  However, this overview 
proved very inaccurate. A number of municipalities were contacted, first by 
telephone, and several visits to potential field sites were made. In particular, I was 
interested in getting access to care homes were the smart home technology was 
actually in use, which proved to be particularly difficult. In fact, this criterion excluded 
all but three of my potential fieldwork sites. So, in the end, I included one field site 
where the smart home alarms were not in use.191 In this care home the carers had 
made a decision not to use technology in care. My choice of this care home as a 
field-site turned out to be an important decision that allowed me to reflect in new 
ways on the issue of materiality in care.
Specificities of the fieldwork-sites
The four care homes housed between five and thirty residents. Two of them were 
located next door to, and were physically connected to, a nursing home. One care 
home was placed in the same building as the nursing home, while one was placed on 
its own in the middle of a residential area. Each of the four care homes had 
permanent staff. However, in one care home the smart home alarms were transferred 
to the night nurses at the nursing home next door. 
Two of the care homes are located in rural areas, while the other two are located on 
the outskirts of smaller to medium-sized cities.192
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Getting approval 
 In order to be allowed to proceed with my study, I had to get the project formally 
approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). In my case, getting 
approval proved to be difficult, and the problem was of principle nature. First of all my 
study was aimed at dementia care, and as the NSD did not consider most people 
with a dementia illness capable of giving informed consent to participate in my 
research project, approval for fieldwork was initially denied. Another problem was that 
the care homes are legally the residents’ own homes. Since fieldwork in people’s own 
homes is regarded as particularly intrusive, the NSD considered it particularly 
important to get informed consent from the residents at the care homes. However, 
the care homes also have large common areas, and through weeks of negotiating 
with the NSD a compromise was reached, and my project was finally approved. The 
compromise was that I, as a researcher, had to provide the residents and their next-
of-kin with both written and oral information about my project. In addition, all the 
residents and their next-of-kin had to agree to give me access to be present at the 
care homes. Further, the NSD decided that I was not allowed to follow the carers into 
the residents’ rooms while they were performing their nursing-duties. Instead, my 
primary focus was on the technology. 
Once this compromise had been reached, written information was sent to all the 
residents and next-of-kin at the four care homes. I also arranged information 
meetings at the care homes where I presented myself and my project, and explained 
the purpose of my study. In addition, I volunteered to sign the standard (legal) pledge 
of professional secrecy that all health-care workers are required to sign in Norway. In 
this way I was able to be present at meetings at the care homes where the carers 
discussed individual residents, and to have access to the resident’s files.
Fieldwork as observation
First of all my fieldwork took the shape of observation. I was present in the care 
homes, observing everyday care practices. In particular I spent a considerable 
amount of time observing night care, as the smart home alarms are more extensively 
used at night than during day. In practice this meant that I accompanied the night 
carer in the carer’s office or common rooms, and observed the ongoing interactions 
between the night carer, the technology and the residents. However, as I was not 
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allowed into the residents’ rooms, I had to rely on the carers’ accounts of incidents I 
did not have access to observe.
In addition I was also present during the day and in the evenings in order to gain 
insight into routines of daily life at the care homes. Then I was present in the common 
areas where the residents spend most of their time, in order to observe and interact 
with the residents and carers.
While doing my fieldwork I frequently discussed matters of everyday care with the 
carers. For instance, I would ask the carers to explain incidents and to recount 
episodes of everyday care with particular relevance to technology. These 
discussions, which often had the form of non-structured interviews, usually took place 
in the carer’s office. Another important source of data at the care homes was the 
carers’ meetings. At each of the care homes such meetings were held three times a 
day in order to exchange important information about the residents as a new shift of 
carers was arriving and an old shift leaving. At these meetings any changes in 
behaviour or medical condition were reported and discussed, which offered important 
insights into the complexity of everyday care. 
Field notes 
During fieldwork I always carried a note-book and a pen. However, when I was 
present in the common rooms during the day and in the evenings I usually left the 
note-book in the (locked) carer’s office and took frequent breaks from observation in 
order to write field notes. The field notes varied depending on the situation. I wrote 
down conversations and descriptions of incidents, questions and general thoughts 
and ideas. I also included descriptions of the physical surroundings as well as my 
emotional reactions to certain incidents I observed. The idea was to put as much as 
possible on paper, uncensored. Sometimes I wrote down questions for myself to 
follow up. At other times the questions were intended for particular persons, as 
follow-ups on earlier conversations. The field notes were entered on a computer at 
regular intervals and stored in separate files, one for each field site. 
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3.4.2: Interviews
A total of thirty-six interviews were conducted as a part of this study. These were 
formal interviews in the sense that they were pre-arranged and involved the use of 
interview-guides. Some of these interviews were with the carers or next-of-kin at the 
care homes, and were conducted parallel to fieldwork in the period between 
December 2003 and June 2005. However, most of the interviews were done between 
April 2004 and January 2006. In the following I will give a brief account of the 
specificities of these interviews.  
Interviews as supplements to fieldwork
Seventeen carers at the care homes were interviewed. These interviews were 
conducted alongside the fieldwork observation, as a means of getting insight into the 
respondent’s experience, thoughts and ideas about technology and dementia care. 
Another important aim was to obtain more information about the history and context 
of the care homes, in particular with relation to the process of planning and 
implementing the smart home technology.
Five next-of-kin were also interviewed. Each of these interviews was conducted at 
the care homes. The aim of interviewing next-of-kin was to get their perspective on 
the care that was offered. In particular I was interested in their views on and 
experiences with the smart home alarm system. 
Another important actor was the local authorities, as the provision of dementia care 
services in Norway is a statutory responsibility of the local authorities.193 In each of 
the care homes I visited, the local authorities had the economic and administrative 
responsibility for the services provided. For this reason I was interested in 
supplementing the fieldwork data by interviewing representatives from the local 
authorities. In particular I was interested in getting insight into the political and 
administrative process of planning and implementing the smart home alarms, as well 
as of economic issues. I interviewed eight representatives from three of the 
municipalities where fieldwork was conducted. Four of these interviews were with 
health administrative staff. In addition I interviewed two members of the 
                                           
193  Lov om helsetjenesten i kommunene [Act relating to the municipal health-care services] and 
’Forskrift om kvalitet i pleie og omsorgstjenestene for tjenesteyting’ [Regulations relating to nursing 
and health-care services for service provision]. 
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administration with responsibilities for the technical aspects of the smart home 
systems with a particular view to get insight into the process of how the technical 
solutions were chosen and designed, as well as issues of use and maintenance of 
the technology. In one municipality I also interviewed two representatives of the local 
dementia-team. The aim was to gain insight into the role of the dementia team in the 
planning and provision of care services at the care home.
Interviews with other central actors
A total of five interviews were conducted with other central actors, who were 
representatives from the Ministry of Health and Care, the Directorate of Health and 
Social Affairs, the Norwegian Housing Bank and the Norwegian Centre for Dementia 
Research. Each of these agencies is involved in issues of policy development and 
service provision with relevance for dementia care and smart home technology. 
These interviews thus provided me with important insights into policy and 
administrative issues of technology and care.
Selection of informants 
In each of the care homes the coordinator (or nurse in charge) was interviewed, first 
of all as they were in a position of being able to provide valuable information. Three 
of the four coordinators had participated actively in the planning process for smart 
home technology, and had worked at the care homes for several years. In addition, 
some carers were interviewed at each field site. These were selected on the criteria 
that they had expressed a particular interest in issues of technology and care, or had 
long experience from working in dementia care. The interviews were always 
organized in collaboration with the coordinator. As the interviews generally had to be 
conducted while the carers were on duty, a re-organization of staff was necessary in 
order for the informants to be available for the interview.
The coordinators also assisted me by giving access to interview next-of-kin. As I did 
not have access to their names or addresses, any contact with the next-of-kin had to 
be made through the coordinators. An important criterion in the selection of 
informants was the health status of the next-of-kin, of which the coordinators at the 
care homes usually had in-depth knowledge. The point was that the request for an 
interview was not to be experienced as an extra burden. Further, and for reasons of 
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convenience, informants were selected on the basis of their mobility, i.e. that they 
were able to come to the care home for the interview.  
In addition, the carers and coordinators were very helpful in providing me with 
information about who to contact in the local administration. 
The selection of informants representing the other actors on a national level was 
based on my prior knowledge of these actors. 
The practical aspects of the interviews 
Most of the interviews lasted for approximately one hour. However, two interviews; 
one with a representative of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and one with a 
representative from the Norwegian State Housing Bank lasted nearly twice that long. 
I used an interview-guide for the interviews. These interview-guides were compiled in 
relation to the different categories of informants and the specific issues and questions 
I wanted to raise. At the same time it was important for me to open up for new 
questions and issues. This means that the interview-guides were used first of all used 
to ensure that the main issues were covered. 
Extensive notes were taken during the interviews. These notes were later 
anonymized and entered on a computer. The informants who wanted to were then 
given the opportunity to read through the document in order to ensure that 
misunderstandings and mistakes were corrected. 
In this thesis I use the excerpts from the interviews in order to inform the different 
chapters. This means that I do not make much use of direct citations from the 
interviews. 
3.4.3: Written material
The empirical data also include different forms of written material, including legislative 
proposals, legal documents, government White papers and official reports and 
documents. In addition, I also bring in an official transcript from a debate in the 
Norwegian parliament, the Storting. The legislative proposals are referred to as 
‘propositions to the Odelsting’. All legislative proposals are treated by the Odelsting, 
which is a part of the Storting. 
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I have also included excerpts from information booklets, newspaper articles and 
official guidelines on smart home technology and care, as well as transcripts from a 
conference on technology and dementia care in my work on this thesis. 
3.5: Other specificities of the data
Although most of the empirical material is based on data obtained in the period 
between December 2003 and January 2006, I also make use of older material. This 
material comes from an evaluation of a care home in 1996.194 This care home, 
referred to as the Tjeldveien care flat, was the first home for people with dementia 
where smart home technology was implemented in Norway. In conjunction with the 
evaluation, I visited the care home twice: once in association with an international 
conference on issues of technology and dementia care, and once in order to 
interview some of the staff. In chapter four of this thesis (‘The emergence of smart 
home technology in dementia care’), I have drawn in some of this material, as it 
provides a concrete context for my further analysis on smart home technology and 
dementia care. 
3.6: Data analysis 
In this section I will briefly account for the process of how I worked with the analysis 
of the data. The aim of the data analysis was first of all to bring out the norms, values 
and ideals of good care the carers tried to establish in and through their practices. 
Further I was interested in getting insight into the material infra-structure of the care 
homes, and of technology’s role in good dementia care. What values are ‘written into’ 
the technologies? How are the technologies negotiated? And how is good dementia 
care achieved? These were all central questions and concerns throughout my work 
with analyzing the data. And assisted by analytical tools, these questions make out 
the starting point for the different chapters. 
My work with the data can be described as a hermeneutical process of continually 
going back and forth between data analysis, gaining new insights/understanding and 
re-interpretations. In this process questions, definitions and interpretations were 
continually re-defined.
                                           
194 Bjørneby et al. (1996). 
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3.7: Reflections on my role as researcher and health-professional 
Having a health professional background (occupational therapist, or OT), and with 
some experience from geriatric care, I found the care home setting somewhat 
familiar. However, a vital difference was that my current role was one of researcher 
and not health-care professional. Clearly, my background as a health-care 
professional helped me to be accepted by the carers working at the care homes. 
However, some of them were initially intimidated and confused by my presence as 
they were not used to having anyone observing them while performing everyday 
tasks. And clearly, many of them were uncertain of what I was actually doing as I sat 
in the common lounge, observing and talking to them and the residents. Usually I 
tried to put them at ease by reassuring them that I was not criticizing or evaluating 
their work, but that my main intention was to earn, and that they were the experts. 
However, they also had some expectations of me as an OT. As none of the care 
homes had an in-house OT and the community OT usually had a long waiting list, I 
was sometimes asked to give advice on issues such as technical aids, sitting 
postures, activities and so on. At first I was unsure of how to respond to these 
requests, in particular in my role as an observing researcher. Would it be possible for 
me to accommodate both roles? In particular I feared a situation where a huge 
demand for OT services and staff expectations of such would make it difficult for me 
to focus on the task of observing care. Yet, I was also eager to give something back 
to the carers. My contribution as a researcher was clearly quite abstract for them, and 
I wanted to show that I appreciated their goodwill by being flexible and 
accommodating. Thus I tried to accommodate their requests as far as possible.
Another challenge that is closely related to my health-care background was not to
become an OT in situations where I would otherwise have intervened. Quite often 
during my fieldwork, I experienced situations that made me want to step into an OT 
role. Usually these were minor incidents and situations, such as advising the carers 
on better transfer techniques, or of how to ensure better sitting comfort for residents 
in wheelchairs. However, at other times, in more complex situations, I had to tell 
myself not to become an OT. Sometimes, if the situation allowed for it, I talked to the 
carers about what had happened after the event.
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3.8: Issues of research ethics 
As I have already mentioned, the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) set 
a number of conditions for approving my study. In addition to the restrictions to my 
role as observer at the care homes, and having to provide both oral and written 
information to residents and next-of-kin, the NSD required the data from the care 
homes to be anonymized. The written extracts from fieldwork and interviews were 
also to be stored on a computer without internet connection. These are terms and 
conditions that I have complied with throughout my work on this project. 
In practice, this means that all names of individual residents and carers are fictional. 
In addition, I have also anonymized the municipalities and the names of the care 
homes.
There is, however, one exception to this rule. In chapters four and five I draw in 
material from the Tjeldveien care flat: the first smart home in Norway and a home for 
eight people with dementia. I visited the Tjeldveien care flat twice in 1996, as a part 
of an evaluation-project.195 In my reference to the Tjeldveien care flat I have chosen 
to use the original name, first of all as this name has been used in other published 
documents.196 Further, my reference to the Tjeldveien care flat is limited to 
descriptions of the lay-out of the building, the organization of care services as well as 
of the smart home system that is installed.        
3.9: Conclusions 
This thesis is a study of the relations between technology and dementia care 
practice. In this chapter I have addressed the methodological and practical aspects of 
this study. The starting point of the investigation is the assumption that reality is 
enacted in and through practices, combined with an understanding of these practices 
as material. This means that reality (as care) is not a given entity, but something that 
is made and re-made in and through material practices. 
In addressing the complex issues of technology and dementia care, an ethnographic 
approach was adopted. During a one-and-a-half year period fieldwork was conducted 
                                           
195 See Bjørneby et al., 1996. 
196 See for example Bjørneby et al. (1996) and Bjørneby/van Berlo (1997).  
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at four different care homes. This fieldwork consisted primarily of observation of 
everyday care practices. The primary aim was to observe the use of smart home 
technology in dementia care. However, finding care homes where the smart home 
alarms and monitoring devices were actually in use proved to be difficult. I therefore 
included a field-site where smart home technology was installed but not in use.  
The fieldwork was compromised as I was not allowed to participate in everyday care 
activities in the residents’ rooms. This means that my fieldwork was confined to the 
common rooms and carer’s office. So, although being present in the common rooms 
gave me ample opportunities to observe interactions between the carers, residents 
and different constellations of technology, to a large extent I had to rely on the carers’ 
accounts of certain incidents.
The fieldwork observation was supplemented with interviews. These interviews 
involved carers and next-of-kin at the different field sites. In addition, I interviewed 
representatives of local and state authorities. Written material is also drawn into the 
analysis. Some of this material dates back to 1996. 
I wind up the chapter with reflecting on my role as researcher. These reflections are 
related to my background as a health-professional (OT), and my new role as an 
observing researcher at the care homes. Initially I struggled with accommodating the 
need for OT-services, and staying focused on the task of observing care. This 
tension eased, however, as the carers became more familiar with my research, and 
as I did my best to meet their expectations. 
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Chapter 4
The emergence of smart home technology in dementia care
4.1: Introduction 
Tønsberg, June, 1996 
As I arrive at the one-storey building, there is nothing to suggest from the 
outside that this is a (smart) home for eight people with dementia. The building 
blends well into the style of the other houses in the residential area on the 
outskirts of Tønsberg, a small provincial city on the south-east coast of 
Norway.
This is my first visit to a smart home, and I am invited as a participant at an 
international conference on ‘Technology, Ethics and Dementia’, which is being 
held in Tønsberg. The care home I am about to enter, which is named ‘the 
Tjeldveien care flat’, is the first smarthome for people with dementia in 
Norway, and has attracted considerable attention from politicians, health-care 
professionals, ethicists, lawyers and journalists both in Norway and abroad. 
Today, as the conference participants enter the building, the residents and 
some of the staff are away on a day trip in the local area. We are met by the 
nurse in charge who takes us on a tour of the building. First she shows us the 
carer’s office, which is located right next to the entrance door. The office has a 
large desk with a strategically placed computer screen; at the far end of the 
room is a sofa-bed for the night carer. The computer screen displays an 
overview of the smart home alarms that are connected to the residents’ rooms, 
the nurse in charge tells us. The smart home infrastructure allows for a 
number of different constellations of alarms, including door alarms, bed alarms 
and heat detectors. The nurse in charge explains that while some of the 
residents need all these alarms, others only have the heat detector connected. 
“Everyone is required to have the heat detector, as it is connected to the fire 
alarm system, which is compulsory. However, the connection of the other 
alarms is based on an assessment of the resident’s individual needs”. She 
adds that the alarms are connected, not only to the computer monitor, but also 
to a pager carried by one of the two carers on morning or afternoon duty. This 
means, the nurse in charge tells us, that the carer is informed of any alarms 
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even when not in the office. The nurse in charge holds the pager up for 
everyone to see.
Afterwards, we are shown the spacious common areas: a lounge and a 
kitchen, where the residents spend most of their time, including eating their 
meals, according to the nurse in charge. We are then allowed to visit one of 
the resident’s rooms. The resident’s rooms consist of a living room with a small 
kitchen area, a separate bedroom and a bathroom. From the living room there 
is direct access to the garden outside through a terrace door. One of the 
participants asks if it is possible to see how the alarms work. The nurse in 
charge switches on one of the hot-plates in the kitchen area as we leave for 
the carer’s office. A few seconds later we can view the alarm on the computer 
monitor. The icon (in the shape of a saucepan) which represents the heat 
detector in room five changes colour from grey to red. The alarm on the pager 
is also activated, first as a discrete ‘beep’ sound, followed by a text message 
on the small screen saying that the heat detector has been triggered in room 
five. The nurse in charge switches the alarm off by using the computer mouse 
to click on the activated icon, which changes colour back to grey. She then 
goes to the resident’s room and switches the hotplate off. There is a second 
message on the pager, saying that the alarm has been attended to.197
The above story describes my first meeting with smart home technology in dementia 
care, at the Tjeldveien care flat in 1996. My visit to the Tjeldveien care flat will play a 
central role in the further analysis of this chapter. The Tjeldveien care flat was the 
first smarthome in dementia care in Norway, and is important in the sense that it has 
served as a reference-smart home for a number of other smart homes in 
elderly/dementia care during the past decade.198
The aim of this chapter is to give an account of the emergence of smart home 
technology in the Norwegian context. This account will serve as a context for more in-
depth analyses of this technology in the chapters to come. 
In the early/mid 1990’s smart home technology emerged as a part of two separate 
developments in Norway. On the one hand, smart home technology materialized as 
part of a growing network of services aimed at the private consumer.199 These 
services primarily targeted security and comfort. On the other hand, smart home 
technology emerged as a part of a larger reform of public sector care-provision. The 
                                           
197 Excerpts from field notes, June 1996. 
198 See Bjørneby et al (1996).  
199 A description of this development is given by the Norwegian researcher Anne-Jorunn Berg, who 
studied smart home technology from a feminist perspective.  See Berg (1994).  
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focus of this chapter is on the latter. More specifically, it is concerned with how smart 
home technology took shape in and shaped care for the elderly.  
It is important to note that the care reform also involved another development: the 
emergence of the care flat as a new and non-institutional care arena. As a part of this 
care reform, government grants and loans were made available to the local 
authorities for the building of care flats and nursing homes. At the same time, smart 
home technology was introduced to the care setting through a network of actors 
representing industry. The smart home technology became a part of the care reform 
in the sense that the state-financed grants and loans also covered the costs of a 
smart home installation. As a result, a number of care flats and nursing homes have 
been built with smart home technology as part of their infrastructure. Although the 
care flat and smart home technology emerged in different ways in Norwegian 
welfare-policy, their paths are interconnected. As the care flat is the setting for the 
empirical basis of this thesis, the focus of this chapter is specifically on the co-
emergence of the care flat and smart home technology. This means that I will deal 
with these technologies as an intertwined phenomenon. Unless otherwise specified, 
whenever I refer to smart home technology, I am referring to smart home technology 
in the care flat setting. 
In order to investigate the emergence of smart home technology, I draw on resources 
from Science and Technology Studies (STS). The notions of ‘scenario’ and ‘script’ 
are of particular importance for this work. 
The starting point of this investigation is the assumption that smart home technology 
is not a neutral entity; it comes with a vision of social and welfare-policy. An important 
aim of this chapter is to bring out and analyze this vision. In order to do so, I mobilize 
the notion of ‘scenario’, which was introduced by Michel Callon as an analytical tool 
for exploring the assumptions that are built into technologies.200 The crucial point 
made by Callon is that the scenario not only establishes the technical characteristics 
of the new technologies; it also defines the actors and the social universe in which 
the technology will function.201 Hence, through the scenario of smart home 
technology more than a new technology is being constructed; it also envisions a new 
                                           
200 1987. 
201 ibid: 86. 
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care system, society and future as such. The question is what this future is that is 
constructed through the smart home scenario? And who are its actors? These two 
key questions are addressed in this chapter. 
Consequently, I am interested in how the smart home technology has been 
translated and specified into a policy of care, that redefines patients, carers and care 
relations. In order to discuss these issues, I use the notion of ‘script’, which was 
developed by Madeleine Akrich as a tool to conceptualize and trace how innovators 
and designers write their vision about their world into the technological content of the 
new object.202 Like a film-script, the technology defines a framework of action and the 
actors that are supposed to act. The script may then be understood as an implicit 
user manual. It defines who the actors (including its users) are, what roles and 
responsibilities they have, and how the tasks are distributed, as well as the actors’ 
needs and interests. In this chapter I will use the notion of ‘script’ to specify the smart 
home scenario. This means that I will use the concept to analyze not a single 
artefact, but a flexible constellation of different technologies, as an integrated 
‘technology care package’. Within STS literature, however, the notion of ‘script’ has 
primarily been used to analyse a single artefact and the expectations/gendering of its 
users.203 Through my use of ‘scripts’ I thus stretch the use of the analytical 
apparatus, and possibly to its limit. Yet I believe that the notion of ‘script’ is a useful 
tool for conceptualizing this new socio-technical network in the sense that it makes it 
possible to bring out the tension and ambivalences embedded in the smart home 
technology. Through this process I have learnt that the shift in focus from a single 
artefact to a more complex constellation of technologies and care regimes is 
demanding and difficult to handle in practice.
In this chapter I contrast the future constructed by the smart home scenario with 
traditional institutional care in nursing homes. Approximately 40 000 people live in 
nursing homes in Norway, and it is estimated that about 75% of them suffer from 
dementia.204 From 1988, the administration of nursing homes became the 
responsibility of the local authorities. Although there are many local variations as to 
                                           
202 1992: 208. 
203 See for example Cockburn (1985/99), Berg and Lie (1995). 
204 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 25 (2005-2006): 9. See also Engedal (2005).  
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the size of the nursing homes, their lay-out and administration, they are defined as 
institutions, and as such (and in contrast to home based care), they are subject to 
specific rules and regulations regarding staffing levels and the availability of medical 
services and qualified health-care professionals including physiotherapists and 
registered nurses.205 In addition, institutions are inspected by the regional health 
authorities.
From the 1970s and 1980s and until recently, nursing homes were relatively large 
institutions for persons in need of extensive care services. The bureaucratic 
organization of nursing homes has been criticized from various positions.206 First of 
all, the strong emphasis on efficiency has been criticized. Consequently, an important 
goal during the past decade has been to improve the home-like qualities of nursing 
home care. One key welfare-policy aim has been to re-organize rooms from dual to 
single occupancy.207
This chapter draws on empirical material from three main sources: the Tjeldveien 
care flat, an analysis of relevant literature and interviews with key actors. Data from 
the Tjeldveien care flat come from two visits in 1996.208 The literature analysis is 
based primarily on policy documents, government plans and reports.209
                                           
205 ’Lov om helsetjenesten i kommunene’ 19.11.1982 nr. 66 [the Act relating to the municipal health 
services]; ‘Lov om statlig tilsyn med helsetjenesten’ 30.03.1984 nr. 15 [The Act relating to supervision 
of health-care services] ; ‘Forskrift for sykehjem og boform for heldøgns omsorg og pleie’ 14.11.1988 
nr. 932 [Regulations relating to nursing homes and 24-hour care institutions]; ‘Forskrift om kvalitet i 
pleie- og omsorgstjenestene’ 27.6.2003 nr. 792 [Regulations relating to quality in nursing and care 
services].
206 NOU 1992, 1: 173. 
207 The targeted allocation of State grants has resulted in 95% single-bed rooms in 2005. See 
Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 25 (2005-2006): 37. 
208 ‘Technology, Ethics and Dementia’ Conference, arranged by Cost A5, an EU-founded network 
working on issues of technology and health-care. The Conference was arranged by the Norwegian 
participants in this network, Sidsel Bjørneby and Simon Clathworthy. The Conference was held in 
Tønsberg in June 1996. 
209 The Norwegian State authorities distinguish between two different forms of reports; Norwegian 
Official reports (NOU’s) and regular reports. Norwegian Official reports are comprehensive reports 
resulting from the Government or a Ministry constituting a committee or work group who report on 
different aspects of society, whereas regular reports may be less comprehensive and not involve 
external committees or work-groups. See www.odin.no. 
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One official report, often referred to as the ‘Gjærevoll Commission Report’, is given a 
central role in my account.210 It is a comprehensive report that has had major 
implications for future policy on elderly care. This report is important because it 
represents a shift in Norwegian welfare-policy towards increased private 
responsibility and more home-like qualities in care. Its extensive recommendations 
have been followed up by the Welfare Report, and later implemented through the 
Action Plan for Elderly Care.211 In addition, other relevant material is drawn in, such 
as official guidelines, information booklets and research reports. This information is 
supplemented by interviews with representatives from the Ministry of Health and 
Care, the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs, the Norwegian Centre for 
Dementia Research and the Norwegian State Housing Bank. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section I will show how smart 
home technology and the care flat, as two partly separate developments, co-emerged 
and shaped dementia care in the Tjeldveien care flat. First the terms ‘smart home 
technology’ and ‘care flat’ are defined. I then go on to give a broad account of the 
networks involved in the construction of smart home technology in dementia care. 
Further, I will analyze the political vision involved in the establishment of the smart 
home scenario. The analysis of policy documents shows that a future is constructed 
in which the number of old people will increase sharply. An increased demand for 
care services is one consequence of this change. As there are not expected to be 
enough carers to meet this demand, the result will be a care crisis. Smart home 
technology emerged as a key actor in this scenario, as a solution to the approaching 
care crisis. The hope is that by reorganizing current care services and introducing 
‘smart’ technology, the municipalities will be able to provide better and more cost 
efficient forms of care services, which in turn will help to lessen the impact of the 
coming care crisis. 
Part two, which is based on a more in-depth approach, analyses four different 
aspects of the smart home scenario as it is materialized at the Tjeldveien care flat. A 
script analysis is also done, with the objective of specifying the smart home scenario. 
This analysis shows that there is an ambivalence in the script as it defines partly 
                                           
210 NOU 1992: 1. 
211 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 50 (1996-97). 
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opposing patients and carers. In the second part of this section I will briefly discuss 
this tension. The question is how this ambivalence is to be understood, and to what 
extent the smart home scenario can be seen to advance different values than what is 
promoted through traditional institutional care. 
A final remark is that this chapter should not be read as a theory of innovation-
policy.212 It is not my intention to leave the readers with the impression that the future 
constructed by the smart home scenario emerges as an idea that originated in policy 
(in the shape of government reports and official documents), as something that is 
envisioned and indicated in politics and subsequently implemented and worked out in 
practice. However, nor do I want to promote a theory of ‘politics by other means’ 
through technology, as if technology and technologists have the power to shape the 
future as well as history in their image.213 On the contrary, what I hope to 
demonstrate is that policy and smart home technology co-emerges in and through 
different locations and practices. These locations and practices include policy 
documents on the one hand and pilot/test projects and conference networks on the 
other. The intention is to show how these are two partly different and partly related 
networks become intertwined.
PART I: The emergence of the smart home scenario for elderly care 
In this section I will show how the smart home scenario materialized in and through 
the Tjeldveien care flat. First I will focus specifically on the network in which the smart 
home care scenario was constructed in the Norwegian context and on how it 
emerged in the Tjeldveien care flat. I will then go on to elaborate on how the 
construction of the smart home scenario was part of a larger welfare-policy care 
reform. The argument is that the technology and policy developed together in and 
through the same processes. 
                                           
212 When I have chosen to use policy documents as a primary source in this context-chapter I am 
aware that I risk this chapter being read as a theory of innovation. This compromise was chosen so 
that this chapter can function as background for the other chapters. A main objective is to depict the 
backdrop for smart home technology in Norway. As the data I have had access to have been limited, I 
have had to use policy documents in order to achieve this. 
213 Latour (1987). 
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4.2: The smart home scenario: a smart home care network is established 
4.2.1: Smart home technology
There are a number of different definitions of smart home technology circulating. The 
following, widely used definition was provided by the Norwegian Directorate of Health 
and Social Affairs:
Smart home technology is information- and communication technology (ICT) 
as used in houses, where the various components communicate with each 
other via a local network (called ‘Home-bus’).214
Smart home technology may be used to integrate different functions, such as energy 
conservation (including the automatic control of light and heat), security and control 
(such as the use of alarms and monitoring devices) and communication.215
One example of a smart home system is a network of sensors registering events. 
These sensors communicate with a control unit and actuators that activate an alarm 
when certain pre-defined incidents occur. Such an incident may be a person not 
returning to bed or someone leaving the house in the middle of the night. The alarm 
typically takes the form of a text message on a mobile phone or a pager signal to an 
in-house carer, a community nurse or to a neighbouring nursing home.
Currently, smart home technology is mostly installed in care flats and nursing homes 
in Norway.216 Usually the smart home infrastructure is installed during the building 
process, as installation in existing buildings has proven to be expensive.217 Wireless 
smart home solutions are also available and are increasingly being used. 
4.2.2: The care flat
The notion of the ‘care flat’ was first introduced by the Norwegian State Housing 
Bank in an information leaflet about a subsidized grant that was distributed to 
                                           
214 ‘Smart Home Technology: Planning and management in municipal services’; the Directorate of 
Health and Social Affairs (English version), 2005: 10. 
215 Berg, 1994: 171. 
216 No formal surveys have been conducted to get an overview of the extent smart home technology is 
implemented in care flats and nursing homes in Norway.  
217 Bjørneby et al 1996: 24. See also ‘Smart Home Technology. Planning and management in 
municipal services’, The Directorate of Health and Social Affairs, 2005: 24-25. 
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Norwegian municipalities in 1994.218 The Welfare Report defines care flats as 
wheelchair accessible homes where the resident can receive necessary care 
assistance.219 Further, care flats are referred to as ‘co-located homes’, as something 
in-between a domestic home and an institution.220 The care flat thus represents a 
new care arena.
The Norwegian State Housing Bank is a state-owned financial institution that 
provides municipalities with funds (loans, grants and allowances) and guidelines for 
the building of care flats and nursing homes in Norway.221 In its information booklet, 
the bank distinguishes between two different types of care flats: individualized and 
shared.222 The individualized care flats are self-contained housing units. A number of 
individual care flats are placed in the same location, with or without access to 
common areas. Here, the care services provided are based on an assessment of 
individual needs, as in traditional home-based care. The shared care flats, on the 
other hand, are built with common-areas. These shared care flats may be organized 
in a number of different ways, for instance as group homes. In contrast to the 
individual care flats, the group homes often have permanent care staff. At the 
Tjeldveien care flat, there are two carers on duty during the day and in the evenings, 
and one resting carer at night.
The focus of this thesis is on the shared care flat, particularly in the form of group 
homes. This is an organizational form which is widely used in dementia care in 
Norway, and forms the empirical basis for this thesis.
                                           
218 Husbanken (The Norwegian State Housing Bank), ‘Bo godt med omsorg’ [‘Live well with care’] HB-
3045, 02.94. See also Husbanken, Rundskriv (The Norwegian State Housing Bank, Circular letter) 
HB-1262, 15. February 1994.  
219 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 35 (1994-95): 147. 
220 ibid: 155. 
221 See www.husbanken.no. The functions of the Norwegian State Housing Bank also include financial 
services to private actors, including private firms and organizations.    
222 ‘Omsorgsboliger og sykehjem. En veileder for lokalisering, organisering og utforming’ [Care flats 
and nursing homes: A guide for localization, organization and design’]; Husbanken (the Norwegian 
State Housing Bank), 1998. 
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In Norway there has been extensive construction of care flats during the past decade, 
primarily as a result of the ‘Action Plan for Elderly Care’.223 Approximately 40 Billion 
Norwegian kroner have been allocated via the State Housing Bank to finance the 
building of care flats and nursing homes. In total approximately 20 000 care flats and 
20 000 nursing home rooms have been built.224
4.2.3: A smart home care scenario is formed
The origins of smart home technology: ideas of the automated home  
The notion of the ‘smart home’ can be traced back to developments in Japan and the 
United States in the early to mid 1980s.225 Following developments within computing, 
research was initiated to find ways in which to make different forms of electronic 
household equipment communicate with each other. Similar developments took place 
in Europe under the name ‘interactive home systems’.226 As smart home suggests, 
this was a technology that was intended for the home, with the aim of ‘home 
automation’. The intelligent home was launched as a home of the future, where the 
integrated functions would mean “... a transformation of the home and everyday 
life”.227 The idea was that through the 
(...) linkage of a wide range of household devices through a ‘home-net’ ... 
automation (...) could permit (...) that devices are electronically controlled ... so 
that previous requirements for human decision-making and labour are 
reduced.228
During the 1980s several test sites were established, both in the United States and 
Japan. However, the ideas of the automated home never generated much interest.229
                                           
223 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 50 (1996-97). 
224 These figures are based on the Norwegian State Housing Bank’s figures as presented in their 
quarterly report (4th quarter 2007). See Husbankens kvartalsrapport (4 kvartal 2007).  
225 Miles, 1988: 33; Miles, 1991: 67. 
226 Miles, 1988: 33. 
227 Berg 1994: 167. 
228 Miles, 1988: 33. 
229 This is the point made by Ian Miles in his analysis of the emergence of smart home technology in 
the late 1980’s (Miles, 1991: 69). Anne-Jorunn Berg reached a similar conclusion in her studies of the 
smart home as a gendered construction (Berg, 1994). 
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As the technologists were not successful in enrolling potential customers into their 
network, the scenario of smart home technology for home automation was never a 
commercial success. 
The European Union and the establishment of a smart home care scenario
The development of smart home technology has been a targeted research field within 
the European Union since the beginning of the 1990s.230 This effort, aiming to 
strengthen European industry resulted in several large research projects where smart 
home technology has been in focus.231 In the early 1990s these research projects 
sought to map out potential new user groups and user arenas for smart home 
technology. One such potential new user group that was targeted was the elderly, in 
particular the elderly in need of extensive care services, such as people with 
dementia. Through the shift to elderly and dementia care, a new network of relations 
was established as new alliances were formed between industry, technologists and 
the health-care sector.
The BESTA-project and the building of new alliances
In Norway, the smart home scenario for dementia care was constructed in part by a 
network of actors involved in the BESTA project. The BESTA project represents a 
private initiative by a group of independent consultants with expertise within the field 
of ergonomics. These consultants had previously been engaged in an EU-project 
targeting smart home technology, dementia and the definition of user needs.232 The 
BESTA project was established in 1994 as a joint venture between this group of 
consultants and the multi-national company Siemens, with the aim of developing and 
evaluating smart home solutions designed for people with special needs, such as the 
                                                                                                                                       
Miles, 1991: 69. This is also a point that is made by Anne-Jorunn Berg (1994) in her analysis of the 
smart home as a gendered construction. 
230 Thygesen, 1998: 43. 
231 TED (Technology, Ethics and Dementia); TIDE ASHoRED (‘A Smarter Home for Residents who 
are Elderly or Disabled)’; ENABLE (Challenges in dementia care: Can technology help people with 
dementia?); ASTRID (‘A Social and Technological Response to meeting the needs of Individuals with 
Dementia and their carers’).  
232 See TIDE ASHoRED (‘A Smarter Home for Residents who are Elderly or Disabled’) Work package 
III, ‘User requirements specifications’, 1992. 
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elderly and people with dementia.233 Another important objective of the BESTA 
project was to assess whether there was a market for smart home technology for 
these groups.234 The project was supported by the Research Council of Norway.235
The success of the smart home scenario depended on the building of new alliances 
between technological development and health-care. Through a number of 
conferences, the production and distribution of information material and the 
establishment of two test sites, the BESTA project members worked to enrol new 
actors into their network. In particular, much effort was aimed at enrolling 
municipalities into the BESTA network. In Norway the local authorities are required 
by law to provide necessary health-care services to their inhabitants.236 As the 
municipalities were considered as potential customers of smart home technology, 
information material and invitations to conferences were distributed to the local 
authorities.
Other important actors were electricians and the construction industry. In addition, 
several public agencies played a central role, including the Norwegian State Housing 
Bank, which was responsible for the allocation of funding. A representative from the 
State Housing Bank participated in the conferences arranged by the BESTA network, 
providing information on funding that was specifically linked to smart home 
technology. The BESTA network also worked to establish a network of relations with 
central policy-makers, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, which played an 
important role in proposing legislation.237 Another important actor was the National 
Insurance Agency, which was responsible for the allocation of technical aids to the 
disabled in Norway, through an extensive network of Regional Centres.238 In more 
                                           
233 Clatworthy og Bjørneby, 1994: 2. 
234 ibid: 3. 
235 As a part of the NORINSTALL-programme. 
236 ‘Lov om helsetjenesten i kommunene’ [’Act relating to the municipal health services].
237 In 2001 the Ministry of Health and Social affairs was reorganized into two separate Ministries; the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs. In 2005, the Ministry of Health was re-named ‘the 
Ministry of Health and Care’.  
238 In 2004, the National Insurance Agency was re-organized as a part of NAV; a new constellation of 
employment, social and welfare services in the same organization. 
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recent years, the Delta-Centre has played a key role in the promotion of smart home 
technology in the care/disability context, as a part of the Directorate of Health and 
Social Affairs. 239
4.3:  The establishment of a new welfare policy agenda: the smart home 
scenario
Tønsberg, June 1996
To meet the challenges of the growing number of old citizens it is not sufficient 
to increase capacity in care services, but rather one needs to find new and 
different ways of meeting individual needs. It is also a challenge to ensure 
more power and influence to the users of our health and social system.240
Karin Kaasa, the Director of Health and Social Services in the municipality of 
Tønsberg, speaks to an engaged audience at the international conference 
‘Technology, Ethics and Dementia’. The conference, arranged by the Norwegian 
participants in the EU-funded research network COST A5, ‘Ageing and Technology’, 
is being held in Tønsberg in order to make it possible for the participants to visit a 
real life smart home, the Tjeldveien care flat. Fifty-two participants from sixteen 
European countries are gathered to discuss the role of technology in dementia care. 
The participants come from a variety of backgrounds; those attending are 
researchers, technologists, local politicians, policy makers, architects, philosophers 
and health-care workers. 
In the above excerpt from the Tønsberg conference, the contours of a new welfare-
policy vision are drawn out. This is a vision where recipients of care services are 
empowered and treated as individuals. The need for radical changes to current 
health and social systems is stressed. Smart home technology emerges here as a 
                                           
239 The Delta-centre was established in 1997, initially as a four-year project under the administration of 
the National Insurance Agency. The Delta-Centre address issues of Universal Design and disability. In 
2002 the Delta-Centre became a part of the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs. Reports on smart 
home technology published by the Delta-centre include ’Innføring av smarthusteknologi i det 
kommunale pleie- og omsorgstilbudet’ [Implementation of smart home technology in local care-
services] (15.02.04); ’Smarthus’, [smart home] dvd (19.06.04); ’Smarthusteknologi – planlegging og 
drift i kommunale tjenester’ [Smart home technology – planning and management in municipal 
services] (2005); ’Smarthus for yngre’ [Smart homes for younger people] (15.01.2005); ’Smart home 
technology’ [Smart home technology] (15.07.05). See www.shdir.no/deltasenteret. 
240 Kaasa: ‘Implications of technology for health and social services’, Paper at the ‘Technology, Ethics 
and Dementia’ Conference, Tønsberg, June 1996 (1997: 40). 
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part of this new future, as a means of facilitating the provision of care and 
independent living.241 In the following I will investigate what this vision is, who its 
actors are, what their roles and relations are, and, finally, how this vision promises to 
change care. 
4.3.1: The definition of an impending care crisis 
We are approaching a period in which the number of elderly persons in society 
will be 25%. The ratio of people in work to those receiving pensions or other 
benefits is likely to be as low as 3.2 to 1.242
At the conference ‘Technology, Ethics and Dementia’, the Norwegian organizers 
(independent consultants Simon Clatworthy and Sidsel Bjørneby) introduce their 
paper on ‘smart home installations in Tønsberg’ by presenting demographic data.243
In this way the smart home scenario defines a certain future: the coming of a care 
crisis. A care crisis is predicted because the ratio between people potentially in need 
of care services and the number of people available to provide such services is 
expected to be low. This future is also defined by the Gjærevoll Commission Report, 
which addresses the socioeconomic implications of the expected demographic 
changes in the coming decades.244 According to this report, there will be significant 
changes in the population structure in Norway in the coming fifty years.245
A tidal wave of old people in need of care246
The demographic change is characterized by a large increase in the numbers of 
people above the age of 80, who are statistically in need of more care services than 
                                           
241 Clathworthy and Bjørneby: ‘Smart house installations in Tønsberg’, Paper at the ‘Technology, 
Ethics and Dementia’ Conference, Tønsberg, June 1996 (1997: 67). 
242 Ibid. 
243 Simon Clatworthy and Sidsel Bjørneby were two central members of the BESTA-network; a 
network of alliances that was established to promote smart home technology in dementia care in 
Norway. See 4.2.3 for a further presentation of this network.  
244 NOU 1992: 1. 
245 Ibid: 11. 
246 The expected large increase in the number of old persons in the years to come is referred to as 
‘eldrebølgen’ [the tidal wave of old people] in Norwegian media.     
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the rest of the population.247 Old people, and in particular those over the age of 80, 
are accordingly defined as important actors in the smart home scenario. Of particular 
importance is the fact that the high number of people above the age of 80 is expected 
to lead to a sharp increase in the prevalence of dementia.248 The Welfare Report, a 
government report which addresses central welfare policy issues, including health- 
care services for the elderly and disabled, estimates that there will be approximately 
60 000 people with dementia by 2030.249 The challenge posed by the new 
welfare/care scenario is, first of all, that people with dementia will be in need of 
extensive care services as their illness progresses.250
Too few carers
Another important actor in the smart home scenario is the carers. As the number of 
elderly people in need of care services is expected to increase in the coming 
decades, there will be a need for more carers.251 However, the demographic data 
shows that the availability of working age persons will decline during this time 
span.252 The result, an increasing discrepancy between the perceived need for care 
services and the availability of such services, will exacerbate the care crisis. A major 
challenge of the future is to find ways of solving this situation. Increased use of 
                                           
247 Ibid: 11. 
248 See for example Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 50 (1996-97): 13; and 
Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 53. 
249 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 35 (1994-95): 149.  A number of government reports 
highlight the expected increased incidence of dementia in the coming decades. However, the reports 
operate with different estimates as to how large this increase will be. Engedal and Haugen, two 
prominent figures in dementia care research in Norway, estimate that there will be approximately 
90 000 people with dementia in Norway by 2030 (1996: 20). This figure is based on official statistics. 
In a more recent Government report [Care Plan 2015], it is predicted that within a period of 30-40 
years, there will be approximately 130 000 people with dementia in Norway. See Stortingsmelding 
(Report to the Storting) nr 25 (2005-2006): 45. 
250 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 34 (1999-2000): 22. 
251 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 31 (2001-2002): 29. 
252 NOU 1992: 1, page 75. In particular the Gjærevoll Commission Report mentions that there will be a 
decline of the available workforce between 2020-2040 of about 90 000 persons compared to the 
period before 2020. 
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technical aids and different types of computer-based technologies will play a major 
role in solving this dilemma, according to the Gjærevoll Commission Report.253
Technology is introduced as a new actor to care
The smart home scenario introduces technology as a new actor to care. Technology 
is here defined as ‘new’ technology, such as smart home and computer-based 
solutions. This technology is referred to in the public reports and documents as a 
valuable supplement to (human) care.254 The idea is that some care tasks, such as 
monitoring and control of the residents’ whereabouts may be delegated to 
technology, reducing the need for human labour. As a result, it is assumed that 
technology may help to lessen the impact of the coming care crisis.255
4.3.2: The collapse of current care services?
Traditional care services hold a highly exposed position in the world constructed by 
the smart home scenario. The Gjærevoll Commission Report is particularly critical of 
traditional institutional care, arguing that it offers more expensive and inferior services 
than what is possible through the reorganization of home based care.256 For 
example, many patients in nursing homes have been living in shared rooms until 
recently, which have afforded few opportunities for privacy and independence.257 In 
addition, the Gjærevoll Commission points out; the organization of institutions tends 
to be bureaucratic, which makes it difficult for patients to attend to home-like tasks, 
such as cooking.258 The result has been that patients have adopted a passive role, 
as they have not been encouraged to participate in everyday tasks.259 Another maj
weakness of institutional care, according to the Gjærevoll Commission Report, is that 
services are scaled according to institutional regulations and not by individual 
or
                                           
253 Ibid: 11. 
254 See for example NOU 1992: 1; 11; Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 61.  
255 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 39. 
256 NOU 1992: 1, p. 228. 
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needs.260 This means that patients living in an institution will get the same (high) level 
of care services, irrespective of their individual needs.      
The payment system of institutional care is under attack in the Gjærevoll Commission 
Report. The patients pay a set fee, which is regulated by legislation independent of 
the actual costs of living at the institution.261 This fee covers ‘everything’, including a 
room, food, care services and medicines. The municipality is responsible for 
compensating for the difference between the fees and the actual costs. This means 
that patients are sheltered from the economic responsibilities of the rest of the 
population, by not being made responsible for paying for their own expenses. The 
Gjærevoll Commission Report concludes that in this way the payment system 
alienates people in institutions from society.262
However, home-based services are also criticized. The Gjærevoll Commission 
Report states that although home-based services are provided on an individual 
needs basis, they are inefficient for people in need of 24-hour care services.263 This 
view is shared by Engedal and Haugen, two prominent figures in dementia research 
in Norway, who point out that although home based services have recently increased 
their capacity, it is often not possible to care for people in the later stages of dementia 
in their own homes.264
A further point made by the Gjærevoll Commission Report is that current care 
services are too expensive and inefficient to provide the necessary services for the 
growing number of older people in the future. Major reforms are seen as 
necessary.265 In addition, this report recommends, the quality of the services needs 
to be improved with a focus on meeting individual needs.266
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4.3.3: Summary
In this section I have analysed the future implied by the smart home scenario. This is 
a future where the number of old people in need of care services will increase 
significantly. Concurrently, the availability of carers is expected to remain at today’s 
level, resulting in a care crisis and a collapse of current care services. So how, then, 
does this scenario promise to solve the challenges of the care crisis? First of all, as I 
have argued, technology such as smart home alarms is introduced as a new actor to 
care. The role of technology is to supplement human care and lessen the impact of 
the care crisis. Further, the reorganization of current care services plays a central 
role in meeting the demands of the future care services. Increased individual 
economic responsibility is an important part of this change.
PART II: The scenario and script of the Tjeldveien care flat 
4.4: The specification of four aspects of the smart home scenario 
I will specify four aspects of the smart home scenario as it was realized at the 
Tjeldveien care flat. The argument is that the Tjeldveien care flat emerges with ideas 
of ‘cost-efficient care’, ‘individual care’, ‘home-like care’ and ‘privacy’. The smart 
home scenario is specified through a script analysis, which aims to gain insight into 
which actors the smart home technology defines, what role(s) they are allocated, 
their perceived needs and interests, and on how the script distributes the different 
tasks. In particular, I will draw attention to the tension inherent in the smart home 
script.
4.4.1: The Tjeldveien care flat as cost-efficient care
Cost-efficient care as increased private responsibility
[The residents pay 4200 kroner in rent each month, which includes heating. In 
addition they pay 1300 kroner for food].267
By making the residents pay for rent and food, which covers the actual costs of 
running the care flat, cost-efficient care is made possible at the Tjeldveien care flat. 
As the care flat is the residents’ own home, and not an institution, this form of 
                                           
267 Excerpt from the BESTA-project evaluation-report. See Bjørneby et al, 1996: 28. 
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payment is possible. The smart home scenario defines in this way a future where 
people in need of care services live at home and are responsible for paying for their 
own living-expenses. In addition to the person in need of care services, the 
municipality play a central role in this scenario, as responsible for providing 
necessary health-care services to its inhabitants. As the relations between the 
residents and the municipality are regulated by a tenancy-agreement and not 
institutional regulation, the municipality’s responsibility is reduced to provide for the 
necessary care services. Hence, the municipality is constituted as a landlord and 
service provider.
In light of the increasing numbers of people in need of care services in the coming 
decades, a clearer division between public and private responsibilities is necessary, 
as recommended by NOU 1992: 1.268
In this scenario the residents of the Tjeldveien care flat are inscribed as tenants and 
citizens, with the same rights and responsibilities as anyone else living in their own 
homes. The Gjærevoll Commission report points out that the role of the person in 
need of care services is to be an active and responsible participant in society.269 By 
paying for their own living expenses, the residents become responsible citizens who 
contribute to making cost-efficient care possible. It is, however, important to note that 
the move towards increased private responsibility is not solely about cost-efficiency, 
but also about improving the quality of care. The persons in need of care services are 
expected to take a more active role in voicing their own needs. The cared-for are 
accordingly constituted not as passive recipients of health-care services, but as 
active ‘users’.
The analysis shows that also another form of cost-efficient care is realized at the 
Tjeldveien care flat. This form of cost-efficient care is understood as ‘replacement of 
human care’. In practice these two forms of cost-efficient care are intertwined. 
However, for analytic purposes I will deal with them separately. 
Cost-efficient care as a replacement for human care
                                           
268 NOU 1992: 1, 19-20. 
269 Ibid: 227. This report makes a contrast to institutional care, which is criticized as segregating 
people in need of care services from society by making them passive and helpless.
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[According to the health administration of the municipality of Tønsberg, 
economic considerations were clearly important in the choice of technical 
solutions for the care flat. The installation of the comprehensive alarm and 
monitoring system opened for the possibility of reducing staff levels at night, 
thus reducing the costs of operating the care flat. Because of the alarm system 
it became possible to have a resting instead of an active night carer. ... The 
resting night carer is paid for four hours of duty each night. ... An active night 
carer is paid for nine hours of duty each night].270
This excerpt from the BESTA evaluation report shows how the Tjeldveien care flat 
came with ideas of cost-efficient care as a replacement for human care. Technology 
is allocated a central role in this form of care. As human care is expensive and not 
easily available within this scenario, certain care-tasks are delegated to the 
technology. The idea is that through the delegation of human labour to technology, 
cost-efficient care is achieved through reduction in labour-costs. Hence the 
municipality plays an important role in this scenario, as a service provider.
At the Tjeldveien care flat the smart home alarms serve to replace an active and 
expensive night carer. The script constitutes this technology, in contrast to the 
previous version of cost-efficient care, as active and responsible. The role of the 
technology is to monitor the residents and alert the night carer every time certain pre-
defined incidents happen, such as when a resident does not return to bed within a set 
time frame. The carers, on the other hand, are delegated a more passive role, as 
responders to the alarms. The carers’ responsibility is to take action, to ensure that 
the residents get whatever assistance they need. However, the question is whether 
the technology actually replaces human care. After all, the Tjeldveien care flat is not 
able to function without a night carer or with fewer staff, despite the availability of the 
smart home alarms.271 Instead, the night carer is delegated a different role in the 
smart home scenario, in the sense that she is resting and is paid less.   
Here, and in contrast to cost-efficient care as increased private responsibility, the 
residents are constructed as sick and dependent. First of all they are in need of care, 
which means they are not necessarily independent, responsible and active citizens. 
                                           
270 Bjørneby et al, 1996: 29-30.  
271 In one of the care flats I visited later, however, the alarms are transferred to the night carers at the 
nursing home next door. 
88
4.4.2: The Tjeldveien care flat as individual care
[The basic functions were installed as planned. ... In addition some possibilities 
were installed for later programming according to individual needs. ... . These 
include ... sensors on all doors from the private rooms to the garden and the 
corridor ... and a bed sensor ... which makes programming possible to alert the 
carers if the resident is out of bed for more than a pre-set time interval at night, 
in case of falls or other incidents].272
The above excerpt from the BESTA evaluation report suggests that the Tjeldveien 
care flat comes with a vision of individual care. The residents are defined as 
individuals with divergent needs. It is the residents’ individual needs that are to 
determine what services are offered. The residents are here allocated the role of 
rational and responsible individuals, who are capable of acknowledging and voicing 
own needs. The focus on individual needs as a basis for service allocation is closely 
linked to the division of responsibility between homes and services, and to the 
inscription of people in need of care services as active and responsible participants in 
society. Within this scenario, service-provision is to be determined ‘from the 
perspective of the user’.273 This right of the individual to have a say on matters that 
concerns him/her is legally constituted.274 However, in dementia care, this is a 
process that usually involves a next of kin, who may be (formally or informally) 
allocated the role as patient advocate. These laws do not take into consideration the 
fact that the residents living at the Tjeldveien care flat have a dementia illness that 
may make it difficult for them to know and voice their own needs. 
A final note about what role the script of ‘individual care’ allocates to the other actors. 
First of all, it is the carers’ responsibility to help the residents in mapping out their 
individual needs and to adjust the care services accordingly. The carers are thereby 
assigned the role of assistance provider. However, as the above excerpt shows, 
smart home technology also plays a central role in individual care. The technology is 
presented as flexible, as possible to adapt to individual needs.275 It is the 
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274 See for example Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr. 28 (1999-2000): 14. 
275 Simon Clatworthy and Sidsel Bjørneby, who are both central actors in the BESTA-network, make a 
particular point about the smart home installations being flexible (Clatworthy og Bjørneby, 1997: 71). 
89
responsibility of the carers and the smart home alarms to meet the resident’s 
individual needs. This means that it is the care services, and not the person in need 
of care that is to adapt as the illness progresses and individual needs changes.   
4.4.3: The Tjeldveien care flat as home-like care
The Tjeldveien care flat, June 1996 
As a part of the visit to the Tjeldveien care flat, the group of participants from 
the ‘Technology, Ethics and Dementia’ Conference is allowed into one of the 
resident’s rooms. As the nurse in charge unlocks the door, we enter a nicely 
decorated living room with a sofa and two chairs, pictures on the walls and a 
red rug on the floor. In one corner of the room there is a small kitchen area, 
with a sink, two hotplates and a fridge. There is also a small table with two 
chairs. A door leads into the bedroom. The resident has kept her own bed, as 
she is not in need of the lifting functions of a hospital bed, the nurse in charge 
explains. She points to a small grey plastic cup that is placed under one of the 
bedposts. “This is the bed alarm” she explains, “which detects when the 
resident leaves the bed at night. And if she is not back within thirty minutes, 
the night carer is alerted”.276
Through the division between private and common rooms, the Tjeldveien care flat 
enacts a vision of home-like care.277 The script of the Tjeldveien care flat defines the 
residents as individuals with a need and a right to live in a home-like atmosphere, 
despite being in need of care services. The aim of the care services is to meet the 
residents’ individual needs, thus enabling her or him to lead [“... an active, meaningful 
and independent life”].278 So when living in one’s own original home is no longer 
possible, the home or the home-like atmosphere is moved to wherever the resident 
can live. This vision is articulated by the Gjærevoll Commission Report, which states 
that [“... older persons ... shall have their own place of living – a home, as all other 
citizens”].279 However, the right to live at home does not necessary mean the right to 
live in one’s own original home. What is important is that the person experiences 
                                           
276 Excerpts from field notes, June 1996. I visited the Tjeldveien care flat as a part of a group 
participating at an International Conference in Tønsberg. 
277 This shift, which is referred to as ‘making care more home-like’ (in Norwegian as ‘boliggjøring av 
omsorgen’), was first articulated in NOU 1992: 1, p. 228. 
278 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 13. 
279 NOU 1992: 1, p. 227. 
90
where he or she lives as a home, and not as an institution.280 ‘Home’ is accordingly 
an effect rather than a stable entity. 
The constitution of separate private and common areas at the Tjeldveien care flat is 
important in home-like care, as the private areas are the residents’ legal home. As 
these areas are large enough for the residents’ own furniture and private belongings, 
a home-like atmosphere is created. This is further emphasized, for example, by the 
availability of hot-plates in the private rooms, making home-like duties such as 
cooking possible. Care services are then not just about providing basic care, but 
about ensuring that the residents can continue an active life. It is about meeting the 
‘whole’ person, and not just the illness.281 The smart home alarms are another 
central actor in this scenario. Their role is to make home-like care possible, in the 
sense that they are to provide the necessary safety and protection. This is done, for 
example, by alerting the night carer if the resident is not back into bed within thirty
minutes at night. This means that within the same scenario of home-like care, the 
residents are also constituted as sick and in need of protection when potential risky 
behaviours and incidents are identified and eliminated through the use of smart home
devices. 
4.4.4: The Tjeldveien care flat as privacy
[If we did not have the alarm system we would have to work differently. We 
would have to go more into each individual flat and check on the residents. .
In particularly at night, we would need an active night carer who could ‘do 
rounds’. ... Of course it can discussed whether or not there should be more 
staff here. But ... I think it is right to let them have some privacy, and not 
having to have a staff member present at a ime
..
ll t s. It increases their irritation.
                                           
They have a need to be alone sometimes].282
The smart home alarms at the Tjeldveien care flat makes it possible for the carers to
have an overview of the residents at any one time. The alarms transfer information 
about the residents’ whereabouts, in the sense that the carers are informed if a door 
is opened. The carers are also informed if the hotplates overheat, and of whether the
280 Ibid: 228. 
281 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 45 (2002-2003): 6. 
282 Quotes from staff members’ experiences with the alarm system at the Tjeldveien care flat. Bjørneby 
et al., 1996: 45. 
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residents are back into bed within a set time at night. This means that the carers do 
not have to physically check the whereabouts of the residents. In this way the smar
home alarms can be seen to enact a form of privacy. Policy documents points out 
that [“... respecting the care-recipient’s privacy and need to control his/her own life ... 
is a fundamental aspect of service provision”].
t
e
care flat into private and 
e
and
man control is not necessary. The carers’ role is then 
                                           
283 In addition to the residents and th
smart home technology, the material organization of the 
common areas is a highly valued actor in this scenario. 
Within the smart home script the residents are constructed as autonomous 
individuals with a need and a right for privacy.284 According to the Gjærevoll 
Commission Report, recipients of care services shall [“... have the possibility of 
privacy and an independent life with security and dignity in their own home”].285 On
the other hand, however, the same script inscribes the residents as ‘at risk’ and in 
need of protection. They may forget to switch the hotplates off, fall on the way to th
toilet at night or leave the care flat without supervision. At the Tjeldveien care flat, 
privacy is achieved partly through the delegation of control tasks to the smart home 
technology, and partly by the material and legal distinction between the common 
private rooms. The private rooms make it possible for the residents to physically 
withdraw from the others, while the smart home devices, at the same time, enable 
the carers to have an overview and control of the situation. And as the control tasks 
are delegated to technology, hu
to respond to the alarms only.
An important question here is what kind of privacy is allowed for since the technology
enables the carers to have an overview of the residents at any one time.286 The fact
that the smart home devices are invisible as they are built into the walls of the care 
flat gives associations to ‘Brave New World’ and raises a number of ethical questions
and issues.287 However, it is important to note that the very fact that the smart home 
283 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 13. 
284 Ibid; NOU 1992: 1, p. 228. 
285 NOU 1992: 1, p. 228. 
286 ‘An overview’ in the sense that the carers will be alerted when a pre-defined incident takes place. 
287 Huxley (1932). 
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alarms are invisible contributes to the home-like and private atmosphere of th
flat. Smart home technology as privacy is thus an example of an ambivalent 
technolog
e care 
y: the invisible alarms enact both privacy and lack of privacy at the same 
time.288
an
 the 
he one hand, while on the other hand, they are construed as sick and 
.
me scenario advances different 
values than those of traditional institutional care? 
4.5: Discussion: tensions and ambivalences 
In the preceding sections I have analyzed four aspects of the smart home scenario 
as constructed at the Tjeldveien care flat. Further, I have shown that this care flat c
be seen to come with an ambivalent script which defines partly opposing roles for 
residents and carers. In particular, I have drawn attention to the tension between
roles constructed for the residents: they are inscribed as active and responsible 
residents on t
dependent.
In the following I will briefly elaborate on this tension and ambivalence inherent in the 
smart home script, discussing whether the smart home scenario has been translated 
into a care policy, with the intention of redefining patients, carers and care-relations
The salient question is to what extent the smart ho
4.5.1: New patients?
On the one hand the script of the Tjeldveien care flat defines the residents as active
and responsible economic actors, as tenants living in their own homes, with a right 
and capacity to voice own needs. This is done by legally constituting the care fla
the residents’ own homes, and through the material and legal division between 
common and private rooms. On the other hand, the residents are also inscribed as 
sick, irrational and in need of protection, partly through the specific configuration o
the smart home alarms. As certain behaviours are pre-defined as problematic by 
carers and the programming of the smart home infrastructure, the role of the sm
home alarms is to compensate for these behaviours. This is done through the 
constant monitoring of the residents’ movements. At the same time, the common 
rooms, the 24-hour presence of staff and routines at the care flat serve to define t
ts as 
f
art
he
                                           
288  For another study of ambivalent technology, see Singleton (1993). 
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residents as dependent and in need of constant monitoring. One example of this 
ambivalence is the hot-plates in the residents’ private rooms, which contribute to 
individual and home-like care. The residents are enabled to make their own f
all meals are prepared and eaten together in the common dining area, as in 
traditional institutional care. The point I am making is that smart home technology as 
it is defined at the Tjeldveien care flat simultaneously enacts two different and part
opposing roles for residents: as economically responsible individuals/citizens and 
dependent patients. So, while the smart home script clearly defines new pa
ood, yet 
ly
tient roles, 
it simultaneously re-enacts the patient role of traditional institutional care.   
4.5.2: New carers and care relations?
But to what extent does the smart home script define new carers and care relations? 
First of all, the smart home script defines the role of carers as meeting the resident’s
individual needs. The carers are thereby assigned the role of assistance providers. 
This entails a shift from the traditional role of carers as professional experts, as well
as from routines and staff availability setting the care agenda. One example of this 
shift is the residents’ right to user involvement, which is a legally constituted right to 
actively participate in the process of defining one’s own needs, and to be given the 
opportunity to influence the allocation of care services. The role of the carers is
redefined as a result of a number of tasks being delegated to the smart home 
technology. The night carer at the Tjeldveien care flat, for example, is on a resting 
shift, and responds to alarms only. So, through the emergence of the smart home 
scenario, the carers are no longer responsible for tasks such as p
 also 
hysically controlling 
.
d as 
g a resident’s room. The residents, on their part are entitled to 
refuse the carer entry. 
the whereabouts of the residents, or checking on them at night.
Another important consideration is the fact that the care setting is a home and not an 
institution. The shift from institution to home implies a major change in care relations
The carers are visitors in the residents’ homes in the smart home scenario, an
such they are thus expected to respect the residents’ privacy, for example by 
knocking before enterin
94
4.5.3: Summing up: New care?
In part two of this chapter I have demonstrated that the smart home scenario defines 
two partly opposing roles for residents. The script is ambivalent: on the one hand, 
care is focused on individual needs, as the smart home script constitutes the 
residents at the Tjeldveien care flats as tenants and economically responsible actors. 
New carers and care relations are also constructed. However, on the other hand I 
have shown that the care that is defined also includes elements of traditional 
institutional care, in the sense that the residents are inscribed as sick and dependent. 
In summing up this section, I will nevertheless claim that the smart home scenario 
.
lence is in my opinion a strength of the smart home 
scenario, and is much to be preferred to an ‘either-or’ form of care, which defines 
tients: the more traditional passive and institutionalized patient, or 
r
rt home technology comes with a scenario that constructs 
the social universe in which the technology is to function. Further, this scenario is 
ked. Consequently, smart home technology 
is here referred to as a complex ‘technology care package’. In this chapter I have 
defines a new form of care. The question that arises is what this new form of care 
that is defined by the smart home scenario consist in?
I will argue that this is a form of care that defines a solution embracing an inherent 
tension. The point is that the residents are considered to be more than their illness
Yet within the same scenario they are also constituted as sick and in need of 
protection and care. This ambiva
only one type of pa
the autonomous citizen patient. 
4.6: Conclusions 
In this chapter I have given an account of smart home technology as it emerged in 
the context of dementia care in Norway. This account serves partly as a context fo
more in-depth analyses of smart home technology in the chapters to come. The 
argument is that the sma
specified by a script that defines its actors, the actors’ roles and responsibilities and 
the distribution of tasks. 
Smart home technology in dementia care consists of two different technologies. 
These technologies (the care flat and smart home technology) are results of two 
separate developments that have been lin
shown how the smart home scenario materialized as the Tjeldveien care flat, the first 
smart home in dementia care in Norway. 
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A central concern of this chapter has been to demonstrate how smart home 
technology and policy co-emerged, for instance in and through the Tjeldveien care 
flat. The account shows that the members of the BESTA project were co-producers 
nse
289
our
man
ribed
legislation. 
te
these problem-behaviours are 
                                           
of policy. This means that policy is not solely defined by ideas; technology is also a 
central actor in the production of policy.
In my account I draw extensively on policy documents. An important question is 
whether I, through my use of material, have made policy actors strong at the expe
of the technology. Traditionally, in script analysis the focus is on the technology and 
its network, or alternatively on the users inscribed by the technology. Hence, the 
technology is made a central actor in these accounts.  Through my focus on the co-
emergence of smart home technology and policy, I have tried to avoid both pitfalls.
Further, and through an analysis of the Tjeldveien care flat I have elaborated on f
different aspects of the smart home scenario. I have argued that the smart home
scenario defines a future where care is cost-efficient. This is achieved in part by 
constituting the care flat as the residents own home, thus making the residents 
responsible for paying for their own living expenses. Care is also cost-efficient since 
a number of care tasks are delegated to technology, thus replacing expensive hu
care. The Tjeldveien care flat also enacts individual care. The residents are insc
as individuals with divergent needs, and the care services are designed to meet 
these needs. This right to individual care is also constituted through 
However, as persons with dementia often have difficulties knowing and voicing their 
own needs, this right is usually delegated to a next-of-kin or carer.
Following on from this, I have shown that the smart home scenario come with a 
vision of home-like care, as the need for the identity of a home (or a home-like 
atmosphere) is attributed to the residents. The material and legal distinction of priva
and common rooms at the Tjeldveien care flat constructs certain areas as the 
residents’ own homes. The smart home alarms play an important role in home-like 
care in the sense that the alarms are programmed to compensate for certain pre-
defined problem behaviours. At the Tjeldveien care flat 
289 Technology is described as ’politics by other means’ by Bruno Latour (1987). 
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defined as leaving the care flat without supervision, staying out of bed for more tha
thirty minutes at night, and overheating the hotplates.
And, finally, I have demonstrated that the smart home scenario defines a form of 
privacy, as control tasks are delegated to the technology, making invisible monitoring 
possible. This invisible monitoring may also be understood as a lack of privacy since 
the carers have an overview of the residents at any one time. Thus, the smart home 
n
on with dementia to his/her 
illness, while at the same time acknowledging that the person with dementia needs 
help, and needs to be looked after.
technology as constructed at the Tjeldveien care flat can be seen as an example of 
an ambivalent technology that enacts privacy and lack of privacy simultaneously.
Importantly, the analysis shows that the Tjeldveien care flat come with an ambivalent 
script, which defines partly opposing roles for residents and carers. On the one hand, 
the smart home technology inscribes the residents as active and responsible 
economic actors who pay for their own expenses and live a ‘home-like’ life. On the 
other hand, however, the residents at the Tjeldveien care flat are inscribed as sick 
and dependent as the smart home alarms compensate for at-risk behaviours. This 
means that elements of traditional institutional care are also written into the smart 
home scenario. In the final section of this chapter I have briefly discussed how this 
ambivalence is to be understood. Is the ambivalent script a weakness of the smart 
home scenario? My position is that this ambivalence is a strength of the smart home 
scenario, in the sense that it does not reduce the pers
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Chapter 5
y and dementia care 
ebated
ral tool? Should we fear (new) technology? And does 
 devices 
as
t the 
electronic devices in care may enhance [“... independence and freedom as they 
                                           
Technolog
5.1: Introduction 
This chapter deals with issues of technology in dementia care; namely, what is 
technology, and how to deal with technology in dementia care. In Norway these 
questions, which have been – and still are – controversial, have been much d
during the past decade: Is technology a given entity that determines the carer’s 
actions? Or is it a neut
technology threaten human values? These are some of the central questions and
issues of the debate. 
Issues of technology and care were made into a political issue in the mid 1990s, 
partly following the introduction of smart home technology in dementia care, in the 
form of alarms and monitoring devices, and through a heated public debate about 
proposed legislation to regulate the use of [‘force and coercion and electronic
for monitoring and observation’] in caring for people with intellectual disabilities.290
Politicians took an active role in this debate. The supporters of the proposed 
legislation (who constituted a political majority) maintained that legal regulation w
necessary in order to ensure control of the use of technology in care, arguing tha
right use of technology can improve the quality of care. For instance the use of 
290 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95). 
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{people in need of 24-hour care services} don’t have to have people around them 
continually, and will hence be given the opportunity to be alone”].291 The opponents
on the other hand, stressed that technology should have no 
,
role in care, as it may 
mean surveillance.292 In the words of Tove Kari Viken, MP: 
t ceptable. (...) This use of technology will soon expand to other 
echnology
rpts
iven
logy is 
as
, as a question of ethical and legal values that 
of
                                           
[We are very dissatisfied with the proposed legislation, and in particular with 
the permission to use electronic surveillance. We are of the opinion that such
use is no ac
groups].293
The significance of this debate is that the assumptions and positions on technology of
the two partly opposing fronts have come to frame policy and debates on t
and care in Norway during the past decade. Policy, which in this thesis is 
materialized as legal documents, ethical guidelines, government reports and exce
from a public debate, impinges on care practices. The argument I develop is that 
policies on technology and care are based on an understanding of technology as 
something new to be introduced into care. Further, this technology is seen as a g
entity that works on society, for better or for worse, and as separate from – and 
potentially in opposition to – human care. The use of technology in care is thus 
framed as an issue of control, as a question of how to ensure that the techno
used in the right way – in order to provide good care. From this perspective, 
technology is something to be evaluated, regulated and judged from the outside, as a 
question for ethicists and lawyers. The point is that policy on technology and care h
been framed as an issue of principle
are detached from actual practices. 
An important aim of this chapter is to show that this principle-based approach is too 
limited as it fails to recognize and acknowledge how technology is already a part 
care practices, forming and transforming care in unexpected ways. Further, and 
drawing on theoretical resources and tools from Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), I will argue that the introduction of a different, empirical oriented approach as 
291 Interview with Anne-Lise Høegh (MP) in Dagbladet (Norwegian National Newspaper) 01.02.1996: 
13, feature article ‘Elektronisk overvåking av utviklingshemmede’ [‘Electronic surveillance of people 
with intellectual disabilities’].  
292 Tove Kari Viken, Stortingsforhandlingene [Proceedings and Debates of the Storting], 1996: nr 8, 13 
juni: 495-496. 
293 Stortingsforhandlingene [Proceedings and Debates of the Storting], nr 8, 13 juni 1996: 495-496. 
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well as analytical tools and concepts will prove a fruitful supplement to current polic
on technology and care. This chapter can
y
 be read as a call for a more empirically-
serve as 
f these assumptions and positions for the framing of policy 
s to 
 role 
nomenon
and
gies and how this embroglio 
296
c
                                           
oriented policy on technology and care.
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I briefly characterize the public
debate on technology and care that preceded the passing of the bill in June 1996, 
and outline its relevance for issues of dementia care.294 This account is will 
a context for a more in-depth analysis of the assumptions and positions on 
technology that policy on technology and care is based upon. I will then go on to 
analyse the implications o
on technology and care.
In the second part of this chapter I will introduce the empirical tools and resource
the field. I do this by working through excerpts from fieldwork and by mobilizing 
theoretical concepts from STS. The key questions in this chapter are: What is the
of technology in dementia care?  And how does it form and transform care? My
primary concern is to show that technology and care are an intertwined phe
that is constituted (or shaped) in and through everyday care practices. For 
conceptualizing this complex web of relations between technology and care I 
mobilize the notion of ‘mutual shaping’ through which technology is not seen as
something that is added on to human care.295 Instead technology and care are 
understood in terms of a mutual relationship where the different entities influence 
shape each other in specific ways. Secondly, and drawing again on the notion of 
‘script’ I will show how the social is written into technolo
of technology and care produces a form of stability.
Finally, I will investigate how technology, in and through its practices, contains 
values. The values that will be enacted are not given, but are a result of the specifi
constellations of humans, technology, expectations and scenarios that are written 
into the technology, as well as its actual use and context. Another important issue is
the assumed dichotomy between technology and human care of the public debate, 
294 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95). 
295 MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999: 23; Berg, 1996: 2.  
296 The notion of ‘embroglio’ was developed by Bruno Latour. See Latour (1999b). 
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that technology leads to less human care. The point I am making is that as it is n
given which relations that is enacted in technology-care constellations, there is 
always a possibility that technology may lead to less human care. However, the 
opposite is also a possibility: technology may contribute to more human care. A 
further issue is whether or not technology may serve to make care more human. The 
argument is that ‘human care’ as it is enacted through the public debate, is assumed 
to be embodied, responsive, relational and emotional. The question to be considered
is whether technology may
ot
 contribute to more embodied, responsive, relational and 
 aim 
nda, I will make reference to developments and actors 
introduced in chapter four.
ART I: POLICIES ON TECHNOLOGY AND CARE 
gh
                                           
emotional forms of care?
In addressing issues of policy on technology and care, this chapter builds on the 
insights of chapter four. However, whereas the aim of chapter four was to draw out 
the broad technical-political setting and future of smart home and its actors, the
of this chapter is to address in more detail the assumptions on technology that 
current policy is based upon, and to confront these assumptions with empirical data,
showing how technology and care are part of dementia care practices. This means 
that in part one of this chapter, as I account for how issues of technology and care 
were put on the political age
P
5.2: A political issue is made and put on the political agenda 
In this section I will give a brief account of how technology and care is made into a 
political issue and is put on the political agenda. In doing so I draw in particular on the 
work of Kristin Asdal, and an understanding of the political as enacted in and throu
a range of material resources and practices.297 This means that also science and
technologies are involved, for example in the form of surveys and statistics, and 
ser (2008) and Asdal (2008). 297 Asdal (2004); Asdal, Borch and Mo
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produce the case in particular ways.298 A crucial point is that ‘putting an issue on the 
political agenda’ is demanding and requires a lot of work.299
My account is partly based on an analysis of relevant policy and legal documents, as 
well as on transcripts from the political debate in the Storting.300 In addition, I have 
drawn in excerpts from the debate in Norwegian newspapers during the early months 
of 1996. However, also a constellation of independent consultants and 
representatives from industry known as the BESTA-project play an important role in 
the making of technology and care as a political issue and in shaping policy. The 
argument is that both the legislative and BESTA actors contributed in constructing 
technology and care as something new that had the potential to change care - for 
better or for worse, and which required regulation. 
The objective of this section is to provide a context for a more in-depth analysis of the 
assumptions and positions on technology that current policy is based upon, and their 
implications. 
5.2.1: Legal regulation: a policy in the making 
Technology and care was made an issue on the political agenda when the Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs proposed a new bill in 1995. This proposed legislation was 
regulating the [use of force and coercion and electronic devices for monitoring and 
observation] in care for people with intellectual disabilities.  The issue of technology 
had been raised by a number of health professionals and Regional Health Authorities 
in a survey conducted by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1994/95, that 
sought to map out the extent of use of force and coercion in care for people with 
intellectual disabilities.  This survey, which was conducted in the context of the 
301
302
                                           
298 See also Barry (2001). 
58 (1994-95), Odelstingsproposisjon 
(Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 57 (1995-96), Innstilling O. (Recommendation Odelsting) nr 79 (1995-
as the first 
proposed legal regulation of the use of electronic devices in care-services. Stortingsforhandlinger
: 494. 
sisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 9 and 26. 
299 Asdal, Borch and Moser, 2008: 6. 
300 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 
96) and Beslutning O. (Decision Odelsting) nr 80 (1996). 
301 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95). This proposition w
(transcripts from the political debate in Parliament) nr 8 (13-18 juni), sesjon 1995-96
302 Odelstingspropo
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recent deinstitutionalization of care for people with intellectual disabilities, revealed 
that a number of different technologies, including bed, door and window alarms, w
in regular use.  This use of technology in care was considered problematic by the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The alarms and monitoring devices were see
as potentially intrusive technologies that might infringe on the individual’s right to 
freedom and privacy.  The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs proposed that the 
use of technology in care was to be treated as an act of coercion, which meant it
would be have to adhere to specific rules and procedures.  The legislative p
contains many references to ‘people with dementia’ as a group whose members, 
people with intellectual disabilities, [“... lacks the ability to judg
ere
n
roposal
like
e or express their 
situation”].306 The issues of coercion and legal rights of the two groups were 
which led the 
303
304
305
considered by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to coincide, 
Ministry to propose a similar bill for people with dementia.307
5.2.2: The BESTA project as an important actor in shaping policy 
In October 1995, and parallel to the proposal of the first bill on technology and care, 
the first ‘smart home’ for people with dementia was created: the Tjeldveien care flat
Tønsberg.
 in 
he care 
d
lerted every time a resident leaves his/her bed at night or opens 
308 A number of alarms and monitoring devices were installed at t
flat, including door alarms, bed alarms and heat detectors. The alarms are activate
to alert the carer a
their terrace door to the garden outside the care flat. Similarly, the power is 
automatically cut off and the carers alerted if a hotplate installed in the residents’ 
rooms overheats. 
                                           
303 Ibid: 26. 
304 Ibid. 
305 The issue of legal rights and coercion was a central inducement behind the law proposal, and is 
closely tied up with policy regulation on technology and care. However, this is not the subject-matter of 
this chapter, and will therefore not be dealt with here. 
306 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 3. 
307 Ibid. 
308 The notion of ‘smart home’ refers to the integration of smart home technology, such as alarms and 
monitoring devices in a building. The point is that a technological infrastructure is integrated in the 
building, making it possible to pre-programme alarms and monitoring devices according to individual 
needs. See chapter 4 for a more thorough analysis of this phenomenon.  
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The Tjeldveien care flat was a result of the BESTA project, an important actor in 
shaping policy on technology and care. The BESTA project worked to make the u
of technology in care into a new and explosive issue, which required legislation. The 
BESTA project consisted of a group of independent consultants with strong ties to 
industry.
se
 for people with 
special needs, including the elderly and people with dementia.310 Through the 
tant alliances were made between the health-care sector, 
using
309 This project was supported by the Research Council of Norway with the 
aim of developing and evaluating smart home solutions designed
BESTA project impor
industry and a number of public agencies such as The Norwegian State Ho
Bank, The National Insurance Agency and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.
5.2.3: Public debate
The proposed legislation, which was supported by a political majority, was 
controversial and caused a heated debate in the Norwegian media (newspapers and 
TV) during the early months of 1996.  A number of actors, including politicians,
journalists, a prominent human rights lawyer and numerous next-of-kin, were enrolle
in an alliance that called on the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to withdraw this
bill.  This was a broad debate that was not limited to issues of surveillance and 
care for people with intellectual disabilities, but which also brought in other perceived 
‘vulnerable groups’, such as people with dementia.  The massive negative me
focus caused the Ministry o
311
d
dia
f Health and Social Affairs to withdraw the bill in March 
314
observation was omitted.
312
313
1996. Two months later a modified proposal was submitted.  This revised proposal 
contained some substantial changes. The most significant change with relevance for 
the issue of surveillance was that the use of electronic devices for purposes of 
                                           
309 See chapter four (‘The emergence of smart home technology in dementia care’) section 4.2.3 for a 
 project and its main actors.
ee Thygesen (1998). 
rvåking av utviklingshemmede’ 
more thorough description of the BESTA
310 Clathworthy and Bjørneby, 1994: 2. 
311 For a more thorough analysis of this public debate s
312 The human rights lawyer was Gro Hillestad Thune. 
313 Dagbladet (National newspaper) 01.02.96: 13 ‘Elektronisk ove
[Electronic surveillance of people with intellectual disabilities]. 
314 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 57 (1995-96). 
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The only time this bill was debated in the Storting was prior to the final vo
1996. This was a comprehensive debate that lasted considerably longer than 
originally scheduled.
te in June 
aluation, become permanent.317 In addition, and in 
as
was interviewed. [We use the smart home 
technology not as surveillance, but as extra protection for the residents], she said, 
al 
ic
devices in care for people with intellectual disabilities’], was made permanent on 1 
January 2004.321 A similar process of legal regulation was initiated with respect to 
315 The politicians on both sides expressed that this was a 
difficult and sensitive issue that demanded extra safeguard.316 The legal 
amendments were therefore suggested to be limited to three years, and then, 
pending the outcome of an ev
order to ensure ‘good practice’, the legal amendments were to be based on a 
comprehensive official directive.318 The modified bill was passed by the Norwegian 
parliament in June 1996.319
The Tjeldveien care flat, which aroused both national and international attention, w
drawn directly into the Norwegian public debate in February 1996 by national 
television.320 [Here people with dementia are subject to surveillance] the newsreader
told the viewers, with obvious reference to the use of smart home technology, as 
pictures from the Tjeldveien care flat were shown on the screen. These accusations 
were denied by the nurse in charge, who 
adding that vigilance was necessary as such technologies could easily be misused.
In the decade that has followed since the public debate and the passing of the first 
bill, the issue of technology and care has been a central theme on the health-politic
agenda. The modified legislation regulating the use of [‘force, coercion and electron
                                           
315 Stortingsforhandlinger [Proceedings and Debates of the Storting] nr 8. 13-18 juni 1996. 
316 Ibid: 484. 
317 Innstilling O. (Recommendation Odelsting) nr 79 (1995-96): 21. 
318 Stortingsforhandlinger [Proceedings and Debates of the Storting], nr 8 13-18 juni 1996: 478.  
319 Beslutning O. (Decision Odelsting) nr 80 (13 juni 1996). 
320 NRK Dagsrevyen 17.02.96 (my translation). 
321 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 55 (2002-2003). 
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people with dementia, resulting in the passing of a proposed bill in 2006.322 During 
the same time period, several official guidelines have been produced that address
323
ersies
important influence in the forming of current policy on technology and care.
specific ethical and legal issues relating to the use of technology in care.
Throughout the past decade the assumptions and positions on technology that policy
is based on have remained the same. The public debate and political controv
surrounding the first proposed legislation can hence be seen to have had an 
5.2.4: Current policy: technology as something new to be introduced into care
What the different actors involved in making technology and care into a political issue 
have in common is that technology is considered as something new to be introduced 
into care. Some technologies constructed as old, such as locks or conventional alar
cords, seemed to be overlooked or taken for granted. As a result, current policy on 
technology and dementia care focuses on how to deal with new technology. [Care 
Plan 2015] defines new technology as [information- and communication (ICT)-ba
technologies, smart home solutions, telemedicine and new care technology].
These technologies are treated by the legal/policy documents as peculiar, in the 
sense that they are seen to be more comprehensive than other technologies, a
thereby in need of tight regulation and control. This is required because [“new 
technological developments continually increase the possibility for surveillance and
control”].  Alarms based on smart home technology can be used in a number of 
                                           
m
sed
nd are 
324
325
322 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 64 (2005-2006). This law proposal is n
aimed specifically at the dementia diagnosis, but includes persons without competence to give their 
informed consent to health-care treatment. However, the issue of technology and dementia care is
also dealt with extensively in Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000). S
particular pages 61-64. Later, in 2002, a bill regulating the use of coercion and electronic de
ot
ee in 
vices was 
rejected by the majority at the official hearing. (See Sosialdepartementet, Høringsnotat. ’Lov om 
rettigheter for og begrensning og kontroll med bruk av tvang mv overfor personer med demens’, mai 
2002). 
323 See for example ‘Hjelpemidler og etikk’ [Technical aids and ethics], Rikstrygdeverket  (National 
Insurance Agency), 2001;  ‘Veileder i smarthusteknologi’ [‘Guidelines to smart home technology’] 
Deltasenteret, Sosial- og helsedirektoratet (The Delta Centre, the Directorate for Health and Social 
Affairs), 2002; and ‘Smart home Technology. Planning and management in municipal services’ 
(English version), The Delta Centre, the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, 2005.  
324 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 25 (2005-2006): 13. 
325 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 26. 
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different ways, including passive monitoring. This means that the monitoring
consciously initiated by the person him/herself, but by certain pre-set conditions such
as getting out of bed or opening the entrance door at night. The point is that the 
alarms and monitoring devices are programmed according to
 is not 
 certain pre-defined 
problematic behavioural patterns. And as the person performs any of these 
 I have accounted for how different actors were involved in making the issue of 
In the following section I will discuss in more detail the assumptions and positions on 
 upon, as well as their implications. This 
5.3.1: Policy on technology and care
behaviours, an alarm is transmitted to the care staff. Another aspect of this 
technology is that it is often integrated into the building, making it impossible to see. 
The person may not be aware of being monitored. In this way the new technology is 
seen as intrinsically different from conventional technology.  
5.3: Assumptions and positions on technology – and its implications for policy 
Above
technology and care political. However, it is important to note that this ‘cooperation’ 
about one case did incorporate a set of different assumptions and positions on 
technology that were played out in discussions. These different assumptions and 
positions are important as they have contributed in framing policy on technology and 
care.
technology that current policy is based
discussion draws on the political reports and documents, as well as relevant excerpts 
from the public debate and the political debate in the Storting that led up to the first 
bill being passed in June 1996. 
So, wh
demen l.
I will deal with these separately. 
hat
tivated,
                                           
at assumptions and positions on (new) technology is policy on technology and 
tia care based upon? Three different patterns seem to emerge in the materia
Technology is given and will determine the carer’s actions
[It is possible to imagine that {technical} systems may be installed in a way t
implies the use of coercion; for example a photo-cell which, when ac
alerts personnel and temporary locks the door].326
326 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 27. 
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In the policy documents, the notion of ‘technology’ refers to technological artefac
such as alarms and monito
ts
ring devices. These artefacts or things are seen as 
ic
aking over care by setting the terms for how 
e policy 
that
economic considerations should not take precedence over providing [sound 
professional and ethical services that are targeted at the needs of the individual].330
                                           
different from care, as a given and autonomous entity that is introduced into care. 
The technology is given in the sense that it is considered to be a result of 
technological development, a development that is run or driven either by its own 
internal/independent logics or by an even stronger economic logic and that has 
specific impacts on care.
One expected impact of technology on care that was problematized in the publ
debate, was the fear that technology will determine the carers’ actions: that the 
carers will have to surrender to the technology, and not be able to influence it. Kåre 
Willoch, a former prime minister who has a grandson with an intellectual disability, 
voiced his concern about [... a practical system with a person sitting in a central 
location, monitoring the persons with intellectual disabilities]. 327 Implicit in this 
statement is the fear of technology t
human care can be performed. As the technology is given, it presupposes a certain 
way that this handling is to be done. And once the electronic devices are installed, 
human care is reduced to sitting in front of the monitor. In the public debate, likewise, 
the outcome of this ‘electronic service provision’ was perceived as given and to ‘have 
its price’, namely, surveillance. 328
This fear of technology determining the carers’ actions is less prominent in th
documents, which express a concern that the drive towards more cost-efficient care 
services will lead to the replacement of necessary human care. The concern is 
economic interests alone will determine what kind of care that is offered, rather than 
professional and ethical standards.329 The initial legislative proposal stressed that 
327 Dagbladet (Norwegian National newspaper) 31.01.96. Feature article: ’Needs care not surveillance’ 
[Trenger omsorg – ikke overvåking’]. 
328 Aftenposten (Norwegian National newspaper) 21.01.96, Feature article: ’For å spare penger’ [For 
the sake of saving money’]. 
329 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 39. 
330 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 27. 
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This is a formulation that is repeated subsequent policy documents. However, 
according to the political opposition, economic considerations and the move towards 
ility of alarms and monitoring devices will naturally 
lead to a temptation to use more and more of them in an increasingly pressured 
situatio
nt to 
beings in 
e to 
ialized and taken under control. This means that it is not the 
Instead, it is considered an important supplement to care, as something that might be 
added
Cold technology will push away warm human care 
d camera-lenses].
efficiency will win, as [the availab
n in the care sector].331
Technology is a (neutral) tool 
[Experiences show that smart home technology can be a useful suppleme
human care, if it is used in an ethically justifiable manner].332
Policy is also based upon an understanding of technology as a neutral tool. From this 
perspective, the use of technology in care is considered as both necessary and 
desirable, as facilitating arrangements that may serve to increase the person’s 
independence.333 This understanding is based on the assumption of human 
control of technology. So, although technology may be misused, for exampl
replace necessary human care, this is a matter that can be influenced by political, 
legal and ethical means. The challenge of new technology is that it must be 
regulated, soc
technological device itself that determines whether care is good, but its use. Proper 
regulation is necessary in order to ensure that the technology is used according to its 
intentions.334
Another important point is that technology is not seen to change care intrinsically. 
 on to care. 335 Care is here equal to human care.
[I fear a development where we bit by bit replace warm care and human 
closeness with cold technique an 336
                                           
331 Lars Sponheim (leader, Centre-left party), Stortingsforhandlingene (Proceedings and Debates of 
elding (Report to the Storting) nr 25 (2005-2006): 81. 
): 26. 
 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Parliament) nr 28 (1999-2000): 62. 
the Storting), June 1996: 495 (my translation). 
332 Stortingsm
333 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95
334 Ibid: 28. 
335
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A third assumption about technology that was particularly prominent in the public 
debate that preceded the passing of the first bill on technology and care in June 
1996, was the fear that cold technology would be used to replace warm human care. 
[“It is human contact, warmth and care these people need, and not electronic 
surveillance”] declared Tove Kari Viken, MP and a representative of the political 
opposition, in her speech in the Storting.337 This position on technology can be seen 
as a fear of the instrumental rationality that technology is believed to represent. 
Technological logic is considered to be essentially different, and not compatible with 
the logic of care. Technology is then understood as something that is – in itself in 
opposition to human care, since the instrumental rationality that governs technology 
may come to influence and possibly dominate care relations, resulting in de-
humanized care. Referring back to the quotes above, from this perspective human 
care is enacted as ‘warm’, as something that is based on contact, closeness and 
concern for the other person. In other words, human care is perceived as embodied, 
responsive, relational and emotional.   
This position on technology and care was shared by the political opposition to the first 
proposed legislation on technology and care and was widely expressed in the public 
debate. The use of electronic devices was characterized in one media-article as 
treating people like [animals with electronic tags].338 It was also claimed that the 
electronic devices would make people in need of care [prisoners in their own 
homes].339 Implicit in these statements is, again, an understanding of technology as a 
single entity, as given and with given consequences. So no matter how the 
technology is used, by whom or in what context, the outcome will always be the 
same: surveillance. 
In the policy documents this position on technology is less pronounced, although 
there is recognition that the use of technology in care may cause the person being 
                                                                                                                                       
336 Lars Sponheim (MP), Stortingsforhandlingene (Proceedings and Debates of the Storting), 13.06. 
1996: 494. 
337 Stortingsforhandlingene (transcripts from the political debate in Parliament): 13.06. 1996: 496. 
338 ’Som kyr med kø-fri brikke’, Aftenposten (Norwegian National newspaper) 01.02.96: 7.   
339 ’Som fanger i eget hjem’, Dagbladet (Norwegian National newspaper) 20.01.96: 14. 
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cared for to experience a feeling of alienation from society as s/he loses control over 
his/her own life.340
Mixture of opposing views
It is important to note that the different assumptions and positions are mixed in the 
policy documents. For example, the initial legislative proposal states that [technical 
devices may imply a serious encroachment on the individual’s right to freedom and 
privacy] and that [technological development contributes to making new forms of 
surveillance and control possible].341 Yet the same proposal points out that [such 
devices may also contribute to increase the person’s independence … and may be 
less infringing than having personnel present at all times].342 These formulations are 
also prominent in other policy documents, demonstrating that there is a movement in 
policy between the different positions, which can be seen as partly reinforcing each 
other.343 One example of how the different views are mixed is the tension between 
the understanding of technology as a neutral tool and the fear that cold technology 
will push away warm human care. The policy documents clearly express the fear that 
technology will replace necessary and warm human care, while stressing that this will 
only happen if the technology is used in this way. The underlying assumption is that 
the technology is a neutral entity that can be controlled.344
5.3.2: The wider relations: assumptions and positions on technology and society 
Above I have presented three different assumptions and positions on technology on 
which policy on technology and care is based. In this section I take the analysis 
further, by asking what the different positions entail. And how do these assumptions 
and positions on technology relate to society in a broader context?
First of all, policy and the policy related documents (such as the excerpts from the 
public debate) are based on a deterministic understanding of technology. This means 
                                           
340 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 39. 
341 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 26. 
342 Ibid: 26-27. 
343 See for example Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 61-62. 
344 See Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 61. 
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that technology is seen as an autonomous power, as an expression of a logic that 
develops independently of society, in a separate sphere, and with effects on
society.345 Society is seen as a product that is influenced or shaped by technological 
development, and the focus of policy on technology and care is to deal with its 
consequences. In its strongest form, it is not only the technology that is given, but 
also its consequences. In the policy related documents this position is reflected in the 
fear that the technology will determine the carers’ actions, that the technology will 
end up controlling what the carers do. The relationship between technology and 
society is perceived as a simple cause-and-effect sequence.346
However, technological determinism is also prominent in more moderate forms in the 
policy documents, such as in the understanding of technology as a neutral tool. Here, 
the technology is still given but its consequences are seen as in control of humans. 
This optimistic version of determinism can be understood as a rationalist and utopian 
story of hope, according to Hans Harbers, a historical sociologist who has written 
extensively on issues of technology.347 From such a perspective both natural and 
social relations can be known and controlled, as humans are the measures of all 
things.348
A more pessimistic version of technological determinism also influences policy on 
technology and care. In the public debate this position is articulated as a fear that 
cold technology will push away warm human care. Technology is seen as a threat to 
humanity and authenticity, as a rationalization and instrumentalization of everyday 
life. Technology is given in the sense that it represents a certain rationality and 
instrumentality that colonizes and pushes away the humane. Technology is then 
seen as incompatible with the humane, as representing an essentially different 
reality. This position implies of an understanding of technology as a threat to human 
care. In more recent times, Jürgen Habermas, a German philosopher and sociologist 
in the tradition of critical theory, is commonly associated with this position on 
                                           
345 MacKenzie and Wajcman;1999: xiv (my emphasis). 
346 Ibid: 4. 
347 2005: 12. See also Sejersted (1998) and Moser (1993).
348 Ibid. 
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technology.349 However, whereas Habermas has addressed this issue from a 
philosophical viewpoint, other social scientists have taken a more empirical 
approach.350
Hans Harbers points out that these two contradictory stories (the rationalist story of 
hope and the dystopian story of despair), set the stage for how technology’s role in 
society in general is understood.351 A central argument in Harbers’ analysis is that 
these scenarios are not merely philosophical positions, but also cultural 
understandings (or discourses). So, according to Harbers, although technological 
determinism has been severely criticized from different positions during the past 20-
30 years, this way of thinking is still endemic at all levels of society, in common 
sense, fiction and in policy prose.352
This is an understanding that is shared by Francis Sejersted, a Norwegian historian 
in the field of social and economic history.353 According to Sejersted dominates 
technological determinism public debates and, to a surprisingly great extent, sets the 
terms for policy development.354 He traces the idea of technological determinism 
back to the optimism of the Enlightenment during the eighteenth century.355
Sejersted’s argument is that the pessimistic or dystopian discourse on technology is 
just as old as the technological optimism of the Enlightenment. Throughout history, 
these two expressions of technological determinism have co-existed together in a 
dialectic pattern: dystopian discourses accompany utopian discourses.356 This 
means that the positions implicit in the development of policy on technology and ca
are deeply embedded cultural patterns that cannot easily be wished awa
re
y.
                                           
349 Habermas (1980).
350 Examples of the latter are Tarja Cronberg’s studies of technologies in everyday life (1986/1988)
and Langdon Winner’s work (1977 and 1985/99).
351 Harbers, 2005: 12. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Sejersted (1998). 
354 Ibid: 10-11. 
355 Ibid: 12. 
356 Ibid: 13. 
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Another aspect of technological determinism is the conception of technology as end-
products, such as alarms and monitoring devices. Technology is seen as containing 
a core or manifestation of an instrumental logic, which implies that technology is seen 
as essentially different and separate from practices. As a consequence, technology is 
also perceived of as a single entity, as stable and unified. In other words, technology 
is seen as activating the same processes and consequences independent of 
technological differences and of the context of its use. This assumption forms one of 
the foundations for policy in the sense that the use of technology becomes 
predictable and controllable from outside practices and the context of its use. 
The dominance of technological determinism has been seriously challenged in more 
recent work in Science and Technology Studies (STS) through the turn towards 
constructivism/social shaping in the mid 1980s and the shift in theoretical focus from 
a one-sided focus on technology’s effects on society to the question and empirical 
analysis of how technologies are formed in various social relations.357 The STS field 
as such can be seen to have originated from this stance against technological 
determinism. The book ‘The social shaping of technology’, compiled by Donald 
MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, was influential in this shift.358 In a series of articles 
the determinist position is criticized, both on a political and on an intellectual basis:
Politically it {technological determinism} seems (...) to encourage a passive 
attitude to an enormously important part of our lives. It discourages creative 
engagement with technology, narrowing the apparent range of political 
possibility to a limited and unattractive set of options: uncritical embracing of 
technological change, defensive adaptation to it, or simple rejection of it. 
Intellectually, technological determinism seems (...) to reduce the intimate 
intertwining of society and technology to a simple cause-and-effect 
sequence.359
Instead, technologies are seen to manifest a social and political agenda. The aim of 
these studies is to define possibilities for influencing technological developments, and 
thus to interfere in the shaping of a technology. This insight is achieved through 
detailed case studies focused on how the technology got its shape and form in 
                                           
357 See Chapter 2 (‘Theoretical tools and resources’) for a more thorough account of this shift and the 
issues debated, pt. 2.3.  
358 1985/1999. 
359 1999: xiv. 
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different contexts. Technology is not a given entity that develops outside society, but 
is understood as different social and cultural entities.360
5.3.3: Further implications for policy on technology and care
So, within policy on technology and care, technology is perceived of as a given 
autonomous entity and as an artefact that is introduced into society and with certain 
effects on society. The next question is – What are the implications of these 
assumptions and positions for policy on technology and care? 
There is a right (and wrong) way of using technology in dementia care 
One implication of understanding technology as a given entity with certain given 
consequences for dementia care is that there is a right and a wrong way of using 
technology. A right way of using technology in care will ensure that the technology is 
used in accordance with values and ideals that protect the individual’s personal 
integrity.
 Outside control is necessary in order to ensure the right use of technology
Following from the assumption that there is a right way of using technology in care, a 
notion of control becomes essential. The issue becomes how to ensure that 
technology is used in the right way, so that human dignity is maintained, and that 
human care is not replaced by technology. In ethical and legal discourse, this control 
comes from the outside, from legal regulation and ethical guidelines. As technology is 
seen to be representing an instrumental economic rationality it is important to ensure 
that people give their informed and voluntary consent to its use, e.g. because they 
value the safety or security that the technology may provide. In this way, through their 
informed consent, it is assumed that control over economic rationality is ensured.361
A wrong way of using technology in this context is defined as replacing humans with 
                                           
360 Other important sources of criticism of technological determinism have been Socialist Feminism 
and different versions of Marxism. See Asdal et al, 2001: 14-19 and Moser, 2007: 329-348. 
361 The use of informed consent in dementia care as a means to ensure autonomy is highly 
problematic, but this issue will not be addressed here. 
115
technology that monitors patients.362 This implies that the patients, if their privacy 
were respected, would say no to such monitoring. 
The right way of using technology in care is seen as a prerequisite for achieving good 
care, whereas the wrong use of technology is considered to lead to bad care.363 In 
the policy documents, the basic principle is that technology is to be used in 
accordance with individual needs and not as a means to save money:364
[The Ministry {of Social Affairs} have found it necessary to set conditions ... for 
the use of intrusive alarm and monitoring systems. ... {T}hese are measures 
that imply encroachments of the right to privacy and freedom of movement. 
Such measures should not be accepted unless there is a situation that can 
have unacceptable consequences for the receiver of care services him/herself 
or his/her environment. ... The crucial condition {for the use of alarm and 
monitoring-devices} must be the care-recipient’s need for care and 
supervision, and not the health-care services’ need to save resources, 
efficiency, etc].365
Technology is to be a supplement to and not a replacement for necessary human 
care.366 Further, technology should not be used for purposes of surveillance.367
However, the policy documents do not specify what this entails.
The framing of care 
The result is that the use of technology in care is framed as an issue of legal and 
ethical control. The concern becomes one of securing the individual’s legal rights by 
ensuring procedures of informed consent in accordance with the dominant ethical 
and legal ideals. The implication is that the use of legal rules, principles and (ethical) 
guidelines becomes the main focus when dealing with issues of technology and 
                                           
362 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 27-28. 
363 Using technology ‘the wrong way’ is first of all assumed to lead to surveillance and hence to care 
without dignity (ibid). 
364 See for example Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 39 and the official 
guideline on smart home technology: ‘Smart home technology. Planning and management in 
municipal services’, (English version), Directorate for health and Social Affairs/The Delta Centre, 2005: 
30.
365 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 28. 
366 Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 39 and 62. 
367 Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 26 and 28-29.  
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dementia care. This is an understanding that is removed from the actual context in 
which care is practiced. As such it represents a very limited understanding of what 
technology is and its role in care. Moreover, as will become apparent in Part Two of 
this chapter, it prescribes an unsatisfactory set of tools for understanding and dealing 
with technology in care. 
PART II: EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF TECHNOLOGY AND DEMENTIA CARE  
Instead of treating technology as a given entity, which is to be added (or not added) 
on to human care, I wish to emphasize the materiality and practice of care. In order to 
do so I draw on theoretical resources and insights from Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) particularly from Actor-Network Theory (ANT).
The starting point of my investigation is that no distinctions are made with regards to 
the relations between technology and care. This means that the social is not seen as 
purely social, but as technosocial in the sense that the material participates in the 
relations that constitute the social world.368
Through its focus on everyday dementia care practices, this thesis builds on a recent 
body of work in ANT. Through feminist engagements with STS, newer ANT has 
increasingly been engaged in issues of medicine and health.369 This involves a shift 
of focus away from the construction of scientific facts, objects and technologies alone 
to technologies in everyday practices.   
This second part of the chapter is based on - and works - through extracts from 
fieldwork in three care flats for people with dementia. In each of these care flats 
smart home technology is installed. The questions that permeate this section are: 
What are the roles of technology in dementia care practice? And how does 
technology form and transform dementia care? In order to answer these questions I 
draw in particular on two theoretical concepts from STS: ‘mutual shaping’ and ‘script’. 
The notion of ‘mutual shaping’ is used by the Norwegian feminist Anne-Jorunn Berg 
to conceptualize the mutual shaping of technology and gender.370 In her study ‘Digital 
                                           
368 Latour (1987).
369 Moser, 2003: 31. 
370 Berg (1996). 
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Feminism’ she investigates how technology and gender are woven together in 
everyday life and action.371 The point is that technology and gender, like technology 
and care are perceived of as simultaneously constructed and reconstructed. This use 
of the notion of ‘mutual shaping’ has close connotations to the metaphor of the 
‘seamless web’ as introduced by the historian Thomas Hughes.372 This metaphor 
implies an understanding of technology and society as inseparate parts of a tightly 
woven web of social, political, legal and economic relations. In this chapter I use the 
notion of ‘mutual shaping’ to conceptualize technology and care as an intertwined 
phenomenon. This means that technology and care are understood as mutually 
constituted, as woven together in and through everyday practices. 
In mobilizing the notion of ‘script’ I draw on Madeleine Akrich’s work on the 
relationship between technology and the social.373 According to Akrich, the social is 
written into technology in the sense that ideas or representations of users and the 
environment in which the technology will be used become materialized into the 
design of technology during the design process. As a result, the technology can be 
said to contain a script. This script, like a film script, attributes (or delegates) specific 
competencies, actions, roles and responsibilities to users and technological 
artefacts.374 In this way the notion of ‘script’ captures how technological objects 
influence human relations as well as the relationships between people and things.375
In this chapter I use the notion of ‘script’ in order to analyse different aspects of this 
relationship between technology and the social; and specifically the expectations, 
norms and relations that are built into the smart home solutions. In particular I find the 
notion of ‘script’ a useful tool to think about how the smart home technology comes 
with ideas of cost-efficiency.
                                           
371 Ibid: 2. 
372 Hughes (1987). 
373 1992. Other authors that have worked with this concept include Anne-Jorunn Berg and Dick 
Willems. See Berg, (1996); Berg and Lie (1995); Willems (forthcoming). 
374 Ibid. 
375 Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003: 9. See also Chapter 2 of this thesis ‘theoretical resources and tools’, 
section 2.5.1 for a more detailed account of the notion of scripts. 
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Finally, I use the notion of ‘script’ as a tool to conceptualize and think about 
technologies as political entities. The script is political in the sense that values, 
norms, users and the distribution of agency and competence are inscribed into the 
technology through the design process.376 Accordingly, the smart home technology 
does manifest, express and establish distinct norms and values of what dementia 
care should be.
5.4: Technology and dementia care practices 
This section is divided into five separate parts, where each section explores an issue 
of technology and dementia care practice. These issues respond to the assumptions 
and positions on technology that policy is based upon, as discussed in the first part of 
this chapter. 
 5.4.1: Technology is integral to care
The first issue is related to technology’s role in dementia care. The question is what
is the role of technology in care? In what follows I will explore this question through 
two stories of night care. The stories are taken from two different care flats: 
Greenfield and Farmview. These care flats are similar in size (eighteen and twenty 
residents, respectively), and both have a carer present at night. The difference is that 
the Greenfield care flat has implemented and uses smart home technology such as 
alarms and monitoring devices, while this is not the case at the Farmview care flat. 
My interest here is not to compare the two care flats, but to highlight how different 
types of technologies are part of dementia care practices. 
Night care at the Greenfield care flat
Night carer Elisabeth is sitting in front of the computer screen in the carer’s 
office. This is where she usually sits while on night duty if she is not doing her 
regular ‘rounds’ or attending to the residents in their rooms. 
On the computer screen in front of her there is an outline of the care flat. The 
smart home system is connected to this screen and to the telephone that 
Elisabeth carries in her pocket. There are a number of alarms installed in the 
Greenfield care flat. There are alarm sensors on the entrance, corridor and 
                                           
376 Latour (1987). According to Latour is this process about ‘politics by other means’.
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terrace doors that are active 24-hours a day. In addition, the alarm sensors on 
the doors leading into the residents’ rooms are also activated at night. The 
door alarms are a part of the general technological infrastructure at the 
Greenfield care flat, which the residents (and their next-of-kin) are informed 
about when they move into the care flat. Individual alarms, such as bed and 
voice alarms are also in use, based on individual assessment and with the 
written consent of the resident and a next-of-kin according to set procedures.
When an alarm is activated, an alarm signal is sent to the carer’s telephone, 
and to the computer screen in the carer’s office. All the alarm sensors are 
represented as icons on the computer screen. When an alarm is activated, the 
icon changes colour, which makes it easy for the carer to see which alarm is 
activated and where. As there are no cameras attached to the alarm sensors, 
it is not possible for the carers to see who has activated the alarm. The carers 
are able to follow the residents’ movements on the computer screen in the 
sense that they can see which alarm has been activated and where; based on 
this information, they can get an overview of the activity at the care flat and 
decide whether or not to intervene. The information generated by the smart 
home system does not get stored.
Tonight Mrs. Kjeldsen is very restless. She has been pacing up and down the 
corridors for hours. Sometimes Mrs. Kjeldsen goes inside other residents’ 
rooms. Just the other night she went to Mrs. Friis’ room and started to scream. 
This caused a lot of disruption, as Mrs. Friis woke up and was so frightened 
that she hardly slept for the rest of the night. So when Mrs. Kjeldsen is 
wandering about, Elisabeth knows that she has to ‘follow’ her movements 
carefully so that she will be able to intervene quickly if Mrs. Kjeldsen starts 
going into other residents’ rooms. 
‘Night care’ at the Farmview care flat
At the Farmview care flat, the smart home infrastructure makes it possible to 
connect a number of alarms and monitoring devices. However, no such 
devices are in use. This decision not to use alarms and monitoring devices is 
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seen as an active choice not to use technology in care.377 The decision was 
based on recommendations made by the local dementia team.378
It is nearly midnight at the Farmview care flat, and I am in one of the common 
lounges with night carer Kathrine. The building is shaped like a U, with 
common areas in each end. This makes it possible to sit in one of the common 
lounges and see straight into the common lounge on the opposite side. In 
order to have an overview of what is happening on the other side of the 
building, Kathrine sits in a lounge chair facing the windows. In the corridors 
and common areas automatic lights are installed, which means that the lights 
are switched on by movements. This makes it easier for the night carer to see 
if someone is up and wandering about. The lights are switched on several 
times during the night in question, and each time Kathrine goes to check out 
who it is, and, if possible, to accompany him or her back to their room. 
During the night, all the doors leading to the residents’ rooms are locked. This 
was done some time ago, after a series of incidents involving one of the 
residents. Mrs. Arntsen often wandered the corridors at night looking for a 
toilet. On several occasions she went into other residents’ rooms, disturbing 
them. In order to prevent this from happening again, it was decided to lock the 
doors.
What can be drawn from these stories? First of all, it is clear that there are a number 
of technologies involved in dementia care. These technologies are not limited to 
devices or artefacts such as alarms and computers, but include a range of 
materialities that are more or less taken for granted, such as the shape of the 
building, locks and a lounge chair. Accordingly, the conclusion can be drawn that 
care necessarily involves technologies; in other words, technology is not something 
that is added on to human care. On the contrary, it is already there – inside care. 
Further, the stories show that in care practice there is no distinction between new and 
old technologies. At the Greenfield care flat night carer Elisabeth sits in front of the 
computer screen in the office, while night carer Kathrine at the Farmview care flat 
                                           
377 This choice is seen as complying with advice given by ethical guidelines and legal rules, which 
states that technology (such as alarms and monitoring devices) in care is considered to be potentially 
intrusive on the individual’s right to privacy, and that it’s use should be carefully considered. See for 
example ‘Hjelpemidler og etikk’ [Ethics and technical aids’] Rikstrygdeverket (National Insurance 
Agency), 2001: 7-15 or ‘Smart home technology. Planning and management in municipal services’, 
Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, 2005 (English version).  
378 The local dementia team is a multi-disciplinary team that provides advice on matters concerning 
dementia care. In this municipality, the local dementia team consisted of a general practitioner, a 
nurse and two occupational therapists.  
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positions herself in one of the lounges, facing the windows. The aim of care is the 
same in both cases: to have an overview of the residents’ movements in order to be 
able to intervene quickly and prevent disruption. The fact that this goal is achieved 
through the use of new technology at the Greenfield care flat and the use of old 
technologies at the Farmview care flat makes no difference in this particular case. 
This means that the distinction between new and old technologies that is so 
prominent in policy on technology and care is created outside care practices.
One important insight to be drawn from the above stories is, then, that care involves 
different technologies (or, rather; materialities) that are tightly interwoven in the fabric 
of care. But there is more to it. The story from the Greenfield care flat demonstrates 
how night carer Elisabeth sits in the office, following the movements of Mrs. Kjeldsen 
on the computer screen. Technology is not confined to the technological artefacts or 
materialities in and by themselves, but includes practices, such as identifying and 
differentiating between different incidents. Similarly, at the Farmview care flat, the 
technology is not limited to the shape of the building and the availability of automatic 
lights, but involves practices such as the specific positioning of the lounge chair and 
the night carer paying constant attention to the lights being switched on at the other 
side of the building. Consequently, care is technosocial: it is the materiality, in the 
shape of the buildings and objects, such as locks, door alarms and computer screens 
combined with humans and activities that involve technologies, that enacts night care 
in its specific form at the Greenfield and Farmview care flats. There is no care without 
technology, as technology – in the broadest sense - is a part of what constitutes care. 
5.4.2: Technology is formed by its script
My next question is related to the issue of the type of assumptions that are built into 
the smart home technology, and how these assumptions structure the care that is 
given. In order to address this issue I will tell a story from the Pinewood care flat: 
The Pinewood care flat is a group home for five persons with dementia and is 
placed immediately next door to the local nursing home. The two buildings are 
physically connected by an internal corridor, which makes movement between 
the two buildings easy. Each of the residents has their own private room and 
bathroom. The individual rooms are spacious, which makes it possible to 
furnish them with personal belongings. The group home also contains a large 
common area that serves as a combined lounge and kitchen. There is direct 
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access to a terrace from this common area. In addition there is an office for the 
staff.
Alarms are installed on all the doors. These alarms are integrated via a smart 
home system and are connected to a mobile telephone. When an alarm is 
activated, information about which alarm has been activated is transmitted to 
the mobile telephone. The terrace and entrance door alarms are connected 24 
hours a day, while the alarms on the doors leading to the residents’ individual 
rooms are also connected at night.
There are two carers present in the Pinewood care flat during the day and one 
in the evenings and on weekends. However, at night time the alarms are 
transferred to the night carers at the nursing home next door. The night carers 
respond to alarms only. 
The above passage describes the design and technological infrastructure of the 
Pinewood care flat. Technology, in the form of the layout of the care flat, its location 
next door to the nursing home, its door alarms, the mobile telephone, and the internal 
corridor which physically links the nursing home and the care flat, forms a vital part of 
this infrastructure. This infrastructure sets a number of conditions for the type of care 
that is enabled. In order to think about and conceptualize the specific structuring of 
care relations, I draw on the notion of ‘script’. In what follows I will give a brief 
analysis of the script of the smart home technology, focusing on how it configures 
care at the Pinewood care flat. 
Three different users are defined by the smart home technology at the Pinewood 
care flat: residents, carers and the municipality. What are the inscribed needs and 
interests of these actors? The residents at the Pinewood care flat, are configured as 
a mixture of citizens and patients. As there are alarms on the doors, the residents are 
free to go outside whenever they want. So, on the one hand, they are citizens, with 
the smart home alarms allowing for privacy and freedom of movement. Yet they are 
also constituted as patients, in the sense of being in need of control and supervision. 
When the alarms are transferred to the carers, they are able to intervene. Thus the 
smart home alarms do also come with an agenda of safety. This safety is made 
possible without the carers being physically present in the care flat, at night when the 
alarms are transferred to the night carers at the nursing home next door. The carers 
are inscribed as responsible and in control through the smart home alarms, as all 
information is transmitted to the carers’ telephones. However, since this responsibility 
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and control can be executed at a distance, the smart home alarms replace a night 
carer at the Pinewood care flat.
A final point is the constitution of the municipality as a user of the smart home 
technology. The script of the smart home alarms is based on assumptions of the 
municipality as in need of saving money. When a night carer is replaced by the smart 
home alarms in the Pinewood care flats, costs are cut, allowing the municipality to 
provide more cost-efficient care services. This means that the smart home alarms at 
the Pinewood care flats are not just about freedom and safety, but also about 
economy.
The fear of this cost-saving agenda was particularly prominent in the public debate, 
and was closely linked to expectations of cold technology replacing warm human 
care.379 The use of technology for economic purposes was considered illegitimate by 
politicians and others, and seen as equivalent to bad care.380 As a result of this 
criticism, various policy documents explicitly state that the decision to use technology 
in care should be based not on economic considerations, but on the individual 
resident’s needs.381 However, as I have shown in this example from the Pinewood 
care flat, economy is an integral part of the assumptions built into the smart home 
technology. To some extent, then, it will structure the care that is made possible. Yet 
it is important to point out that whether the smart home alarms contribute to good 
care is still an open (empirical) question. 
5.4.3: Technology is shaped by practices
Following on from the issue of technology and its script, I will explore to what extent 
the technology can be seen to be shaped and transformed by practices. In order to 
do so I will tell another story from the Pinewood care flat:   
                                           
379 The debate in Norwegian media (newspapers and TV) during the early months of 1996 (see 
section 5.2.1). 
380 See Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 27-28; 
Stortingsforhandlinger (Proceedings and Debates of the Storting) nr 8 (13-18 juni), sesjon 1995-96: 
494 and 497.  
381 See for example Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 58 (1994-95): 27, 
Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 57 (1995-96): 14, and Odelstingsproposisjon 
(Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 64 (2005-2006): 48.  
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The procedure for switching off the door alarms at the Pinewood care flat is 
laborious and time-consuming. 
None of the five residents at the time I visited the Pinewood care flat had a 
tendency to wander off, and during the day there were two carers on duty, 
which meant that they were able to have an overview of the residents without 
the alarms, one of the carers told me. Thus the door alarms were really not 
necessary during the day, at least for the time being. However, all the carers 
agreed that in the evenings and on weekends, when there was only one carer 
on duty, the alarms were useful, as it made it easier for her/him to have an 
overview of the residents. And at night the alarms were considered to be 
absolutely essential, because there is no one in the care flat except the 
residents, and the alarm signals are transferred to the night carers at the 
nursing home next door. 
In order for the alarm system to work, each alarm has to be switched off using 
a set procedure. If an alarm is not switched off properly, it will simply be 
immobilized and the system will not work. This means that there will be no 
other alarms until the initial alarm is switched off in the proper way. The carers 
discovered that they could use this flexibility to get the system to work 
according to their needs. When the daytime carers walked into the care flat in 
the morning, and the door alarm was activated, they simply did not switch the 
alarm off. It was not until the evening carer came and switched off the initial 
alarm that the alarm system was reactivated.
The above story shows how the carers creatively negotiate the smart home 
technology according to their needs. By not switching off the door alarm when they 
arrive in the morning, the carers effectively inactivate the entire smart home system. 
Then in the afternoon, when the evening carer arrives, the system is reactivated. The 
smart home alarm system is shaped by the carers’ practices. However, human care 
at the Pinewood care flat is also formed and shaped by the technology, for instance 
by making it possible for the night carers in the nursing home next door to assume 
responsibility for of the residents at night.
The current configuration of technology and humans at the Pinewood care flat is the 
result of a specific process involving a number of factors, including staffing levels, the 
behaviour of the residents and the flexibility of the programming of the smart home 
infrastructure. This means that the technology is not one (or the same) independent 
of its use as the specific circumstances of its shaping will differ. In order to 
understand what a technology is, knowledge of the context and concrete practices is 
essential. A further observation is related to the notion of script. The story above 
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shows that the script does not set all the terms for how the technology is used. 
Instead, this is a two-way process in which the carers actively interact with the smart 
home alarm system. This interaction, which can be described as a dialogue, implies 
that there is some flexibility built into the smart home alarms at the Pinewood care 
flat.382 As the carers find an alternative way of making the alarms work in accordance 
with their needs, they renegotiate and challenge the script of the smart home 
system.383
5.4.4: Technology contains values
But the script also inscribes and makes visible specific values of how care should be. 
The role of ethics in high-tech home care technology is a central issue in Dick 
Willems’ forthcoming book ‘Moral Machinery – The Ethics of Home Care High 
Tech’.384 Willems uses the example of artificial respiration to raise normative 
questions and issues about moving advanced medical equipment from the hospital to 
the home. Drawing on resources from STS, and in particular Akrich’s notion of 
‘script’, Willems shows that different normative elements are incorporated into home 
care technologies. The point is that the technology comes with specific ideas “... 
about good care ... and about what a good life is”.385 The salient question is: what
values are inscribed into the smart home alarms? For a positive example of how 
technology contains values, I will relate another episode of night care at the 
Greenfield care flat. 
Night carer Elisabeth is busy attending to Mr. Rolfsen in his room when there 
is an alarm on her telephone. She quickly takes the telephone out of her 
pocket. The display shows that it is the door alarm of room six, where Mr. Moe 
lives, that is activated. As Mr. Moe usually goes out on the terrace for a smoke 
at this time of the night, she assumes that this is what he is doing tonight as 
well. She does not leave Mr. Rolfsen to check on Mr. Moe, but switches off the 
alarm by pressing the green button on the telephone. Shortly thereafter there 
is a second alarm, and as Elisabeth predicted, it is the terrace door. Elisabeth 
                                           
382 Berg, 1996: 38 
383 See Suchman (2002) and Akrich (1992a).
384 Unfinished. 
385 Akrich (1992a) and Willems (unfinished): 13. 
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switches the alarm off again, slips the telephone back into her pocket, and 
continues attending to Mr. Rolfsen. 
In the above episode, Mr. Moe goes outside for a smoke at night. What this excerpt 
shows is that the smart home alarms at the Greenfield care flat enact certain values. 
Here, going out for a smoke is made possible by the door alarms, allowing for values 
such as freedom of movement, getting outside, smoking and freedom of choice. 
Willems particularly stresses the importance of aesthetics as a form of ethics in high-
tech home care. According to Willems, the whole idea of home care technology 
depends on the idea of ‘dwelling’, as this is what you do at home.386 The question is 
what sort of home the technology is made to fit, and, further how technology makes 
homes and care adapt to itself?387 In going back to the above story once more, it is 
clear that the smart home alarms allows Mr. Moe to continue his habit of smoking 
despite living in a sheltered environment. The fact that the alarms are invisible and 
that Mr. Moe may be unaware of activating the alarms when he goes outside for a 
smoke reinforces the value of maintaining a form of normal life in the Greenfield care 
flat. This form of normal life would not be possible through the use of locks, which 
hinders the residents from going outside and makes them feel like they are in a 
prison. Technology such as locks assumes that the value of safety is more important 
than the freedom of choice. What this suggests is that technologies are not neutral 
entities, as assumed by policy on technology and care. On the contrary, they are 
political, as the normativities inherent in them participate in shaping of the world of 
dementia care.388
5.4.5: Can technology make care more human?
My final point is related to one of the issues raised in the public debate, that cold 
technology will replace warm human care.389 This assumption is based on an 
                                           
386 Willems (unfinished): 85. The notion of ’dwelling’ is inspired by Heidegger’s notion of ’poetic 
dwelling’. However, according to Willems, Heidegger’s use of the notion of ‘poetic dwelling’ is opposed 
to a technological way of living. Willems’ use of the term can be seen as anti-Heideggerian, as he is 
first of all concerned with how technology makes a poetic dwelling possible.   
387 Willems (unfinished): 91. 
388 Ibid. 
389 See section. 5.3.1. 
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understanding of technology as in opposition to human care. In the empirical analysis 
above I have shown that technology and care are mutually shaped. Further, I have 
demonstrated that what a technology is has to be understood in its context, as it is 
shaped and formed in the specific circumstances of its use.390 Hence, technology 
forms and shapes care in unexpected ways. The question that remains is whether 
technology may also contribute to make care more human. In this context human 
care is perceived not as a pre-determined category, but as something that is enacted 
through practices. In Part One of this chapter I have demonstrated that human care 
in its enactments in the public debate is assumed to be embodied, responsive, 
relational and emotional.391
In discussing this issue I will return to the second story of night care at the Greenfield 
care flat, where night carer Elisabeth is busy attending to Mr. Rolfsen in his room 
when there are two alarms on her telephone. She concludes that these alarms inform 
her that Mr. Moe is on his way outside to have a cigarette. Thus she continues 
attending to Mr. Rolfsen in his room. In this example, the smart home alarms, 
combined with her knowledge of the specific behavioural patterns of Mr. Moe, makes 
it possible for Elisabeth to take care of both Mr. Rolfsen and Mr. Moe at the same 
time. The point is that the specific configuration of the alarms is a precondition 
enabling night carer Elisabeth to respond and relate to both Mr. Rolfsen and Mr. 
Moe’s needs in this situation. In this case human contact – and care – is enhanced
by technology. 
5.5: Conclusions 
I now return to the initial questions that have informed this chapter: What is the role of 
technology in dementia care? And how does it form and transform care? In 
addressing these questions and issues, I have analysed the assumptions and 
positions on technology that current policy is based upon, contrasting them with 
insights gained from empirical studies of dementia care practices.
                                           
390 This argument is also made by Susan Leigh Star. See Star (1991). The point is that technologies 
come with a built in context and specific history. Moving a technology into a new context can therefore 
not be done easily. Instead it requires a lot of adjustment-work and negotiations.  
391 See ‘Cold technology will push away warm human care’ section 5.3.1. 
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The analysis shows that policy is based on an understanding of technology as 
something new to be introduced (or added) to care. The new technology is seen as a 
given entity, as a neutral tool that has certain effects on care. The focus of policy is 
directed at controlling these consequences. Further, as a technology is considered to 
be one entity independent of its use, the consequences are seen as predictable and 
hence as controllable from outside care practices. These assumptions and positions 
imply that policy on technology and care is framed as a legal and ethical issue and as 
a matter to be dealt with through legal regulation, adherence to ethical principles and 
the compilation of guidelines.
Empirical studies of dementia care practices show, however, that these assumptions 
and positions on technology are too limited. Drawing on theoretical resources from 
STS, as well as on excerpts from empirical material, I have demonstrated the 
intertwined shaping of technology and care. Further, I have shown that the notions of 
‘mutual shaping’ and ‘script’ are useful tools for conceptualizing these relations.  
Firstly, technology is seen to come with a number of assumptions about its users and 
their environment. These assumptions are built into the technologies; accordingly, the 
technology can be understood to contain a script. This script produces a degree of 
givenness, in the sense that it attributes and delegates specific competencies, 
actions and responsibilities to users and technological artefacts. Thus the technology, 
including its use, is to some extent shaped by its script. Yet technology is also 
shaped by practices. The script may be changed or renegotiated. Consequently, the 
technology is not one or the same independent of its use. The implication is that the 
technology is no longer a predictable entity; it needs to be understood in the context 
of its use. Care and technology are hence not made once and for all, but are 
continually being made and re-made. This insight has important ontological 
implications in the sense that reality – or in the present context, care – is no longer a 
fixed entity.392
Further, by mobilizing the notion of script I have demonstrated how technology can 
be said to contain values. Technology is not a neutral entity, as assumed by policies 
on technology and care. The values that are enacted are a result of the specific 
                                           
392 See for example Mol (1998/2002); Moser (2003); Pols (2004); Singleton (1998/2007); Struhkamp 
(2004).  
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constellations of human care and technology. This means (contrary to the 
assumptions of the public debate) that technology may also make care more human. 
 An important question that arises is what the implications of these insights are for 
policy on technology and dementia care. In this chapter I have shown that a view 
from within practices is necessary in order to understand and deal with the mutual 
shaping of technology and care. I have further demonstrated the importance of the 
articulation of these ‘within’ views, for instance by an ethnographer. However, these 
forms of empirical studies are dependent on researchers, health-care professionals 
and others gaining access to study the routines, artefacts, procedures, activities and 
day-to-day practices that are involved in dementia care. Today this knowledge is 
difficult to obtain, primarily because current policy severely restricts access to the 
care setting.
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Chapter 6 
Dementia care as creative ethics 
6.1: Introduction 
In chapters four and five, I have moved from a focus on framing conditions for how 
the issue of good dementia care is conceived of, to everyday practices. In this turn to 
practice I pose two key questions: What constitutes good dementia care? And how is 
it achieved?
In Norway, as in many other countries, these questions are addressed with reference 
to the bioethical ideals, and in particular the principle of autonomy. According to the 
principle of autonomy, good care means those being cared for are allowed to decide 
on matters that concerns themselves without the interference or manipulation of 
others. Autonomy is legally constituted through the principle of informed consent.393
Autonomy as informed consent is further ensured through the application of ethical 
principles, legal regulations and standards that are enforced by ethical and legal 
specialists.394 From this perspective, good care is a rational process with a ready-
made solution, in the sense that it is about applying externally identified principles 
                                           
393 Beauchamp and Childress, 1983: 67. 
394 In Norway this responsibility is partially delegated to the Regional Health Authorities 
(Fylkesmannen). The legal experts of the Regional Health Authorities are responsible for approving 
any use of coercion (including the use of intrusive electronic devices) in the care of people with 
intellectual disabilities (Sosialtjenesteloven/The law regulating the provision of social services). In the 
Netherlands, as in other countries, legal experts are employed by hospitals as patient advocates. 
Jeannette Pols provides a description of how such patient advocates work in the Dutch context. See 
Pols 2004: 77-105.  
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and rules in order to achieve a given hierarchy of goods, of which individual 
autonomy is the most important.
An important aim of this chapter is to present an alternative understanding of care, 
and dementia care in particular, that does not begin with preconceived ideas of what 
good care is and of how it is achieved. The starting point of my investigation is 
studies of dementia care practices, as well as tools and resources from a body of 
work on health, medicine and care in Science and Technology Studies (STS).395
Specifically, I ask: What are the goods care(rs) try to establish when dealing with 
everyday care dilemmas, such as preventing falls at night? And how are these goods 
achieved?
Drawing on different practices of fall prevention, I will show that good dementia care 
may be better understood as a creative process of trying out different care 
arrangements. This process is ethical in the sense that it involves a number of 
different goods that the carers strive to realize and balance. The values that are 
involved and how they are weighted is not given. Good dementia care is here not 
solely about ensuring the person’s autonomy and independence. The aim of care is 
rather about what I will call ‘sustaining the person’.   
In addressing issues of subjectivity I draw on the work of Ingunn Moser. Subjectivity 
is in her work understood of as “(...) a location for knowing, thinking and 
consciousness, and (...) not (...) as an inner essence (...)”.396 According to Moser is 
subjectivity shaped in particular ways and is made possible in local material 
relations.397 Further, she emphasises subjectivities in the plural, as “(...) a subject 
position is not a position one has or is structured into once and for all, but rather a set 
of differently structured positions one moves between and is moved through, more or 
less fluidly”.398
To sustain the person implies of a relational understanding of ‘the self’ and the care 
relation. The person is sustained through care practices that enable him/her to 
                                           
395 See also chapter 2 (‘Theoretical tools and resources’) section 2.6 and 2.7. 
396 Moser, 2003: 31. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid: 32. 
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achieve, develop and/or maintain a self; or an ‘I’.399 As these capacities, 
competences and characteristics that make up the self are enacted and re-enacted in 
and through relations with other entities, it follows that these capacities and 
characteristics are not absolute, but are enabled to a greater or lesser degree in the 
concrete contexts in which they are expressed. By employing the notion of 
‘sustaining the person’ I thus move away from an understanding of care as 
dependent upon a stable sense of a person as autonomous, rational and 
independent, to allow for multiple and contrasting values to co-exist in the 
construction of what a person is.
A major concern of this chapter is to acknowledge and appreciate the significance of 
the seemingly trivial and often mundane work of everyday dementia care.400 This 
work is often unrecognized and ignored by bioethical and policy discourse and 
consequently experienced by carers as unrelated to ethics. My objective is to show 
that this work is indeed significant for ethics in the sense that it is about creative
ethics-in-practice.401 In contrast to the vast issues of bioethics, my approach to ethics 
is concerned with daily care routines.402
The notion of ‘arrangements’ is central in this chapter.403 My use of the term is 
related to the notion of ‘assemblages’ as deployed by John Law in his book about 
                                           
399 In addition to STS I draw on resources from the field of ‘ethics of care’ in my development of a 
relational understanding of care. See for example Verkerk (1999); Tronto (1993) and Stollmejer 
(2000). 
400 Jeannette Pols uses the notion of ‘care as usual’ and ‘necessary care’ to denote everyday care 
tasks and routines (Pols, 2004: 100).  
401 See also Moreira (2001). 
402 Bioethics has traditionally been concerned with dramatic, life and death issues (Moody, 1992: 30).  
403 This term is used to index a much larger literature which I will not go into here. My use of the notion 
of ‘arrangements’ is closely tied up with the term ‘conditions of possibility’, which has been deployed 
by Michel Foucault to trace empirically how discourses and epistemes (or regimes) structure what it 
becomes possible to know, and how it can be known within certain historical periods. One of 
Foucault’s aims was to show how this was done in local, situated practices and settings, and what 
actors, techniques and procedures were involved in this event in which knowing took place and 
realities emerged (See Moser, 2003: 42). These sets of material relations and interactions were called 
‘dispositifs’, and denote an ordered arrangement through which facts, entities and realities emerge 
(Moser, 2003: 43; Foucault 1979; Foucault 1981). The argument is that specific ordered arrangements 
set the conditions for practices: for what kind of realities that are made possible. Similarly, specific 
ordered arrangements of procedures, legal regulations, technologies and humans set the conditions 
for care practices; for what kind of care that is made possible. See also Moreira (2004). 
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methods in social science research.404 The term ‘assemblages’, which comes from 
the French ‘agencement’ and the work of Deluze and Guattari, indicates
                                           
a process of building, of assembling, or (…) of recursive self-assembling in 
which the elements put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a 
larger pre-given list but are constructed at least in part as they are entangled 
together.405
So, assemblages, as arrangements, are about how things hold together without an 
external framework, in what Law describes as a “tentative and hesitant unfolding”.406
The emphasis is on arrangements as active and evolving practices or processes that 
are re-worked, rather than as a static structure.407 Further, these arrangements are 
heterogeneous, in the sense that they are both discursive and material. In this thesis 
I have chosen to use the notion of ‘arrangements’ to conceptualize these practices of 
putting elements together as the notion of ‘assemblages’ denotes a looser 
entanglement than what is implied by my use of the notion of ‘arrangements’. Another 
important factor is that the notion of ‘arrangements’ travels better than the notion of 
‘assemblages’ to an audience of policy makers and health-care professionals. 
This chapter is based on the parts of the fieldwork material that showed how 
preventing falls was done in practice. Fall prevention was an important aspect of 
dementia care practice in the four care flats where fieldwork was conducted for this 
thesis: this was an articulated and non-contested goal of care in each of the care 
flats. Fall prevention is also a problem in elderly care in general.408 By connecting the 
empirical analysis to one particular set of situations, my objective is to bring out the 
details of how care works in practice. These details are of central importance, as they 
show that even minor changes or adjustments in the care arrangements can have 
404 ‘After method. Mess in social science research’, Law (2005). Other authors who have addressed 
the notion of ‘assemblages’ are Verran (2001), Moser (2003), Mol and Law (2004) and Moreira (2004). 
405 Law, 2005: 42. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid: 41. See also Mol and Law (2004). 
408 Falls among the elderly is a targeted research-area. According to statistics presented by the US 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention does one in three adults above the age of 65 year fall each 
year. Of those who fall, 20-30% suffer moderate to severe injuries that increase their chances of early 
death. In 2000 the costs of falls among the elderly in the US was estimated to more than 19 billion 
USD (See www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/fallscost.html).  
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great implications for whether the person is sustained. In addition, a focus on details 
gives prominence to the efforts and ongoing work that is involved in trying out and 
maintaining different arrangements. This is work that is closely linked to what 
Annemarie Mol has called ‘the process of doctoring’.409 Mol’s book on ‘The logic of 
care’ has been a particularly important source of inspiration for my work on this 
chapter. In her book, Mol sets up the logic of care in contrast to the logic of choice. 
These two logics are two very different ways of handling life with a disease.410
Through detailed ethnographic studies of life with and treatment of diabetes in the 
Netherlands, Mol articulates the specificities of good care. Her argument is that the 
tradition of care contains more suitable repertoires for handling life with a disease 
than does patient choice.411 Mol’s book is important as it provides a framework for 
exploring issues of good care using an ethnographic approach.
This chapter is divided into five sections. I start with a very brief bioethical account of 
care that focuses on autonomy as informed consent and on how good care is 
perceived as a rational process that is ensured through the application of rules and 
principles. Bioethics, or more precisely, bioethical principles, will serve as a 
framework and contrast to the alternative, empirically-based approach that I present 
in the remaining four sections of the chapter. In the second section I will demonstrate 
how dementia care may be understood as a process of trying out different care 
arrangements. The objective is to highlight the creative elements of this process as 
well as the work involved. Further, in section three, I focus on how the different care 
arrangements enact different values, or in other words, how the process of trying out 
different care arrangements is about creative ethics in practice. The argument that I 
develop is that creative ethics is about sustaining the person. Sustaining the person 
implies a relational understanding of care, which means that the values that are 
involved in care and how they are ranked is not given. And finally, in the last section, 
I briefly address the importance of context in finding an arrangement that sustains the 
person.
                                           
409 ‘The logic of care: Health and the problem of patient choice’. 
410 Mol, 2008: ix. 
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6.2: Bioethics and dementia care: Good care as a process that can be 
rationalized 
For the past thirty to forty years, bioethical ideals - in particular the principle of patient 
autonomy - have been influential in matters concerning health-care in Norway and in 
a number of other Western countries.412 According to Rita Struhkamp, a Dutch 
researcher in the field of STS, the emphasis on individual autonomy as the most 
important moral value of contemporary Western ethics grew strong after the Second 
World War.413 As the Nazi practices of enrolling people with mental disabilities and 
prisoners in medical experiments without their consent were disclosed, “... critics 
made a strong claim for self-determination and respect for a person’s autonomy and 
bodily integrity in medical experimentation”.414 The principles of individual autonomy 
were first formulated in the Nuremberg Code in 1947, and were later acknowledged 
as fundamental human rights and formally endorsed in the Declaration of Helsinki in 
1964.415 In the following decades, Struhkamp points out, “... the principle of personal 
autonomy developed into one of the key moral ideas of medicine and health-care”.416
This means that policy and discussions on care are framed first of all in terms of 
individual autonomy. This trend is also evident in dementia care; to some extent the 
principle of autonomy has replaced other ideals and aims of health-care practices, 
such as the traditional principles of beneficence (the promotion of individual well-
being) and social justice.417 In this section, I will give a brief account of the 
background for the principle of autonomy and of its close ties to principle-based 
ethics.418
                                                                                                                                       
411 Ibid: 2. 
412 When I refer to ‘Western’ countries I refer to Western Europe, North America and Australia.  
413 Struhkamp, 2004: 18. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Moody, 1992: 32; Verkerk, 1999: 360. 
418 Moody, 1992: 32. 
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6.2.1: The aim of care: individual autonomy 
The notion of ‘autonomy’ recognizes the human capacity for self-determination and 
puts forwards the principle that individual autonomy should be respected.419 A 
fundamental tenet of the principle of autonomy is that the person should be free to 
decide on matters that concern him/herself without the interference of others.420
Within bioethics literature, autonomy is constructed as a capacity of individuals.421
Autonomy implies a capacity for agency, in the sense of an ability to act and of being 
able to articulate one’s preferences, independent from the influence of other’s. 
Autonomy also implies rationality: of being able to reflect critically on one’s own 
decisions and beliefs, and to exercise discretion.422 Individual autonomy is legally 
constituted through the principle of informed consent, which represents a specific 
verbal and cognitive approach to what it means to be a person and the aim of care. 
6.2.2: Principle-based ethics: a rational approach to care
The strong focus on individual autonomy is closely interrelated with a principle-based 
approach to ethics. Ethical dilemmas arise when different values or ethical principles 
come into conflict, as they often do. It then becomes the task of ethics to clarify 
conflicts among these values and principles and ultimately to develop rules and 
strategies for professional action and public choice.423 The principle-based approach 
is based on the assumption that ethical dilemmas can be solved by rational means, 
first of all by clarifying the choices that are open to the different actors and their 
implications. As the different actors are assumed to be able to calculate what is in 
their interest, the emphasis is on individual choices.424 The argument is that the 
individual’s wishes ought to be respected unless the interests of others are harmed. 
                                           
419 Verkerk, 1999: 360. 
420 Beauchamp and Childress, 1983: 59; Moody, 1992: 25. 
421 Beauchamp and Childress, 1983: 60; Verkerk, 1999: 360.  
422 Verkerk, 1999: 360. 
423 Moody, 1992: 32.
424 Widdershoven, 1996: 7. 
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Ethical decision-making may be enhanced by providing better information and by 
securing freedom of choice.425
A prominent feature of principle-based ethics is the prevalence of legal principles and 
modes of argument.426 One example is the understanding of individual autonomy in 
terms of the legal principle of informed consent. The right to individual autonomy as 
informed consent is constituted in legislation that defines patients’ rights in health-
care situations.427 These laws define the legal position of the patients, for example in 
terms of the right to refuse treatment and of protection against coercive 
interventions.428
Over the past decades, this interpretation of individual autonomy has been criticized 
from various positions.429 First of all, the argument is that the understanding of 
individual autonomy as a right to self-determination “... implies an atomistic model of 
human agency, which refers to individuals as existing apart from social relationships 
and being self-sufficient”.430 The point is that ethics, and the principle-based 
approach it supports is based on a non-contextual ideal.431
6.2.3: Autonomy as informed consent and the care setting: implications
In the following I will briefly elaborate on the issue of the implications of this bioethical 
understanding of individual autonomy as informed consent in the context of care. The 
question is: what is good care in this context? And, how is good care assumedly 
achieved?
                                           
425 Ibid. 
426 Moody, 1992: 32. 
427 Verkerk, 1999: 361.  
428 Pasientrettsloven [The Act relating to patients’ rights]. 
429 For example from feminist ethics, ethics of care, virtue ethics and hermeneutical ethics (Struhkamp, 
2004: 44). 
430 Struhkamp, 2004: 44. 
431 This non-contextual ideal is criticized by Martha Nussbaum and the field of situated ethics (see for 
example Nussbaum, 1997/1998).
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First of all, good care is understood as a given entity, in the sense that it is about 
promoting patient autonomy and independence. Patient autonomy and independence 
is secured through the establishment and enforcement of legal rules, ethical 
principles and procedures. One example is the use of standard procedures of 
informed consent in certain situations when significant choices are being made, such 
as admissions to hospital, the establishment of a legal guardian, decisions with 
regards to medical treatment, research and so on.432 These procedures are 
formalized in the sense that they are written and involve the signing of an agreement 
that is legally binding. In situations where it is uncertain whether the person is legally 
competent to make a choice, other rules apply, and a next-of-kin (or, in some cases, 
health-care workers) may give consent on behalf of the person.433 Other means of 
ensuring good care are the compilation and enforcement of standards, guidelines 
and legal rules specifying, for example, how technical aids are to be implemented 
and used.434 Good care is accordingly a rational process that presupposes a set 
hierarchy of goals, and the means to how these goals are to be achieved. 
But what are the implications of understanding care in terms of autonomy as 
informed consent? On the one hand, the focus on autonomy as an inherent and 
rational capacity of individuals results in a lack of recognition of other, more collective 
forms of autonomy.435 Moreover, the one-sided focus on individual autonomy fails to 
recognize and acknowledge other goods or aims of health-care practices from an 
ethical perspective.436 The consequence, I will argue, is that the carers are deprived 
of the opportunity of experiencing, justifying and developing their everyday practices 
as ethical, as ethics in practice. The ethical principles are often experienced by the 
                                           
432 Some situations that require written consent are specified by the law, e.g. situations that involve 
what is defined as ‘coercion’ or the use of certain types of technology that are defined as ‘intrusive’ (on 
the individual’s right to privacy or personal freedom). Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the 
Odelsting) nr 64 (2005-2006) specifies the legal rules for giving health-care assistance to persons who 
are considered not incompetent to give their informed consent.  
433 Helsepersonelloven (§ 7) [The Act relating to health personnel]. 
434 See for example Hjelpemidler og etikk’ [Technical aids and ethics], Rikstrygdeverket (National 
Insurance Agency), 2001 and ‘Smart home technology. Planning and management in municipal 
services’, Directorate for health and Social Affairs, 2005. 
435 Struhkamp, 2004: 44. For other examples see also Winance (2006) and Stollmejer (2000). 
436The point is that it leaves ‘blanks’, and is hence an incomplete philosophy on care (Pols, 2004: 100). 
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carers as abstract ideals that are remote from the texture and dilemmas of everyday 
care practices.437
6.3: Dementia care as a creative process 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on dementia care practices. The aim of this 
section is to show that good dementia care can be better understood as a creative 
and collective process of trying out different care arrangements. The question I 
address in this section is how the carers bring about this creative process.
I will examine this issue through two examples of fall prevention taken from my 
material. These two examples, taken from different care flats, have been chosen 
because they give a broad and comprehensive picture of how fall prevention is 
addressed in dementia care. The fact that these cases represent two different 
material environments is important as it highlights how dementia care is different in 
different contexts. 
6.3.1: Fall prevention as arrangements
Mr. Edvards broke his hip two years ago, and since then he has been very
unsteady on his feet. In order to avoid falling he is dependent upon assistance 
when walking, either from his walking frame or from one of the carers. At night 
time he usually gets up in order to go to the toilet, and although the night carer 
makes sure that his walking frame is positioned right next to his bed, he tends 
to forget to use it. This means that he is very unsteady, and the carers are 
concerned that he might fall on his way to the toilet. So the carers discuss 
what to do. 
The above excerpt from my field notes describes a very common situation in 
dementia care, where falls may have potentially devastating consequences and 
preventing them from happening is an important aim of care.438 But, how are falls 
prevented? First of all, the above story shows that this involves a particular care 
arrangement, such as the positioning of the walking frame next to Mr. Edvards’ bed. 
Drawing on insights from the empirical analysis of technology and care in chapter 
                                           
437 Moody, 1992: 33. 
438 According to Tinetti et al (1994) and Kannus et al (1999) are a great majority of fatal head injuries 
in elderly people related to falls.   
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five, these care arrangements are heterogeneous or technosocial in the sense that 
they involve humans and technologies as well as knowledge and activities.439
The issue I will explore in the remainder of this section is what the other 
characteristics of these arrangements are, and how they are determined. 
6.3.2: Arrangements are temporary
I will begin to explore this issue by continuing the story of Mr. Edvards:  
First of all Mr. Edvards’ medication was changed, as the sleeping tablet he had 
been taking for some years was thought to make him dizzy and more likely to 
fall. Instead, he was given something to calm him down earlier in the evening. 
However, this did not seem to have any effect at all, the carers concluded after 
an observation period of a few weeks. He was still as unsteady as before. 
Moreover, this observation period involved the night carer going frequently to 
his room at night, which clearly disturbed Mr. Edvards. Being a light sleeper, 
he woke up practically every time the night carer entered the room. So an 
arrangement was needed that did not involve a carer going into his room to 
check on him on a regular basis, the carers agreed. Other possible 
arrangements, such as putting up the bed rail were discussed. However, the 
carers decided against this, as Mr. Edvards was considered to be likely to 
climb over it, putting him at an even greater risk of falling. 
To start with, this narrative shows that there are several sets of arrangements 
involved in preventing Mr. Edvards from falling at night. In addition to the positioning 
of the walking frame next to his bed, his medication is changed. Then an 
arrangement of the night carer going frequently into his room is tried out. But there is 
even more going on. The carers continually monitor Mr. Edvards and discuss 
different options, such as putting up the rail on his bed. The aim of trying out these 
different arrangements is to prevent falls without disturbing Mr. Edvards. When 
changing the medication fails to improve Mr. Edvards’ unsteady gait, other 
arrangements are tried out. 
My data show that arrangements in dementia care are not permanent or fixed, but 
temporary. There are constant changes or shifts of different arrangements being 
                                           
439 See chapter 5 (‘ Technology and dementia care’) and particularly section 5.4.1. See also Latour 
(1987). 
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tested out or rejected, such as the carer going into Mr. Edvards’ room at night. 
Arrangements are, then, ongoing processes that require continuous effort.
The constant work involved in care is beautifully described in Annemarie Mol and 
John Law’s article on diabetes care, ‘Embodied Action, Enacted Bodies: The 
Example of Hypoglycaemia’.440 Here Mol and Law show how maintaining a good 
blood sugar balance is a continuous care process that involves practices such as 
measuring, eating, observation and injecting (insulin). The point is that maintaining a 
stable blood sugar level is continuous work; it involves an ongoing and active effort. 
When eating (or not eating) fails to improve the blood sugar balance, other 
arrangements, such as injecting insulin, may be tried. 
6.3.3: Arrangements involve trial and error
But, what kind of work is involved in finding good arrangements for preventing falls at 
night? This is the story of Mrs. Knutsen: 
For some time now Mrs. Knutsen has been up at night a lot, rummaging 
around her room. Moreover, during the past few weeks, the carers have found 
urine on the floor on a regular basis. This is considered a problem as Mrs. 
Knutsen has slipped twice on the wet floor and fallen. The carers are worried 
that she may fall again and injure herself. The problem is discussed among the 
carers, and different arrangements are tried out. 
At first, when the carers observed urine on the floor they assumed that Mrs. 
Knutsen was having problems finding her way to the toilet. As verbal 
communication was very limited, the carers looked for non-verbal cues. The 
urine on the floor on a frequent basis was one such cue. And as Mrs. Knutsen 
had slipped and fallen on the wet floor, the carers agreed that something had 
to be done in order to prevent her from urinating on the floor. First of all, a 
toilet chair was tried out. It was positioned right next to Mrs. Knutsen’s bed, 
which was expected to provide her with the immediate visual cue of a toilet. 
Would it solve the problem of her finding the toilet at night? It didn’t. The next 
few weeks showed that the toilet chair was hardly ever used, and the 
behaviour of urinating on the floor continued. 
Going inside Mrs. Knutsen’s room to see to her at night was not an option, as 
she is an extremely light sleeper. Usually, just opening the door to her room 
will wake her up, and once she is awake she is not likely to fall asleep again, 
the carers told me. So instead of going into her room to see if she was in bed, 
                                           
440 2004. 
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the night carer often stood at the door listening for any sounds, before deciding 
whether to enter. However, this arrangement was unsatisfactory, as it did not 
give very reliable information about what was going on inside Mrs. Knutsen’s 
room. So the search for a good arrangement continued. 
The story of Mrs. Knutsen demonstrates that the process of finding a good solution 
involves testing out different constellations of arrangements.441 Arrangements are 
thus about trials and errors, in the sense that the action keeps moving backwards 
and forwards for as long as necessary.442 So as the toilet chair is tried out, and the 
carers keep finding urine on the floor, other arrangements are tried out, such as 
listening at Mrs. Knutsen’s door at night. The carers continually monitor and evaluate 
the different arrangements, making necessary changes or adjustments. The trial and 
error process is unpredictable in the sense that it is never given what arrangement(s) 
will prove to be good, or for how long. The carers hope the arrangement with the 
toilet chair will solve the pattern of urinating on the floor and hence prevent Mrs. 
Knutsen from falling at night. However, as Mrs. Knutsen does not use the toilet chair, 
this arrangement fails. Failure is inevitably an integral element of arrangements as 
trial and error, of the continuous and unpredictable process of care443.
It is, however, important to note that the search for a good arrangement does not 
start from scratch. As the carers have extensive experience in preventing falls at 
night, they have a repertoire of arrangements to draw from. And as the observations 
and experiences related to Mrs. Knutsen are discussed among the carers, different 
possible solutions are contemplated. In the case of Mrs. Knutsen, the carers start by 
mobilizing an arrangement that is already at hand; the toilet chair, and by changing 
their routines of going into Mrs. Knutsen’s room at night.  
An important aspect of the trial and error process of trying out different arrangements 
for Mrs. Knutsen is the limited verbal communication. This makes the work of finding 
a good arrangement particularly demanding and time-consuming. Autonomy as 
informed consent becomes irrelevant in this context, since it presupposes a capacity 
for rational decision-making and of being able to verbally communicate one’s 
                                           
441 Mr. Edvards’ story above also shows this. 
442 Mol, 2008: 18.
443 This is also an important argument of Mol and Law (2004: 57) and Mol (2008). 
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preferences. However, as Mrs. Knutsen has a very limited verbal capacity, the carers 
have to rely on careful observations of non-verbal reactions and visual cues to find 
out whether an arrangement is working.
6.3.4: Arrangements as an ongoing accomplishment
This means that there are no ready-made solutions, and there is a lot of effort 
involved. But what does that mean – in practice? The story of Mr. Edvards continues: 
The carers decided to try out an alarm cord solution. The arrangement that 
was chosen for Mr. Edvards was a slight modification of an already existing 
solution. There was an alarm cord plugged into the wall beside his bed. When 
the alarm cord is pulled, an alarm is transmitted to the night carer’s telephone. 
However, Mr. Edvards had never used this alarm cord, and the carers 
considered it to be unlikely that he would remember to pull it before getting out 
of bed at night. So, in order to ensure that the cord was pulled when Mr. 
Edvards was leaving his bed, the alarm cord was attached to his pyjamas top 
with a safety pin. In principle this meant that every time he moved out of bed, 
the alarm cord would be pulled, alerting the night carer, who would come and 
assist him to the toilet.
This arrangement did work well for some weeks. Every time he got out of bed, 
the cord was pulled and an alarm was activated, making it possible for the 
night carer to come to his room and assist him to the toilet. However, during 
the following weeks it became obvious to the carers that this cord being stuck 
to his pyjamas seemed to annoy Mr. Edvards. The carers discovered that he 
had ripped several of his pyjamas tops in order to get loose of the alarm cord. 
And on at least one occasion he had even undressed to avoid the alarm cord 
altogether. Another problem with this arrangement had to do with the plug that 
fastens the alarm cord to the wall. If the plug loosens, the alarm will not work. 
And on a couple of occasions the carers found that this was the case: the plug 
had not been in place. 
And then, one early morning, Mr. Edvards slipped and falls on his way to the 
toilet. No alarm was transmitted to the night carer’s telephone, so he was left 
lying on the floor until the day shift carer came to see to him. And as Mr. 
Edvards is sent to hospital with a broken hip, the carers tried to get an 
overview of what happened. Two weeks later, Mr. Edvards was returned to the 
care flat, frail and bed-ridden. The carers continued to discuss how to prevent 
him from falling when and if he recovered. However, Mr. Edvards died a few 
weeks later, still bed-ridden. 
This narrative shows that the work involved in finding a good arrangement does not 
stop until Mr. Edvards dies. Arrangements are, then, an ongoing accomplishment.
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This understanding clashes with the well-defined structures of implementation as 
described in official guidelines on the assessment and use of technical aids in care, 
which portray implementation as involving certain pre-set stages, with a movement in 
a given direction. 444 First a problem is identified, and then an assessment follows. 
Further, a solution is found and the problem is solved. After a period of time the 
solution is evaluated and the implementation is complete.445 However, organizing an 
arrangement in practice is not a task with a clear beginning and a well-defined end. 
Instead it is a continuous process of changes, adjustments, fine-tuning and 
monitoring. It is a process that Annemarie Mol has named ‘doctoring’, which suggests 
that the activity involves the attuning of a number of complex configurations (or 
variables) to each other in an ongoing process.446  This process is ongoing in the 
sense that although everything may fit and seem to work well for a time, it may well 
slip again.447 Care is not about implementation, Mol points out, but about being 
attentive, inventive and persistent.448
This means that initially, although the safety pin solution seemed to work, the carers’ 
work of adjusting and monitoring the arrangement continued: Does Mr. Edvards 
appear to find the arrangement acceptable? Is the alarm activated every time he gets 
out of bed? And is the night carer able to get to his room in time to assist him to the 
toilet? These are all central issues and questions that the carers pay attention to on a 
daily basis. In other words, the focus is on doing: on what has to be done. Care is 
about figuring out how the various actors concerned should collaborate to best 
improve the person’s situation.449
                                           
444 See for example ‘Hjelpemiddelformidling – en del av et større system’ [The allocation of technical 
aids. A part of a large-scale system] Rikstrygdeverket (National Insurance Agency), 2000. 
445 These are the standards elements involved in the process of providing technical aids to the 
disabled and the elderly, a procedure that is standardised by the National Insurance Agency 
(Rikstrygdeverket). See for example ‘Hjelpemidler og etikk’ (‘Ethics and technical aids’), 2001. 
446 2008: 54. 
447 Ibid. 
448 ibid: 55. 
449 Mol, 2008: 56.
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6.3.5: Arrangements: failures, tensions and conflicts
Thus far, I have presented the work of trying out different care arrangements as if this 
were a process without tensions and conflicts. However, this picture needs to be 
nuanced, for tensions and conflicts are a prominent part of the care-process. At the 
care flats where my examples are taken from, for example, there were constant 
tensions and conflicts between individual and collective needs. In the case of Mr. 
Edvards, when routines were changed and the night carer went to his room 
frequently to see if he was awake and getting out of bed, a consequence was that 
less time was available for attending to the other residents’ individual needs. Finding 
a good arrangement, then, is about juggling and attending to individual and collective 
needs. And these needs are often in tension.
Another form of tension was the conflict between the carers. Although the carers 
discussed the different care arrangements on a daily basis and usually agreed on a 
course of action, there were also regular disagreements about what care 
arrangement to try out next, or whether a care arrangement was considered to be 
working successfully. This means that the work of trying out different arrangements is 
about finding workable compromises.
Other forms of tensions and conflicts were also part of the care process at the care 
flats, such as conflicts between the different needs of the person. Mr. Edvards’ need 
for a good night’s sleep, for example, was clearly in conflict with the arrangement of 
going into his room frequently at night in order to prevent him from falling.
Mol and Law maintain that dealing with these tensions is not about making rational 
choices between different clearly defined options.450 The ideal of perfect balance 
(such as between individual and collective needs) or harmony (in professional 
judgement or in meeting different individual needs) is not sustainable, they point out 
simply because things don’t add up.451 There are always some variables missing - 
they may behave unpredictably or are not known such as the alarm plug falling out of 
                                           
450 2004: 55. 
451 Ibid. 
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its socket, which caused the collapse of the safety pin solution for Mr. Edvards. No 
matter how hard you try, unexpected failure may be the result.452
6.3.6: Summing up: arrangements as creative processes
In summing up this section, I argue that the examples of fall prevention demonstrate 
that good dementia care can be understood as a creative and collective process of 
trying out different care arrangements. The work of organizing the different 
arrangements is creative, in the sense that it is about attuning the many variables to 
each other in an ongoing process.453 It is about attending to what is needed, both at 
an individual level and collectively. This is not without difficulties, since there are 
always frictions and tensions. Even so, as Annemarie Mol points out, the logic of care 
requires us to keep on specifying:”Try, be attentive to what happens, adapt this, that 
or the other, and try again”.454 The success of this work is first and foremost 
dependent on the carers’ ability to experiment with what can be done and to respond 
to the ever emerging frictions.
Good care is hence not a rational endeavour in the sense that is not just a cognitive 
task that involves priorities, means and procedure rationality. Instead, it is about trial 
and error and the endless work of monitoring, observation and fine-tuning. It is a 
creative and highly unpredictable process that involves a number of compromises. 
6.4: Dementia care as an ethical project 
What I have argued so far, is that good dementia care is about the creative work – or 
processes – of organizing different care arrangements. But there is more to it. I will 
now take the analysis further by addressing the issue of values in dementia care. 
What makes a good (or less good) care arrangement? Or, in other words: how to 
think about dementia care as an ethical endeavour?455
                                           
452 Ibid. 
453 Mol, 2008: 55. 
454 Mol 2008: 53.  
455 As ‘ethical’ in the sense that it is about trying to do good. This implies a much wider understanding 
of the notion of ethics than what is implied by bioethics, where ethics is synonymous with the ethical 
principles of autonomy, beneficence and justice.   
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6.4.1: Each arrangement involves the (creative) balancing of goods and bads
The above stories of fall prevention show that while some arrangements are seen to 
work, others do not. The safety pin solution of Mr. Edvards is one example of an 
arrangement that initially worked, but later turned out not to be a good arrangement 
as it did not prevent him from falling at night.
In the case of Mr. Edvards, the safety pin arrangement works initially, as the night 
carer is alerted every time he is getting out of bed, and as Mr. Edvards does not 
seem to object to the limitations imposed on him by having the alarm cord fastened to 
his pyjamas top. However, Mr. Edvards increasingly finds the alarm cord being 
pinned to his pyjamas top annoying and limiting, and the good safety pin solution 
becomes a bad one. Another important variable is the alarm plug that keeps falling 
out of its socket, making the arrangement unstable and unreliable. What is a good (or 
bad) arrangement is hence not an absolute or given category, but a matter of care 
creatively attuning to the many variables that makes up the arrangement. The 
conclusion to be drawn is that arrangements have both limiting and enabling aspects, 
which means that the process of trying out different care arrangements is also a way 
of creatively weighing and balancing goods and bads.456
The trope ‘weighing and balancing’ is important, as it indicates that judgements are 
being made. However, it is important to note that these judgements are not definitive 
in form. This is not an academic discipline of reflecting systematically on problems of 
good and bad. Instead, weighing and balancing is used here to denote the active and 
creative process of attuning, of continued doctoring.457
6.4.2: Bads are a necessary part of all arrangements
But how is this weighing and balancing of goods and bads done in practice? Here is 
a continuation of the narrative about Mrs Knutsen. 
                                           
456 This understanding of arrangements as containing both limiting and enabling aspects resembles 
Foucault’s understanding of power. According to Foucault is power a capacity of individuals. Power 
relations are seen as a necessary part of living in society as “(…) a society without power can only be 
an abstraction” (Foucault, 1982: 208). Further is power not a renunciation of freedom. On the contrary 
Foucault emphasizes the enabling aspects of power relations. See also Foucault (1979).  
457 Mol 2008: 53-54. 
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The carers discussed different options, including the use of a mattress 
alarm458. It was no coincidence that a mattress alarm was considered, as this 
technical aid was already in stock, having been purchased by the municipality 
when the care flat was first opened nearly three years ago. The mattress 
alarms had not been used, as the local dementia team considered them to be 
surveillance technology, since the alarm would detect any movements in and 
out of bed.459 The use of the mattress alarms was thereby restricted and 
subject to formal approval by the local dementia team, following the 
submission of a written application. These procedures were based on official 
guidelines.460 So the carers knew that the mattress alarm would imply an 
infringement on Mrs. Knutsen’s privacy, since the night carer would know 
whether she was in bed at all times during the night. Yet they also knew that 
this alarm might increase the likelihood that the night carer would be able to 
assist Mrs. Knutsen to the toilet, reducing the risk of her urinating on the floor. 
So, it was worth trying, they decided. 
But first the necessary paperwork had to be done. In the written application the 
carers had to describe in detail Mrs. Knutsen’s problems and the issues that 
the mattress alarm was expected to solve. The form was signed by the nurse 
in charge, as well as by Mrs. Knutsen’s son, as her next-of-kin.461 The 
application was approved by the dementia team within a couple of days. Since 
the alarm was already in stock, all that was needed was for the carers to call 
the caretaker, and ask him to come and install it. 
The carers were uncertain. Would the alarm prove to be a good solution? The 
alarm was tried out. And yes, it did seem to work. Now the night carer was 
alerted every time Mrs. Knutsen was in the process of moving out of her bed. 
Usually she was still sitting on the side of her bed when the night carer arrived 
to assist her to the toilet and back. The pattern of urinating on the floor 
                                           
458 A mattress alarm is a thin mattress like sensor that is placed in the bed. The sensor detects any 
movements and transmits an alarm through the smart home system to the night carer’s telephone. 
459 The local dementia team is a multi disciplinary team appointed by the municipality to give 
professional advice on matters concerning dementia care. 
460 See for example ‘Hjelpemidler og etikk’ [Technical aids and ethics], Rikstrygdeverket (National 
Insurance Agency), 2001 and ‘Smart home technology. Planning and management in municipal 
services’, Directorate for health and social affairs, The Delta Centre, 2005 (English version). 
461 The application was not signed by Mrs. Knutsen as she was considered by the nurse in charge not 
to be competent of giving her informed consent. So her son was asked to sign on her behalf. This was 
done despite the fact that Mrs. Knutsen was not formally declared incompetent. Very few people with 
dementia are formally declared as incompetent in Norway, and it is a common procedure to get the 
next-of-kin to give their informed consent in these kinds of matters. This practice is also legally 
approved. See Pasientrettighetsloven [The Act relating to patients’ rights] § 4-6. See also 
Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 64 (2005-2006): 3.1: 15. 
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stopped. And the night carer no longer had to open Mrs. Knutsen’s door at 
night to know whether she was in bed. 
This is a story of a good arrangement - of an arrangement that worked to provide 
good care for Mrs. Knutsen, at least for the time being. The arrangement of the 
mattress alarm allowed information of Mrs. Knutsen’s movements to be transmitted to 
the night carer’s telephone. This in turn made it possible for her to know when Mrs. 
Knutsen was moving out of bed, and hence to assist her to the toilet. Using a 
mattress alarm was considered to be better than waking her up. However, this 
arrangement also has its bads or limitations, as it allows for the constant detection of 
Mrs. Knutsen’s movements in bed. As these limitations are defined by (bio)ethical- 
and legal rules as an intrusion on her privacy, they are subject to certain 
procedures.462 However, the point I am making is that bads or limitations cannot be 
avoided; they are a necessary part of all arrangements. In the story of Mrs. Knutsen, 
the point is that it is precisely the detection of her movements in bed (the bads or 
limitations of the mattress alarm) that makes it possible for her to get assistance 
when she needs it without being disturbed in her sleep. 
The resulting argument is that bads will have to be weighed in the total picture to find 
the best arrangement. In other words, the different arrangements must not be seen in 
isolation or out of context, but as a part of a whole. This approach conflicts with 
bioethics and the understanding of certain technologies (and arrangements) as being 
bad in themselves, and as separate from practices.463
                                           
462 ‘Smart home technology. Planning and management in municipal services’, Directorate of Health 
and Social Affairs, 2005: 26-29. ‘Hjelpemidler og etikk’ [Technical aids and ethics], Rikstrygdeverket 
(National Insurance Agency), 2001: 13 and 15. Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-
2000): 61-63.  Odelstingsproposisjon (Proposition to the Odelsting) nr 64 (2005-2006), 4.6.5.5: 48, 
Pasientrettighetsloven [The Act relating to patients’ rights] § 4. 
463 See for example Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 62-63. This report 
specifically addresses the issue of technology and dementia care. Different types of technologies are 
classified according to how intrusive they are perceived to be. Five different categories of technologies 
are identified ranging from ‘ordinary technologies and technical aids’ to ‘technical solutions that limits 
the personal freedom’. The point is that the technologies are considered as given outside the context 
of their use. See also Chapter 5 in this thesis for a more in-depth analysis on the assumptions on 
technology that current policy on technology and care is based upon.  
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6.4.3: Creative ethics involve different values
What I have shown is that arrangements are ethical in the sense that they involve the 
balancing (the striving for, realization and manifestation) of different values, including 
bads or limitations. But what are these values? Returning to the narratives of Mr. 
Edvards, I will highlight some of the values in the different arrangements that were 
involved in preventing him from falling at night.  
In the walking frame arrangement, the night carer placed the walking frame next to 
Mr. Edvards’ bed so that he would be able to use it when he got out of bed at night. 
However, the carers discovered that Mr. Edvards hardly ever used the walking frame 
despite it being placed right next to his bed. This means that the walking frame was 
not a good arrangement as it did not prevent Mr. Edvards from falling at night. 
Although this arrangement preserved Mr. Edvards’ to be autonomy, in the sense that 
he could decide for himself whether or not to use the walking frame, it was not a good 
arrangement. In this context, being autonomous was too limiting, as it did not secure 
the necessary support or assistance needed to prevent Mr. Edvards from falling. In 
being made autonomous, the responsibility for preventing falls at night was made to 
rest upon Mr. Edvards. However, the fact that he did not use the walking frame is not 
necessary an expression of his free will (a conscious decision not to use the walking 
frame). It may equally have been a consequence of his illness, as dementia involves 
the erosion of cognitive functions, including memory, orientation and the capacity for 
rational decision-making.464 Mr. Edvards may have forgotten to use the walking 
frame when he was getting out of bed at night. It is impossible to know. The point is 
that if the carers had assumed that not using the walking frame was an expression o
Mr. Edvard’s rational choice, and they had consequently failed to explore oth
alternatives, this would have been neglect, which is bad care.
f
er
                                           
465
The arrangement of the night carer going frequently into Mr. Edvards’ room at night in 
order to see if he was getting out of bed, did make it possible for him to get the 
necessary assistance, i.e. the needed safety or protection from falling. However, this 
arrangement also had its limitations, as it disturbed his sleep. So the value of a good 
464 Moser (2008). 
465 Mol 2008: 85. 
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night’s sleep was involved. Other values were also at stake, such as care, in the 
sense of being looked after and attended to, and autonomy (as privacy). 
In the arrangement using the safety pin and the alarm cord, Mr. Edvards did initially 
get the necessary assistance. When he moved out of bed, the alarm cord was pulled 
and the night carer alerted. So also this arrangement involved the good of safety, or 
the necessary assistance and protection from falling. In addition it was not necessary 
for the night carer to come to his room frequently at night, which disturbed his sleep. 
So this arrangement also made the good of a good night’s sleep possible. A major, 
but necessary limitation of this arrangement was, however, the physical attachment 
of the alarm cord to Mr. Edvards’ pyjamas top, impinging on the value of freedom of 
movement.
An important point is that it is the specific configurations of the arrangements that 
enact the different goods and bads. These values do not come from the outside, from 
some abstract ideals or ideas of what dementia care should be, as in bioethics.  
The above analysis also shows that there are multiple goods in health -are. The 
values that are involved and how they are ranked are outcomes of the weighing and 
balancing of the specific arrangements. In the case of Mr. Edvards, undisturbed 
sleep, safety and freedom of movement were more important values than individual 
autonomy. This means that there is no simple or given hierarchy of values in 
dementia care, and that ranking individual autonomy as the most important value 
independent of specific care contexts is too limiting.
6.5: The aim of creative ethics: to ‘sustain the person’ 
Creative ethics acknowledges that dementia care involves a number of different 
values and that their ranking is not given. Further, these values do not come from the 
outside, from abstract ideals of what dementia care should be, but from within 
practices, and are brought into being through the creative process of trying out 
different care arrangements. In this section I will argue that this creative work of 
organizing arrangements by weighing and balancing different values is about 
sustaining the person.  
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The notion of ‘sustaining the person’ is a broad concept. First of all it is based on an 
understanding of the person as enacted (and re-enacted) in and through practices.466
This means that individual autonomy is not perceived of as an innate capacity of 
humans in the humanist sense, but as one possible outcome of concrete relations. 
Whether these relations are good (or serve to sustain the person) is not given, but 
needs to be judged in the actual context. Sustaining the person does not take for 
granted what values are involved, or how they are ranked.
It is important to note that the aim of sustaining the person is not limited to the 
recipient of care services. The aim of creative ethics can equally be seen to be about 
sustaining the carer. I will argue that sustaining the person is about finding a way that 
makes it possible to get through the day in a way that is the least limiting for both 
carers and the cared for. 
6.6: What is a good arrangement has to be decided in context 
I will briefly address the importance of context in finding an arrangement that sustains 
the person. In order to do so I will tell the story of Mrs. Solberg and her wooden bed 
side arrangement: 
As Mrs. Solberg kept falling out of bed at night, the carers mobilized a 
succession of different arrangements to prevent this. One such arrangement 
involved an ordinary bed rail. All of them failed. 
Although Mrs. Solberg had no verbal language, it was clear that she was very 
anxious and distressed about the situation. So the carers discussed what to 
do. In the end they decided to ask the local caretaker if he could come up with 
a solution to the problem. And he did. A high bed guard was made of solid 
wood and attached to the bed. Finally, Mrs. Solberg was protected from falling 
out of bed. As a result, the carers tell me, she has clearly become more 
content with the situation. She does not look as anxious as before, and she co-
operates with the carers as they assist her with getting into bed.
First of all, the story shows that it is not given what arrangement(s) may work to 
sustain the person. This means that a wooden bed guard arrangement is not 
necessarily unethical in itself. On the contrary, the unconventional arrangement 
clearly makes Mrs. Solberg feel safe, as she is no longer afraid of falling out of bed. 
This solution does limit her movements, since she is unable to get out of bed on her 
                                           
466 Moser, 2003: 31. 
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own. But in this case, the limiting of her movements is precisely what makes it a good 
arrangement for Mrs. Solberg.
According to bioethical ideals, this kind of arrangement is considered unethical in 
itself, as it hinders Mrs. Solberg’s freedom of movement and thereby her individual 
autonomy; she is not able to decide for herself when (or if) she wants to get out of 
bed. According to legal rules and principles these kinds of arrangements are illegal to 
use in most circumstances.467 Other arrangements involving new technologies, such 
as the mattress alarm for Mrs. Knutsen, are seen to be problematic, as their use is 
considered intrusion on the person’s individual autonomy. If arrangements that 
involve these types of technologies are contemplated, certain formal legal and ethical 
procedures are enforced to ensure that the legal rights (or individual autonomy) of the 
person is maintained. In practice this means that care arrangements involving these 
technologies are only to be used if a written informed consent is obtained, or in an 
emergency situation when patient autonomy is temporarily suspended. 
A serious implication of following these principles is that a number of potentially good 
arrangements are ruled out on the basis of abstract/decontextualized principles 
alone. The consequence is that legal and ethical principles limit the ways in which the 
person may be sustained.
6.7: Conclusion 
In this chapter I have addressed issues of good dementia care. Through the 
mobilization of tools and resources from a body of literature on health, medicine and 
care within  the STS field, as well as empirical data from studies of dementia care 
practices, I have shown that good dementia care can be understood as an ongoing 
and creative process of trying out different care arrangements. The process is 
creative in the sense that it is never given what arrangement(s) will turn out to be 
good or for how long: Thus care is about trial and error, and the neverending work of 
experimenting with what can be done, both at an individual level and collectively. As 
this process is filled with frictions and tensions, this work is difficult and demanding. 
Care is not a rational endeavour, in the sense that it is not simply a cognitive task that 
                                           
467 See for example Stortingsmelding (Report to the Storting) nr 28 (1999-2000): 63. Headline: 
[Technical solutions that hinders personal freedom]. 
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involves priorities, means and procedure rationality, which are stressed by bioethical 
ideals.
Further, I have argued that this process of trying out different care arrangements is 
an ethical project, in the sense that it involves the weighing and balancing of different 
values. The values that are involved and how they are weighed is not given, but is an 
outcome of the specific configurations of the care arrangement(s). However, an 
important point is that all arrangements involve limitations, or bads. This means that 
the bads will have to be weighed in the total picture to find the best arrangement. In 
order to know whether or not an arrangement is good, it is necessary to see the 
arrangement in its context, as a part of a whole, and not in isolation. Through 
different stories of fall prevention, I have shown that the aim of care is not necessarily 
individual autonomy, as specified by bioethical ideals; good care is about sustaining 
the person. The arrangements that may work to sustain the person are not given, and 
have to be decided in context. This means (in contrast to the bioethical ideals) that no 
arrangements are unsuitable in themselves.
An important aim of this chapter has been to highlight and acknowledge the work and 
tremendous effort involved in providing good dementia care. The examples given 
demonstrate the significance of everyday activities and routines, such as those 
involved in preventing falls at night. In this chapter I have shown that these practices 
are indeed important, as they are creative ethics in practice.
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Chapter 7
Sustaining the person: 
Re/articulating multiple versions of good dementia care 
7.1: Introduction 
This chapter elaborates on the conclusions of chapter six, namely; that everyday 
dementia care is about creative ethics, and that the aim of creative ethics is to 
sustain the person. In expanding the analysis, my aim is to identify and articulate the
different forms of good care that are enacted in everyday dementia care practices, 
and further, to show how these forms of good care work to sustain the person.468 The 
notion of ‘sustaining the person’ denotes an understanding of the person as enacted 
in and through relations with other entities. Good care is achieved when these 
relations work to accomplish, develop or maintain a self (or an ‘I’). As it is not given 
which relations will work to achieve good care, or for how long, the notion of 
sustaining the person implies a movement away from an understanding of good care 
as a given entity. Instead, good care is seen to allow for multiple and contrasting 
values to co-exist in the construction of what a person is.
The starting point for this chapter is the prevailing strong emphasis on bioethics, with 
its promotion of individual autonomy as the goal of dementia care. According to 
different authors, this one-sided focus on individual autonomy as good care has 
resulted in the creation of a dichotomy, where good care is defined in relation to its 
                                           
468 In addressing issues of everyday ethics I build on a long tradition of care ethics. See for example 
Gilligan (1982); Tronto (1993); Verkerk (1999) and Held (2005).
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antithesis: coercion.469 The result is that there is a ‘void’ in care, as bioethics fails to 
recognize and acknowledge care practices that cannot be voiced in terms of the two 
extremes: individual autonomy on the one hand, and coercion on the other.470 The 
present chapter, which addresses this ‘void’ in care, will identify and make visible the 
forms of good care that are ignored and rendered invisible and silent by bioethical 
discourse. The aim is to articulate these forms of care, showing how these practices 
work to sustain the person in everyday dementia care practices.
By making articulation a central theme in this chapter, I aim to bring out, verbalize 
and highlight the more hidden (or taken for granted) forms of good care. The term 
‘articulation’, which I have borrowed from Donna Haraway, stems from a larger 
feminist tradition of ‘giving voice’.471 To articulate means to link or join together, 
referring to the active, situated and pattern-making aspects of knowledge 
production.472 It should be noted that articulations are incomplete, as they connect 
some things and not others. These articulations, including  but are not limited to 
verbal articulations, allow hidden or oppressed stories to be told.473 Jeannette Pols’ 
study of good care in long-term psychiatry is one excellent example of how, through 
the articulation of everyday care practices, more tacit forms of good care are made 
explicit so that they may become topics of discussion among health-care workers, 
policy-makers and others.474
Another important source of inspiration is Vicky Singleton’s study of the introduction 
of the New Public Health Program in the UK.475 In her article, Singleton investigates 
how new public health policies are realized in the practices of a local community and 
how these policies and practices incorporate and enact different and tension-filled 
                                           
469 See for example Verkerk (1999); Pols (2004). 
470 Pols, 2004: 100. Pols uses the term ‘no-mans-land’ to talk about the care practices that are about 
neither the promotion of individual autonomy nor coercion. See also Verkerk (1999). 
471 Haraway, 1991. See also Pols, 2004; Moser and Law (2003) and Moser (2008). 
472 Moser (2008).  
473 Ibid. 
474 Pols (2004). 
475 Singleton (2007). 
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normativities. Through her analysis Singleton specifically attends to and 
acknowledges stories, practices and realities that are often seen to be marginal. The 
result is that new possibilities and alternative realities are opened up.476
Similarly, my intervention in this chapter is not to criticize bioethics, but rather to 
emphasize the alternatives: to foreground the forms of good care that are 
marginalized by bioethics, thereby making them more visible.  
The argument I develop is that carers deploy a variety of tactics in order to sustain 
the person in everyday care practice. A tactic refers here to an approach, maneuver 
or method that is mobilized in order to intervene in dementia care practices.477
However, it is important to note that these tactics are not necessarily strategic, 
explicit nor discussed among the carers. I use this term to index what John Law has 
named ‘modes of ordering’, a concept that was introduced by Law as a tool to 
conceptualize the different strategies (or patterns) at work that allows a certain 
coherence to emerge in practices.478 These patterns may be studied empirically, as 
they are enacted and expressed through our interactions with the reality that is being 
studied. Modes of ordering can in this way be understood as a downscaling of Michel 
Foucault’s term ‘discourse’, which is used to describe grand shifts in the orderings 
pertinent to Western societies over the centuries. A further important difference 
between the two terms is that ‘modes of ordering’, in contrast to what is implied by 
‘discourse’, does not give priority to verbal forms of knowledge. Instead, Law 
emphasizes the material heterogeneity of social ordering.479 This means that more 
hidden or less explicit/verbalized forms of orderings are also recognized and 
acknowledged.480
In this thesis I use the notion of ‘modes of ordering’ as a tool to conceptualize the 
multiplicity of dementia care. Through my analysis of the empirical material, different 
patterns of care intervention were discerned. When I have deployed the notion of 
                                           
476 Ibid. 
477 Collins English Dictionary, 2001 (1995). 
478 Law (1994). 
479 ibid: 105-107. 
480 See for example Knorr-Cetina (1992); Collins (2001) and Heath (1997).
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‘tactics’ to talk about these patterns of practices, it is because some of the tactics are 
not as materially embedded as what is implied by ‘modes of ordering’. Further, tactics 
vary in magnitude. So although my use of ‘tactics’ strongly resembles ‘modes of 
ordering’, they are also distinct. It is, however, important to note that the notion of 
‘tactics’ in my usage does not denote a position of control. Instead, the carers, who 
are themselves seen to be a part of the ordering process, change with the dynamics 
of the situation.
My concern lies in showing that good dementia care is about the constant movement 
between different tactics. Good care is hence complex and unpredictable in the 
sense that it is dynamic and situated. There is no one ‘Grand Theory’ or given 
hierarchy of values that works to sustain the person, but instead a series of dynamic 
practices and incidents. 
In addressing issues of multiplicity in dementia care, I draw on empirical material 
from dementia care practices, as well as theoretical resources from Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). In particular, my work builds on a tradition within STS that 
is concerned with normativities in care and ethics in practice, where the work of 
Annemarie Mol, Jeannette Pols, Vicky Singleton and Ingunn Moser is central.481 The 
argument is that different care practices produce not only different perspectives on 
care, but also different (care) realities. Multiple realities.482 However, these realities 
(or forms of good care) are not distinct in the sense that they result in plurality. 
Instead, the patterns of practices, such as the different tactics of dementia care, work 
and relate in different ways.483 The point is that these realities are interrelated; they 
shade into each other and co-exist in dementia care practice. An important aim of this 
chapter is to demonstrate how the different tactics relate and cohere in order to 
sustain the person in everyday dementia care practice.
The chapter is divided into two sections. I start by identifying five different tactics (or 
modes) of good care. These tactics are drawn out of the empirical material, which is 
based on fieldwork in four care flats for people with dementia. It is important to note 
                                           
481 See for example Mol (1998/2002/2008); Pols (2004); Singleton (1998/2007) and Moser 
(2000/2003). 
482 Mol (1998/2002). 
483 Mol and Law, 2002: 7; Mol (1998/2002).  
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that these five tactics clearly do not represent the total number of tactics that are 
mobilized. My aim is, however, not to identify them all, but to demonstrate that there 
are a number of tactics at work in everyday dementia care, analyzing what their goals 
are and how they work to sustain the person. Further, my analysis shows how these 
tactics enact different realities and relations.
In the second part of this chapter I will analyze the dynamics of how the different 
tactics co-exist in practice, and how the carers work in order to be able to deal with 
the situation at hand.
7.2: The articulation of different tactics of good care
In the following I will present five different tactics of good care. The tactics are 
differentiated on the basis of their diverging objectives; moreover, they work in 
different ways and on different materials and relations. The focus of the analysis is 
directed at how these tactics work to sustain the person, as well as on the types of 
realities and relations they seek (or contribute) to create.484
7.2.1: The cognitive tactic: Intervention through reality-orientation
The situation was tense. Agnes Rasmussen was standing in the middle of the 
doorway with her walking frame in front of her on her way out. The time was 
about 7 p.m. She was dressed in proper walking shoes and had her coat on, fit 
for being outside in the mild spring evening. 
Quite a crowd had gathered there in the door opening. One carer was standing 
directly in front of Mrs. Rasmussen, blocking her way, while two more carers 
were standing just behind her. Mrs. Rasmussen was angry. ‘Please let me go’, 
she said to the carer in front of her, ‘I need to go home and look after my father 
and the animals. He will not manage on his own, you see!’ The carer kept 
standing there, asking Mrs. Rasmussen to go back inside. Mrs. Rasmussen 
was becoming more and more desperate. ‘But my father will not manage on 
his own. He is waiting for me to come and look after the animals!’, she kept 
arguing, raising her voice. And as no amount of distractions seemed to help, 
one of the carers tried to reason with her: ‘Look, Mrs. Rasmussen. How old are 
you?’ Mrs. Rasmussen looked puzzled, and replied ‘Eighty-two’. The carer 
went on: ‘Well, if you are eighty-two, that would make your father more than a 
hundred years old. You have to understand that he is no longer with us!’ Mrs. 
Rasmussen looked confused and was silent for a while, thinking. She was still 
standing there in the middle of the doorway. But then it was as if she suddenly 
remembered her mission, as she exclaimed: ‘But the animals then? I have to 
                                           
484 Similarly, Akrich and Pasveer show how bodies and selves are performed in birth narratives. 
Through these narratives different realities are made/constituted. See Akrich and Pasveer (2004). 
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go and look after the animals….’ The anger and distress in her voice was 
clear. ‘But there are no animals’, one of the carers replied. ‘It is your 
grandchildren that live there now. So you cannot go there tonight. But we can 
call them and ask if you can come and visit them one day soon. And, anyway, 
it is too far for you to walk, and soon it will be dark.’ Mrs. Rasmussen did not 
seem convinced, but she did not resist when one of the carers took her arm, 
turned her around, and walked back inside. 
The carers called Mrs. Rasmussen’s daughter to have her explain the situation 
and get Mrs. Rasmussen to calm down. Mrs. Rasmussen was offered a seat 
at the desk in the office and handed the telephone. She was silent as she 
finished the phone call. She got up from her chair and walked down the 
corridor towards her room.      
The above excerpt describes a very common situation in dementia care. The aim of 
the intervention is to stop Mrs. Rasmussen, to prevent her from leaving the care flat. 
The carers know that Mrs. Rasmussen would not be capable of walking the three 
kilometers to her previous home and that she is likely to get lost. Just letting her go is 
not an option, as it would amount to neglect, which is bad care. In stopping Mrs. 
Rasmussen, the carers do not treat her intention to leave the care flat as a rational 
choice or as an act of her free will, but as a symptom of her illness. Her reduced 
cognitive capacity due to dementia has led her to be confused, believing that her 
father is still alive and that she needs to assist him with the animals.  
The cognitive tactic is a much-used intervention strategy in dementia care, known as 
‘reality orientation’. This tactic, which is based on a well-articulated theory, pursues 
the objective of “helping to re-connect disoriented patients with the world at hand”.485
Reality orientation is based on the assumption that confusion can be prevented and 
that people feel better when they are oriented to present time and place.486 The idea 
is to correct patients when their responses do not correspond to present time and 
place. During the 1970s and 1980s the method of reality orientation was widely used 
in dementia care in Norway, as an individual and group-based alternative and 
supplement to medical treatment.487 However, this method has gradually been 
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486 Feil, 1988: 129-130. 
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miscredited, as the use of verbal confrontation and correction was experienced to 
cause increased stress and frustration among a number of people with dementia.488
It is important to note that reality orientation implies more than the use of verbal 
intervention. Materials such as clocks, information boards and calendars are actively 
used to orient confused persons to present time and place.489 At the care flats where 
the fieldwork was conducted for this thesis, the layout of the buildings, signs and 
color-coding were all a part of an overall plan to enhance reality orientation. One of 
them, which was sectioned into two zones, used contrasting colors to separate the 
two areas: one area was blue, with blue curtains, furniture and tablecloths, while the 
other area was red. Each of the care flats also had a large calendar on display in the 
common lounges in order to provide the residents with information about the date, 
day, year and (in some cases) the season.
Returning to the narrative above, the question is how the mobilization of the cognitive 
tactic works to sustain Mrs. Rasmussen. I will argue that she is sustained in two 
different ways in this situation. First of all, she is sustained as she is prevented from 
going outside on her own  from a situation that would have been unsafe and 
potentially dangerous. Further, she is sustained as the carers, by mobilizing of the 
cognitive tactic, avoid a dramatic confrontation and the use of coercion. The carers 
do this by stopping Mrs. Rasmussen, by blocking her way, which then makes it 
possible to confront her with arguments and reason. The carers intervene by trying to 
inform and correct the reality of Mrs. Rasmussen. They do so by confronting her with 
facts (such as her age) and by telling her that there are no animals to attend to. In 
addition, the carers mobilize another important actor, Mrs. Rasmussen’s daughter, 
who can testify to how things really are. Through the use of arguments and reason, 
then, as well as the enrolment of her daughter, Mrs. Rasmussen is sustained. 
                                           
488 Ibid: 56. This was the conclusion presented by Harald Nygård, professor of geriatrics and a 
prominent figure in Norwegian dementia research, in a recent review of non-medical approaches to 
dementia care. In my experience, however, reality orientation remains a widely-used method of 
intervention in dementia care. As I see it, reality orientation is primarily miscredited in discussions 
about research and methodology. 
489 Feil, 1988: 130. 
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The cognitive tactic as reality orientation is based on an understanding of reality as 
‘one’. There is only one reality, the reality of the carers, and this is not open for 
negotiation. It is the carers’ task to correct the reality of the person with dementia, 
which is considered to be false.  When Mrs. Rasmussen is on her way to her former 
home to look after her father and the animals, she is confronted with the truth. Verbal 
confrontations, arguments and reason, all of which are important strategies within this 
tactic, serve to convince Mrs. Rasmussen that she is indeed mistaken. 
Further, the relations are asymmetrical. As the only true reality is the reality of the 
carers, the carers’ duty is to correct the reality of the patient. This means that the 
carers have all the answers. And when Mrs. Rasmussen is faced with the 
overwhelming evidence (including the conversation with her own daughter) that she 
is indeed mistaken, she seemingly accepts the reality of the carers and returns to her 
room.
7.2.2: The emotional tactic: Intervention through the acknowledgement of emotions
Night carer Wendy tells me about the work she does at night and the 
conversations she sometimes has with the residents. She stresses that the 
method of ‘reality orientation’ does not always work when a person with 
dementia is feeling anxious and confused. Wendy smiles as she tells of one 
early morning recently when she met the manager, Ben, in the corridor as she 
was ready to go home after a long night at work. Ben had politely asked if 
she’d had a good night at work. And Wendy had replied that indeed she had, 
but that it had been a particularly busy night, as she had been cooking a large 
pot of ‘mutton-in-cabbage’ (a traditional Norwegian dish) and had helped to 
deliver two lambs during the night. Ben had looked at her, shocked, before he 
realized that it was not actual lambs or ‘mutton-in-cabbage’ that she was 
talking about. 
In this story, night carer Wendy gives an example of how she uses an emotional 
tactic in her work. As one of the residents is upset and restless because he needs to 
help deliver lambs and cook a pot of mutton-in-cabbage, Wendy does not dispute his 
feelings or try to convince him that he is mistaken. Instead, she recognizes and 
acknowledges the resident’s feelings by offering to help him  not by actually doing 
the tasks, but by verbally affirming his feelings. In this way she engages herself in the 
emotional sphere of the resident. This emotional tactic worked to sustain the resident, 
as his rationality (and reality) was recognized and acknowledged.
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The emotional tactic can be understood as an expression of what is known as 
‘validation’, another widely used intervention strategy in dementia care.490 Like reality 
orientation, the validation approach is based on articulated ideas of dementia care 
intervention. Naomi Feil, a gerontological social worker, developed the method of 
validation over a period of nearly twenty years, from 1963 to 1980.491 The approach 
is based on Feil’s experiences with disoriented nursing home residents in this period. 
According to Feil, validation is a therapy for communicating with the disoriented 
elderly, including people who are suffering from dementia.492 First of all the method is 
used with people over the age of 80, who are in a process of tying up living in order 
to prepare for dying.493 The aim of validation is to help these people reach their goals 
by acknowledging the reason behind their behaviour.494 This is achieved through 
validation of the person’s feelings, allowing self-worth, dignity, communication and 
happiness to be restored.495
Validation is about meeting the person wherever he or she is. When the resident tells 
night carer Wendy that he is restless and anxious as there are lambs to be delivered 
and a pot of mutton-in-cabbage to be cooked, she does not confront or dispute his 
reality, although it does not have any basis in the reality she experiences. The point 
is that the reality and emotions experienced by the resident are acknowledged as 
real, both by the resident and by the carer. This means that there are two realities, 
the reality of the resident and the reality of the night carer, but these two realities do 
not clash or confront each other. Instead, night carer Wendy brackets (or 
suppresses) her reality in order to go along with the resident’s reality.
The relationship between the caregiver and the old person, an important aspect of 
validation, is characterized by the focus on empathy, acceptance and 
                                           
490 Naomi Feil (1988/1993). 
491 Feil, 1988: ix and Feil, 1993: 27. 
492 Feil, 1993: 27. 
493 Feil, 1988: 1. 
494 Ibid.
495 Finnema et al.; 1998: 193. 
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acknowledgement.496 A central aim of the emotional tactic is to establish closeness 
and good relations, as this is what makes it possible to affirm the resident’s emotions 
and calm him down. In the above narrative, the resident is sustained through 
acknowledgement and dialogue. 
It is, however, important to note that the acknowledgement of emotions is not limited 
to verbal forms of communication. Non-verbal forms of acknowledgement and 
communication are also an important part of the emotional tactic. During my period of 
fieldwork I frequently observed how the carers used their bodies actively when 
dealing with distressed residents. Holding hands and maintaining eye contact are two 
examples of embodied enactments of the emotional tactic.
7.2.3: The activity tactic: Intervention through a positive ‘here-and-now’ experience
As I walk into the common kitchen, I can see two residents and a carer 
standing by the stove. They are just finishing shaping homemade buns. The 
buns are placed on two large baking trays, and one of the residents is starting 
to brush them with an egg glaze. The carer and the two residents discuss 
whether the dough is too thick and if there is enough liquid in the dough. The 
carer explains to me that last week when they made buns, the dough was so 
thick that the buns turned out heavy as stones. So this time there is more 
liquid in the dough. The resident finishes brushing them. A couple of minutes 
later the first tray is in the oven. The two residents go to the common lounge 
and sit down on the sofa right next to the kitchen. They talk about the buns 
they’ve made, looking through the kitchen door towards the stove. After a few 
minutes, one of the residents gets out of the sofa and walks up to the stove. 
‘They are looking great!’ she tells the others with a smile on her face, pointing 
at the buns in the oven. A few minutes later the kitchen is filled with the 
delicious smell of freshly baked buns. The two residents inspect the buns and 
nod in satisfaction: ‘Yes, they turned out perfect!’ The second tray is put in the 
oven, and everyone walks back to the lounge again. – A few hours later, the 
buns are served at supper for all the residents. 
The above excerpt is an example of how an activity tactic is used as intervention in 
dementia care. The activity tactic is based on the assumption that through active 
participation and the mobilization of intact individual resources, the residents will get 
a feeling of well-being and will experience themselves as valuable. The activity tactic 
is closely related to the notion of ‘rehabilitation’, which has only recently been 
associated with dementia care.497 However, whereas rehabilitation uses activities 
                                           
496 Ibid. 
497 Marshall (2005). 
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primarily for skills training or the maintenance of functions, the activity tactic has a 
broader focus.498
How, then, are the two residents in the above story sustained through the activity of 
making buns? First of all, the residents are sustained as they have a positive here-
and-now experience. This is achieved by one of the carers actively intervening in 
order to make it possible for the two residents to engage in the activity and to ensure 
that the activity will have a positive outcome. The carer checks the consistency of the 
dough and oversees the activity. The positive here-and-now experience also has a 
historical dimension. As the residents are former housewives with considerable 
experience in baking buns, the activity may bring up memories and old skills. The 
residents are sustained when they experience themselves as competent and useful. 
In addition, the smell and taste of the freshly baked buns may work to sustain the 
residents as it may increase their appetite and contribute to improved individual 
health. This is important, as reduced appetite and malnutrition are a major problem in 
dementia care.499
By mobilizing the activity tactic, the carers attempt to create a shared reality. The 
focus is on the reality as experienced at this moment. The important point is that 
there is no conflict or tension in this shared reality, in the sense that no boundaries 
are brought up or questioned. 
Further, the activity of making buns helps build good relations between the residents 
and the carers. When the two residents and the carer co-operate in making the buns, 
they work as a team  feeling the texture of the dough, and discussing important 
matters such as whether or not there is enough liquid in it. The expertise of the 
residents is considered important and failure-proof, as it allows for different levels of 
involvement and withdrawal. The residents may choose to help make the dough, 
watch the oven or simply smell the freshly baked buns. And not least: to eat the buns 
afterwards at supper. 
                                           
498 The use of activities for skills training or the maintenance of functions is not evident in my stories, 
as rehabilitation has not been the focus where I have done my fieldwork.  
499 Sensory issues (such as changes in smells and tastes) may lead to decreased appetite. Further, 
depression is common in dementia and may seriously affect appetite. Moreover, different forms of 
medication may have side effects such as nausea that can reduce the person’s appetite.  
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This means that new types of social relations are created between the residents and 
between the residents and the nurses. These relations are more symmetrical than 
the carer-patient relations that dominate the day-to-day routines. Another important 
point is that the focus on doing, alone or as a part of a team, makes it possible to 
establish relations despite having a limited verbal capacity. A practical and tactile 
form of relations, such as shaping the buns, brushing them with egg glaze, putting 
them in the oven, smelling them and not least, eating them, is not based on verbal 
language alone, but first of all on doing. Doing activities, then, is considered as 
valuable in itself. This means that the activity tactic provides a means by which the 
person may be sustained that does not presuppose verbal capacity or the ability to 
express emotions. In the example of the activity of making buns, the smell of the 
freshly baked buns (and eating the buns for supper) provides sensory cues of the 
activity, making it easier for the residents to remember. 
7.2.4: The reminiscence tactic: Intervention through personal objects and materials
Mrs. Svensen has recently moved to the Greenfield care flats as she is no 
longer able to manage at home. For some time now she has been suffering 
from dementia. And as her cognitive functions have deteriorated considerably 
during the past few months, she is increasingly becoming disorientated and 
has few verbal skills. 
This evening, as I accompany her to her room for the night, she invites me to 
come in and have a look. It is a lovely room, nicely decorated with personal 
belongings and furniture. Mrs. Svensen has brought a sofa, two chairs, a 
coffee table and a bookshelf as well as a bed from her former home. The walls 
are decorated with pictures, and there are flowers on the window shelf. In 
addition there are many photos: some larger ones hanging on the wall, while a 
number of smaller ones are placed on the bookshelf and on the coffee table. A 
photo of a large farm draws my attention; it is hanging just above her bed. – 
And yes, Mrs. Svensen confirms, this is the farm where she grew up. Where 
she’d lived most of her life, actually. Mrs. Svensen looked around the room as 
if uncertain of where she was now. 
There was a faded old photo of another, smaller farm with an unclear image of 
a man and a child standing next to the fence. This was her husband’s farm, 
Mrs. Svensen told me. And it was her husband that was in the photo, with their 
oldest son. They had lived in the small farmhouse for a few years after they’d 
married. As we looked at more photos, she told me about her husband, who 
had died many years ago, and about their three children, a girl and two boys. 
They were all grown up now. 
One smaller, more recent colour photo showed the large farm again. It was a 
photo of the beautiful entrance area, full of flowers. I commented on the 
flowers, saying that it was obvious that someone living there had a ‘green 
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thumb’. Mrs. Svensen smiled. Flowers had always been her passion, and the 
flowers in the entrance area always used to be her pride. 
In this story, different objects such as photos and furniture are used as visual cues to 
bring back memories and emotions and to get access to whom Mrs. Svensen has 
been – and is. Mrs. Svensen is not just a resident at the Greenfield care flat: she has 
a history and identity as a local farm girl, a wife and a mother of three, and later as a 
widow and a sole parent. And, moreover, a lover of flowers. Reminiscence carried 
out in this way is a history-oriented identity project, where the memory is put in the 
objects.
This organization of homeyness in care through the use of furniture, personal 
belongings, photos and other materialities is a part of a national strategy of ‘making 
care more homelike’.500 The legal definition of the care flats as the residents’ ‘own 
homes’, and not institutions, is a part of this move. This means that the residents are 
tenants, and not patients. Accordingly, when new residents move into the care flats, it 
is expected that they bring their personal belongings  and hence their history and 
identity  with them into the new home.
Reminiscence has been used as a therapeutic intervention in dementia care since 
the mid1960s, with the aim of promoting socialization and mental stimulation, both on 
an individual and on a group basis.501 Reminiscence as intervention in dementia 
care, which is based on utilizing the relatively intact long-term memory of a person 
with dementia, is often achieved through the systematic use of triggers (or stimuli) 
such as music or different household objects.502
In the above narrative the reminiscence tactic works to sustain Mrs. Svensen, in the 
sense that the photos and personal belongings allow her to retain her dignity and 
self-esteem in encounters and situations in which she would otherwise be ascribed 
                                           
500 The Norwegian term that is used is ‘boliggjøring av omsorgen’. In many ways, this expression, 
which was first used in the Gjærevoll Commission Report (NOU 1992: 1, p. 228), marks a new era in 
the organization of care services. See Chapter 4 (in particular section 4.4.3) for a more detailed 
analysis of this movement towards ‘making care more home-like’.  
501 Feil, 1993: 128. 
502 Woods et al., 1992: 138. 
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an identity only as someone who is sick and incapable of looking after herself.503
Through the photos and personal belongings she is instead enacted as an actor and 
a subject. So, although Mrs. Svensen is forgetful, her history and identity are made 
present in the objects in the room, in this way sustaining her as a historical person. 
Further, by mobilizing the reminiscence tactic a ‘historical reality’ is enacted. This is a 
reality that can be seen as part of, but not the same as, the ‘here-and-now’ reality 
mobilized through the activity tactic. The historical reality is a shared reality in the 
sense that it is not contested or questioned, so there are no confrontations or 
clashes. However, dealing with people’s pasts is difficult as the historical reality that 
is enacted may not always be positive. Traumas and memories of war or of difficult 
family relations may be triggered and cause increased agitation and anxiety. In order 
for the carers to use the individual resident’s history successfully in their interactions, 
they need to be familiar with the resident’s past.  
Through the mobilization of the reminiscence tactic, personal relations become 
possible. In the case of Mrs. Svensen, she is enabled, through her photos and 
personal belongings, to tell others of her life, of who she has been. Without the 
objects this would have been difficult, as Mrs.Svensen has reduced cognitive 
functions, as well as a limited verbal capacity. Having the photos makes it possible 
for the carers (or others) to ask questions that Mrs. Svensen can respond to. This 
means that she is enabled to communicate about other things than what is here-and-
now and to connect to a life, relations and experiences from other places. To be able 
to focus on other things than what is here-and-now may be particularly important in 
the sense that the here-and-now may be negative. 
7.2.5: The relational tactic: Intervention through the maintenance of relations
Mrs. Dun is more or less constantly wandering through the corridors at the 
Greenfield care flat complex. She is often particularly restless at night, and 
may be aggressive. She often screams and tries to hit the nurses, and 
sometimes she goes into the other residents’ rooms, waking them up and 
frightening them. I ask night carer Turid how she deals with Mrs. Dun’s 
behaviour. Turid tells me that she hardly ever has any conflict with Mrs. Dun: 
                                           
503 This is also the point made by Ingunn Moser in her story about how a disabled man called Olav, 
through the relationships he creates via his computer, demonstrates different identities that are not 
tied up with situations where he otherwise would be reduced to his disability, i.e. situations in which he 
is often passive and silent. See Moser, 2000: 231.  
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‘You see, Mrs. Dun and I have a very good rapport’, she explains, adding that 
Mrs. Dun believes Turid is a part of her family. ‘I went to her previous home as 
a home helper when she used to live there, so she remembers me. And we’ve 
always got on really well’ Turid tells me. ‘So when Mrs. Dun is restless and 
unsettled I just tell her that I am tired and that I need to have some peace and 
quiet. Then I walk off, and she usually goes off to bed, as she does not want to 
disturb me’. 
In this tactic, the establishment and maintenance of a relation between the carer and 
the resident is a central objective. The above story shows that flexibility is very 
important in this form of care, as there are no fixed positions. Instead there is give-
and-take while Mrs. Dun and night carer Turid negotiate their relations. A relational 
goal for care does not elicit many prescriptions, as there is no pre-set hierarchy of 
goals. Instead, relations are subject to change and require work to maintain them. In 
the case of Mrs. Dun and Turid, they clearly have positive relations to each other. 
They like each other and feel an obligation to make an effort to maintain their good 
relations. Mrs. Dun shows that she cares about Turid by abstaining from hassling her 
and by behaving well when Turid is on duty. Turid, on her part, also puts effort into 
keeping good relations with Mrs. Dun. In this way both Mrs. Dun and Turid are 
sustained through their mutual relations.  
A similar understanding of the purposeful development of relations as the goal of 
care is proposed by Jeannette Pols in her analysis of citizenship in psychiatric care in 
the Netherlands.504 Through an analysis of washing practices, Pols investigates what 
kind of citizenship that is aimed at for mental health-care patients. Four different 
repertoires are described, each oriented towards a specific notion of citizenship. One 
of the repertoires identified by Pols is ‘washing as a relational activity’.505 ‘When 
washing is a relational activity, to be a citizen is to be connected to other people; … 
the citizen has to establish and maintain relations with other people’, Pols argues.506
The point, according to Pols, is that
(...) {E}stablishing living together in a convenient way as the goal of this care 
practice means downplaying professional claims of psychiatric nursing. Caring 
                                           
504 Pols, 2004: 45-75. 
505 The other repertoires described are ’washing as part of individual privacy’, ’washing as a basic skill’ 
and ’washing as a precondition’ (for citizenship).  
506 Ibid: 68. 
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is unpredictable; it is not easy to prescribe ‘methods’ or rules of how to act. 
Caregiver and patient will have to work it out together.507
Similarly, in returning to the above narrative, the relation between Mrs. Dun and Turid 
is seen to be unpredictable, because relations are influenced by moods and other 
inconsistencies. Hence, flexibility is an important element of this tactic.
A further question is: What realities and relations does the relational tactic enact? 
Mrs. Dun and night carer Turid can be seen to live in different realities. However, 
these realities co-exist in the sense that their realities accommodate each other. This 
is because in the relational tactic there is no such thing as one reality or one truth. 
Instead, there are different moods and uncertainties.508
In the case of Mrs. Dun and Turid, a relation was already established before Mrs. 
Dun moved into the care flats and Turid started to work there as a night carer. Mrs. 
Dun associates Turid with her former home, and Turid has knowledge of Mrs. Dun’s 
previous life. This maintenance and continuity of relations is remarkable, as Mrs. Dun 
is not expected to remember Turid.509 However, both have a commitment to their 
continuous relations, and this commitment involves obligations and expectations. 
Emotions are another important element of these relations. Relations are maintained 
as personal and emotional ties are formed.
An important point is that the relational tactic is not based on verbal communication 
alone. One example of a more materially-embedded mobilization of the relational 
tactic in everyday care is the use of primary carers at the care flats. In each of the 
four care flats where fieldwork was conducted for this thesis, the residents were 
assigned a ‘primary carer’. The primary carer has extensive responsibilities for 
his/her resident that go well beyond the usual care duties. These responsibilities 
include contact and information exchange between the resident and others, such as 
next-of-kin and medical practitioners. In addition, the primary carer is responsible, 
together with the resident, for a number of practical tasks, such as ensuring that the 
                                           
507 Ibid. 
508 Pols, 2004: 65-66. 
509 The question is whether Mrs. Dun actually remembers Turid, or if this is a non-cognitive form of 
remembering: a memory from ‘within’ relations, such as ‘I know you, so you react in a way that you 
know me’. 
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resident’s room is tidy and that the dirty laundry is washed. In some instances, such 
as when there is no next-of-kin, the primary carer may even help the resident with 
tasks such as banking or shopping. The building of relations between the carer and 
the resident is a vital element in this kind of care. 
Tom Kitwood, a social psychologist and an internationally acknowledged authority on 
dementia-care matters, emphasizes the relational aspects of care in his theory of 
person-centered dementia care.510 The notion of ‘personhood’ is central in Kitwood’s 
theory. According to Kitwood, we are who we are in the context of our relationships 
and social being.511 Kitwood was particularly interested in how the social 
environment, including care givers and family, influences the development of 
dementia. Good care is about acknowledging the person as s/he is, ensuring that 
s/he is met by his or her social environment with understanding, respect and care, 
Kitwood argues. The person with dementia becomes someone who others (carers, 
family) relate to. This understanding of good dementia care differs from what is 
implied by the relational tactic in the sense that the relational tactic is based on 
mutual and active relations.
7.3: The co-existence of different tactics in everyday care-practice 
So far five different tactics of good care have been analysed. The analysis shows that 
each tactic mobilizes different interpersonal and material resources that contribute to 
sustain the person in everyday dementia care practice. Further, I have demonstrated 
that the carers, through the process of mobilizing and organizing different tactics, 
enact multiple realities and relations. Everyday dementia care is thereby about 
managing dynamic and shifting care realities. A care reality is understood as the 
specific reality/realities and relations that are enacted through the mobilization of a 
tactic. And as the carers continually mobilize different tactics in everyday care, 
different care realities are enacted and re-enacted. Sometimes a care reality is 
enacted that is based on a shared reality and mutual relations, such as in the 
relational tactic. At other times, however (for example through the mobilization of the 
                                           
510 Kitwood (1997). 
511 Ibid. 
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cognitive tactic), the care reality that is enacted recognizes only one reality and is 
based on asymmetrical relations.
However, the different tactics of good care do not exist independently of each other. 
In the following section I will take the analysis further by demonstrating how different 
tactics co-exist in dementia care practice. 
7.3.1: The different tactics shade into one another
As I arrive at the Pinewood care flat complex I find evening carer Anna and 
three of the residents sitting in the common lounge. On the coffee table in front 
of them is a book with historical photos and drawings from the local area. Anna 
and the three residents are looking at the pictures and chatting.  As Anna turns 
the pages, she asks questions about the different pictures. These are 
questions that relate to the residents’ childhood and life in the small local 
community.  As it is nearly suppertime, Anna gets up to start preparing for the 
meal and asks if anyone wants to help her by setting the table. Mrs. Thune, 
one of the residents, offers to help her and joins Anna in the kitchen. The two 
of them continue chatting as the table is set and supper is served. 
In this story evening carer Anna moves between reminiscence and activity tactics in 
her interaction with the residents. Through the interaction, a historical reality is 
enacted. At the same time, a positive here-and-now experience and social interaction 
is achieved, as Anna and the residents look at the book together and chat. Here, the 
two tactics shade into one another and are difficult to differentiate. The point I am 
making is that sometimes the different tactics are seamlessly conjoined, as the 
realities and relations that are enacted reinforce each other.
7.3.2: The dynamics of good dementia care: Constant shifts, different constellations
In everyday practices, the boundaries between the different tactics are blurred as 
they melt onto one another. Further, there is a constant shift between the different 
tactics, or constellations of tactics, as different actors get involved or as the situation 
changes. Other carers might, for example, have used another constellation of tactics 
in the above setting, and Anna herself may mobilize another set of tactics when 
interacting with these residents in another setting. The crucial point is that there is no 
gold standard that always works. Instead, sustaining the person is a matter of 
continually shifting back and forth between different tactics, in the process enacting 
different realities and relations. This is because intervention through one tactic alone 
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will tend to get stuck.512 During my fieldwork I witnessed several episodes where use 
of the reality orientation tactic alone got stuck. When carers pursued continued verbal 
confrontation, some residents reacted with anger and frustration. The result was 
often a worsening of behavioural symptoms related to dementia, such as increased 
restlessness and wandering.
7.3.3: Tensions and conflicts between different tactics
Tactics may also be in tension or conflict with each other. I return to the story of Mrs. 
Rasmussen:
Mrs. Rasmussen has calmed down somewhat after the episode at the front 
door earlier in the evening.513 So when night carer Elisabeth arrives, she is in 
a better mood. The two of them chat as Elisabeth helps Mrs. Rasmussen into
her nightgown. The atmosphere is warm and relaxed. Elisabeth is a former 
neighbour of Mrs. Rasmussen, so they talk about ‘the old days’. And when 
Elisabeth leaves the room, Mrs. Rasmussen is in bed. 
                                           
A few hours later, however, in the very early hours of the morning, Mrs. 
Rasmussen is on her way down the corridor. As she approaches Elisabeth she 
asks if Elisabeth can call a taxi for her as she needs to get home urgently. ‘But 
it is in the middle of the night, Mrs. Rasmussen. The time is just 4 a.m. You 
cannot go home now! And besides, there are no taxis at this time of the night. 
Come, let us go to the kitchen and I will make us both a nice cup of tea’. 
The point I want to draw from this story is that Elisabeth moves from a relational to a 
cognitive tactic in her dealings with Mrs. Rasmussen. The above story is an example 
of a not-so-subtle shift between different tactics, as the shift from a relational to a 
cognitive tactic involves a movement from a shared reality to reality as ‘one’. This 
move is also problematic as it involves a shift from mutual and shared relations to 
more asymmetrical care relations. By mobilizing the cognitive tactic, Elisabeth 
confronts their shared reality and relations, putting their mutual relationship at stake. 
The result of this clash is not given and depends on a number of factors, such as 
Elisabeth’s ability to re-establish good relations with Mrs. Rasmussen and Mrs. 
Rasmussen’s cognitive functions, such as how quickly she forgets the incident.  
512 This is also one of John Law’s arguments in his study of the organization of the Daresbury 
Laboratory in ‘Organizing modernity’. Law identified four different ‘modes of ordering’ at work at the 
Daresbury Laboratory: enterprise, administration, vision and vocation. His point is that organizations 
that are based on only one mode of ordering tend to get stuck. See Law (1994). 
513 See the story of Mrs. Rasmussen in ‘The cognitive tactic: intervention through reality orientation’, 
section 7.2.1. 
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There is a tension between different tactics as they enact different and conflicting 
realities and relations. These tensions and conflicts are most prominent in moves to 
and from the cognitive tactic, as the cognitive tactic is less compatible with the other, 
more relational-based tactics. A major difference is that the cognitive tactic is more 
verbal and confronting than the other tactics. 
The mobilization of different tactics also enacts other forms of conflicts and tensions 
in dementia care. The enactment of a positive here-and-now experience may, for 
instance, be in direct conflict to the establishment of a historical reality. Tension or 
conflict may be the result when the here-and-now interaction results in the triggering 
of difficult or traumatic memories.
7.3.4: Provisionality, coincidences and inconsistencies
Mr. Hansen was a much feared patient, as he was known to be very 
aggressive. He was particularly aggressive in the mornings when the carers 
assisted him with washing, dressing and getting him out of bed. On a number 
of occasions he had hit the carer helping him. 
One morning Ella attended to Mr. Hansen. And as there was a cassette player 
on the bookshelf in Mr. Hansen’s room, she turned it on. The music had an 
instant effect on Mr. Hansen. He clearly enjoyed listening to it, and the 
morning ritual was completed without any signs of aggression. At the lunch 
meeting, Ella informed the other carers of her discovery. 
The next morning, however, when another carer attended to Mr. Hansen and 
played the same music, he was his usual aggressive self and did not seem to 
derive any comfort from the music. 
The above excerpt describes how Ella, by coincidence, mobilizes a positive here-
and-now experience that works to sustain Mr. Hansen. However, when the same 
tactic is used the next day by a different carer, Mr. Hansen does not respond 
positively to the music. This shows how provisional and inconsistent good dementia 
care is, because it is never given how the person can be sustained. Finding an 
arrangement that works to sustain Mr. Hansen is an ongoing process in which 
coincidences and trial and error play an important role.514
                                           
514 See chapter 6 ‘Dementia care as creative ethics’, section 6.3.3 for a more thorough analysis of 
good care as a trial and error process. 
175
7.3.5: Summing up: Good care is about handling a repertoire of tactics 
In this section, I have shown that the different tactics are at times seamlessly 
conjoined, while at other times they produce tensions and confrontations. 
Consequently, good dementia care is about being flexible, in the sense that it is 
about handling a constantly shifting set of tactics.
The artful carer organizes different tactics with the aim of sustaining the person. In 
order to do so the carer needs a repertoire of tactics to draw from. This repertoire of 
tactics is built up through experience in dealing with different situations, and by 
experiencing what works and what does not work in these situations. Interactions and 
observations as well as training and discussions with colleagues are important 
aspects of building up these constellations of tactics. A large repertoire of tactics is 
important, as it may give the carers the needed flexibility in dealing with the dynamics 
and messy complexity of everyday care.
7.4: Conclusions 
In this chapter I have shown how the carers work to sustain the person in day-to-day 
dementia care practices. They do so by organizing and mobilizing different tactics. 
Five tactics that were drawn out of the empirical material have been dealt with 
separately. The cognitive, emotional, activity, reminiscence and relational tactics are 
differentiated, as they have diverging goals and work in different ways using different 
materials. Further, each tactic enacts different realities and relations. In everyday 
care practice these tactics co-exist in complex ways, sometimes shading into one 
another and sometimes producing tensions or clashes.   
Through experience and training the carers build up a repertoire of tactics that they 
draw from in different situations. Good dementia care, which requires juggling a 
constantly shifting set of tactics, is complex and messy. There is no one ‘Grand
Theory’ or given hierarchy of values that works to sustain the person; instead, there 
is a series of practices and incidents. This means that good care is not one, but 
multiple. Whether or not care is good (the person is sustained) depends on a number 
of factors, such as the flexibility of the carer and his/her ability to adequately deal with 
the situation at hand.
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My intervention in this chapter is two-fold. The first goal is to make silent knowledge 
visible. Through the articulation of various more or less taken for granted tactics of 
good care, I have shown how the carers work to sustain the person in everyday care. 
This is important work that needs to be acknowledged, particularly as it is necessary 
for the carers (and others) to know what is going on in order to be able to critically 
reflect on their own practices, making better care possible.
A second aim of this chapter is to challenge the predominance of bioethics. As good 
care is complex and situated, in the sense that it is not given how the person may be 
sustained, it is not consistent with a strong prescriptive focus on individual autonomy, 
as articulated by bioethical ideals. However, instead of criticizing bioethics, my aim in 
this chapter has been to emphasize the alternatives, foregrounding the practices that 
are marginalized by bioethics and thereby strengthening them. By showing how 
important these practices are, I increase their chances of prevailing in the struggle 
over what realities to create. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions
8.1: Introduction 
In this concluding chapter I will briefly sum up the thesis, aiming not to give a 
complete or chronological summary of the different chapters, but with an emphasis 
on the main arguments. In addition, I will attend to the issue of interventions. The 
question is how this knowledge can be used in order to improve dementia care. 
My doctoral project is an empirical and theoretical investigation into dementia care 
practice and policy in Norway. The key questions are: What is good dementia care? 
And how is it achieved? In addressing these questions I have used technology as a 
point of entry. By paying particular attention to technology’s role in dementia care, I 
have been able to explore and demonstrate how good care is constituted through 
everyday care practices.
The thesis draws upon empirical data as well as theoretical tools and insights from 
the interdisciplinary and academic field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
The empirical material includes data obtained from observing care in four different 
care flats for people with dementia. In addition, a number of actors have been 
interviewed. The data also incorporates policy documents, excerpts from a media 
debate in Norwegian newspapers and a number of other public reports and 
documents in order to explore the framing and articulation of ethical issues in 
dementia care, particularly in light of the use of technology. 
In the thesis I have demonstrated the necessity of attending to the richness of 
practices and the detail of the work involved in dementia care. Through this focus on 
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practices and detail, good dementia care emerges as complex, dynamic, responsive, 
context specific, relational and materially heterogeneous. Moreover, good care is not 
an accomplished or stable entity; it is continuously created in and through everyday 
creative care practices. The practices are ethical in the sense that they involve 
weighing and balancing as well as the realization and manifestation of values. These 
values may include but are not limited to individual patient autonomy. The aim of care 
is seen to be about sustaining the person, which is a broad ideal as it allows for 
multiple capacities and values to co-exist in the construction of what a person is and 
what is implied in personhood. Consequently, this thesis offers an alternative to 
bioethical constructions of the person as first and foremost autonomous, rational and 
independent.
A further argument is that technologies, or (more broadly) materialities, play a crucial 
role in dementia care. Using narratives from dementia care practices, I have shown 
that technologies are built into dementia care in a multitude of different ways. The 
main argument is that good dementia care can be understood as an ongoing process 
of trying out different care arrangements that involve changing configurations of 
humans and technologies. It is never given which constellation of arrangements will 
constitute good care. Distinctions between good and bad care, ethical and unethical 
care, old and new technologies and between the human and the technological are 
seen as effects of specific care arrangements and contexts rather than as 
predetermined, stable categories. These insights contribute to the more general 
argument of the thesis: that current care policies built on principle-based ethics enact 
inappropriate assumptions about technology and care practices.
Policy on technology and care assumes that technology is a given entity and that it is 
applied to care. This means that the role of policy is to control the use of technology. 
What good care consists in is assumed to be knowable and predefined. By contrast, 
this thesis argues that a technology is a relational and multiple object. This means 
that a technology is determined by its relations to other entities, including humans. 
Knowledge of context and actual care practices is essential in order to ensure good 
dementia care. The argument is that current policy on technology and care needs to 
be supplemented with insights from ‘within’ care, recognizing the relationality, 
material heterogeneity and precariousness of care practices. 
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I will sum up this section by commenting briefly on my use of the analytical 
apparatus. The question is what the theoretical tools and resources have contributed 
with in my investigations into the relations between technology and care. I have three 
points to make. The analytical apparatus has, for a start given me a framework for 
exploring the materiality of care. Through empirical studies of care practices based 
on an understanding of technologies as actors in care, the significance of the material 
context became apparent. The result is a change of orientation from a preoccupation 
with how ‘new’ or ICT-based technologies are part of care to an investigation of 
technologies in a much broader sense. 
The analytical apparatus has also provided me with concepts and tools for exploring 
technology and care as an intertwined phenomenon. This as well as my use of 
methods; detailed observations of care practices, has enabled me to show that 
technology is not something that comes from the outside and which is added on to 
care. On the contrary technology is in care, as a part of what constitutes care. The 
question becomes hence what kind of care technologies and human elements enact.
In order to answer this question and to grasp the intertwined phenomenon of 
technology and human care, detailed studies of care practices is necessary. This 
leads me to my final point, which is related to the sensitivity for details that this 
theoretical and methodological approach has enabled. This focus on details is of vital 
importance, as it has made it possible for me to highlight how care is different in 
different places. And hence, that what makes good care is different in different 
places.
8.2: Policy and practice implications 
I will now briefly discuss how this knowledge may be used in order to promote a 
policy of sustaining the person. The notion of ‘sustaining the person’ is based on a 
different understanding of ‘the self’ or person than what is implied by principle-based 
ethics. Personhood is not something you either have or don’t have, but is achieved, 
developed and maintained in and through relations with other entities; which includes 
both human elements and technologies. The question is how to promote care-policy 
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based on a relational understanding of personhood. In the following I will highlight 
three central aspects of a policy of sustaining the person.
8.2.1: Foregrounding of local and situated knowledge
In this thesis I have shown that knowledge of actual context is necessary in order to 
ensure good care. This is because it is never given what constellations of humans 
and technologies that will work to sustain the person. Further, there is not a given 
hierarchy of goods, but a number of different values that patients and carers seek to 
achieve in care. In the case of preventing Mr. Edvards from falling at night, for 
example, a number of different values were at stake; including safety, a good night’s 
sleep and freedom of movement. And in everyday care, these values do clash. One 
example of how different values clash in everyday care situations is the story of Mrs. 
Rasmussen wanting to go home in order to assist her father with the animals.515 In 
stopping Mrs. Rasmussen from going outside, the carers clearly compromised her 
autonomy. However, and at the same time, just letting her go was not an option as 
the carers knew that Mrs. Rasmussen would not be able to walk the three kilometers 
to her former home, and that she was likely to get lost. Thus her safety and integrity 
were at stake. In this situation universal ethical principles and rational modes of 
argument is not enough. The argument I am drawing out is that the dilemmas of 
everyday care cannot be solved theoretically, at the philosopher’s desk, abstracted 
from the actual situation and care context. The dilemma facing the carers in dealing 
with Mrs. Rasmussen in the above situation for example, is not choosing whether 
Mrs. Rasmussen should be allowed to leave the care flat, but how to prevent her 
from leaving in a manner that sustained her. In this situation a cognitive tactic was 
mobilized, and through verbal arguments and reason Mrs. Rasmussen was 
persuaded to come back inside. And hence the carers avoided the use of coercion. 
Another important point is that care is about materially embedded infrastructures and 
routines. In this thesis I have shown that the specificities of the material 
infrastructure, such as the lay-out of the care flat and the configuration of the alarms, 
as well as routines play a crucial role in shaping care. In going back to the story of 
Mr. Edvards once more, it was the specific configuration of the safety-pin solution 
                                           
515 See Chapter 7, section 7.2.1. 
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which initially sustained him, in the sense that it provided the necessary assistance 
for going to the toilet at night, while – at the same time – ensuring a good night’s 
sleep. However, this arrangement failed in the end as Mr. Edvards increasingly found 
the safety-pin being fastened to his pyjamas top annoying and restraining. A policy of 
sustaining the person needs to recognize and acknowledge this multiplicity and 
situatedness of good care. The salient question is how this may be achieved. 
The foregrounding of the contextual, local and situated relegates the rationality of 
principle-based ethics into the background. The question is whether there is room for 
principles from this kind of ethics in a policy of sustaining the person. I want to leave 
this question open. 
8.2.2: Towards an ethnography of good care
In order to recognize and acknowledge the multiplicity and dynamism of good care, it 
is necessary to get insight into what matters in everyday care. This is achieved by 
paying attention to the specificities of how people and technologies attend to each 
other.516 Of how they care. The focus on the specificities of care is accomplished 
through telling stories about the activities of people and things, of engaging in what 
Harbers et al. name ‘an ethnography of good care’.517 In the article ‘Food Matters. 
Arguments for an ethnography of daily care’ the authors uses detailed descriptions of 
the practicalities and materiality of food in a Dutch nursing home in order to highlight 
the specificities that characterize different modes of caring. However, an ethnography 
of good care is not a mere description Harbers et al. argues. Instead “what is 
required is involved description: ethnographic work that looks for contrasts, sets up 
differences and seeks for what one practice might learn from another.”518 Hence, the 
articulation of tensions, ambivalences and conflicts are important in order to get 
insight into the multiplicity and situatedness of good care. The aim is not to pass 
verdicts or to come to firm conclusions, but to open up new questions.
An important aspect of an ethnography of good care is that it allows for the 
articulation of non-verbal forms of knowledge. This means that also taken for granted 
                                           
516 Harbers et al., 2002. 
517 Ibid. 
518 Ibid: 219. 
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forms of good care may be brought out into the open and become topics for 
discussion.519
8.2.3: Sustaining the person through openness and debate
Openness and debate is a crucial element of a policy of sustaining the person. 
Through the foregrounding of local and situated knowledge, the multiple forms of 
good care may be articulated. As different forms of good care are brought into the 
open and is made subject to critical and constructive reflection, it becomes possible 
for care workers, next-of-kin, policy makers and others to discuss whether or not this 
is what they actually want.520
Openness and debate may be achieved in a number of different ways. I will briefly 
discuss two different strategies for how this may be accomplished in dementia care. 
New forms of exchange of information
Increased openness and debate may be achieved through new forms of exchange of 
information between carers and other health-professionals. This may for example 
involve carers visiting other care settings on a regular basis, experiencing how things 
are done in other environments. This information-exchange may also involve setting 
up new forums for carers where they, on a regular basis, get to meet other carers in 
order to discuss concrete cases. As carers from one care setting describe the details 
of how they have worked on a particular case, other carers may bring forward their 
own experiences with similar cases.  And as information is exchanged, new insights 
may be gained. This may in turn encourage the carers to reflect on the effects, 
limitations and possibilities of current care practices, and thus contribute to improve 
care.
Today some of these arenas of information-exchange and mutual reflection are in 
place, although in a limited form. In two of the care flats where fieldwork was 
conducted for this thesis, the carers had regular in-house meetings in order to 
discuss specific residents. In one care flat the local dementia team was consulted on 
matters concerning difficult cases. However, a major problem with regards to 
                                           
519 See Pols, 2004: 23-24. 
520 Ibid: 24. 
183
information-exchange in dementia care today is lack of resources. In the two care 
flats when in-house meetings were held on regular intervals, the other carers had to 
take on additional responsibilities in order to make it possible for a meeting to take 
place. Sometimes also extra staff was hired in. This was however not always 
possible, as the budget was tight. But also getting hold of qualified carers posed an 
ongoing, major challenge the leaders of the care flats told me. Each of the care flats I 
visited also had a high turn-over of staff. Hence, more extensive programs of training 
and exchange of carers would clearly pose a big challenge for the local health-
authorities. On the other hand, I will argue, the exchange-programs may also 
contribute to increase the carer’s motivation, and thus be conducive in reducing turn-
over.
The new forums of information-exchange may also include other actors, such as 
next-of-kin or members of the municipality’s senior citizen’s panel.521 These groups 
may be able to contribute with valuable insight and experiences, and thus be 
conducive of the learning process. Further, it is also possible to imagine this 
information-exchange as a part of a more formal co-operation with health-care 
teaching institutions, such as University Colleges.
Outsiders getting access to the care arena 
Another important aspect of achieving openness and debate is to give researchers 
(or other outsiders) access to the care arena. Nursing teachers and researchers may 
as outsiders contribute to new reflections and insights that will inform the debates. It 
is important that these are broad debates that involve a number of different actors 
including health-care workers, researchers, next-of-kin, ethicists, policy makers and 
journalists. Today, however, such access to the care arena is difficult to obtain; first 
of all as it is considered to be an intrusion of basic human rights, as privacy and 
individual autonomy is seen to be compromised. For example was my initial 
application to the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) to do participant 
observation at the care flats denied with reference to the human rights declaration 
                                           
521 In Norway these senior citizen panels are named ’eldreråd’. The municipalities are instructed by the 
law to appoint an ‘eldreråd’ in every municipality. (Lov 1991-11-08 nr 76: Lov om kommunale og 
fylkeskommunale eldreråd) [The law regulating local and regional senior citizen panels]. 
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and on the basis that an informed consent would be impossible to obtain.522 The 
consequence of this policy is that the insights and openness that such studies bring 
about are denied on the basis of legal rules and principles alone.  
                                           
522 Den europeiske menneskerettighetskonvensjonen (The European Human Rights Convention) 4. 
November 1950.
185
Bibliography 
Akrich, Madeleine. ‘The De-scription of Technical Objects’. In Shaping Technology,
 Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. Wiebe Bijker and John 
 Law. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992a: pp. 205-224. 
Akrich, Madeleine and Bruno Latour. ‘A summary of a Convenient Vocabulary for the 
 Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Assemblies’. In Shaping Technology, 
 Building Society: Studies of Sociotechnical Change, eds. Wiebe Bijker and 
 John Law, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992b, pp. 259-264. 
Akrich, Madeleine. ‘Inscriptition et Coordination Socio-Techniques: Anthropologie de
  Quelques Dispositifs Energetiques’, Paris Ecole Nationale Superieure des 
 Mines de Paris, These pour le doctorat Socio-Economie, 1993. 
Akrich, Madeleine and Bernike Pasveer. ‘Embodiment and Disembodiment in 
 Childbirth Narratives’, in Body and Society, 10, 2004, pp. 63-84.
Alm Andreassen, Tone. ’Brukerinvolveringens betydning for ekspertisens posisjon i
  helsepolitikken’. I Ekspertkunnskap og (for)brukermakt. En antologi. Kristin
 Asdal og Ingunn Moser (red.), Unipub forlag, 2008: pp. 57-80. 
Asdal, Kristin. ’Politikkens teknologier. Produksjon av regjerlig natur’. Doctoral thesis, 
 University of Oslo, 2004. 
Asdal, Kristin, Brita Brenna and Ingunn Moser (red.): Teknovitenskapelige kulturer.
 Spartacus Forlag AS, 2001. 
Asdal, Kristin, Brita Brenna and Ingunn Moser (eds.): Technoscience. The Politics of 
 Interventions. Oslo Academic Press, Unipub Norway, 2007. 
Barry, Andrew. ‘Political Machines. Governing a technological society’. The Athlone
  Press. London and New York, 2001. 
Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress. ‘Principles of Biomedical ethics’. 
  Second Edition. New York Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983 [1979].
Bell, Colin and Helen Roberts (eds.): Social Researching. Politics, Problems, 
 Practice. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 
 1984. 
186
Berg, Anne-Jorunn. ‘A gendered socio-technical construction: The smart house’.
 In Bringing technology Home. Gender and Technology in a Changing Europe,
 eds. Cynthia Cockburn and Dilic R. Fürst. Open University Press, 1994. 
Berg, Anne-Jorunn. ‘Digital feminism’. Doctoral Thesis. Norwegian University of 
 Science and Technology (Trondheim, Norway). Centre for Technology and 
 Society, Report nr 28, 1996.  
Berg, Anne-Jorunn and Merete Lie. ‘Feminism and Constructivism: Do Artifacts Have 
 Gender’? Science, technology and Human Values 20, no. 3, 1995.
Berg, Marc and Annemarie Mol (eds.): Differences in Medicine: Unraveling 
 Practices, Techniques and Bodies. Durham N.Ca and London: Duke 
 University Press, 1998.
Bijker, Wiebe, E., Thomas P Hughes and Trevor Pinch (eds.): The Social 
 Construction of Technical Systems: New directions in the Sociology and 
 History of Technology. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987. 
Bijker, Wiebe E. and John Law (eds.): Shaping Technology, Building Society: Studies
  in Sociotechnical change. Cambridge, Mass: MIT-Press, 1992. 
Bogen, Hanne, Torunn Kvinge, Karin Høyland og Bjørg Østnor. ’Egen bolig – også
  når helse svikter? Evaluering av omsorgsboliger for hjelpetrengende eldre’.
 Sintef-rapport, SBF51/A 06017, desember 2006. 
Bjørneby, Sidsel, Simon Clathworthy and Hilde Thygesen. ‘Evaluering av BESTA-
 installasjon i Tønsberg’. Rapport, 1996.  
Bjørneby, Sidsel and Ad Van Berlo (eds.): Ethical Issues in use of technology for
 Dementia Care. The Akon Series ‘Ageing in the contemporary society’,
 Volume 13,  Akontes Publishing, Knegsel, 1997. 
Bjørneby, Sidsel, Hilde Thygesen, Harald Jørgensen og Toril Laberg. ’Veileder i 
 smarthusteknologi. Introduksjon til teknologi som bygger ned 
 funksjonshemmede barrierer’. Del 1. Deltasenteret, 2002.
Bjørneby, Sidsel. ’Å føle seg trygg med demens’. Prosjektrapport, prosjekt 2004-1-
 0274. Nasjonalforeningen for folkehelsen, Stiftelsen Helse og Rehabilitering,
  2006. 
Bloor, David. ’Knowledge and social imagery’. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 1976. 
Brattvoll, Morten, Kai Vidar Falao og Toril Laberg. ’Innføring av smarthusteknologi i 
 det kommune pleie- og omsorgstilbudet’. Nasjonalt senter for 
 telemedisin/Sosial- og helsedirektoratet, Deltasenteret, 2004. 
187
Butler, Judith. ’Gendertrouble: feminism and the subversion of identity’. New York:
  Routledge, 1990. 
Callon, Michel. ‘Some elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the
  Scallops and the Fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay’. In Power, Action and
 Belief: A new Sociology of Knowledge? Sociology Review Monograph, ed.
 John Law, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986: 196-233 
Callon, Michel. ‘Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for 
 Sociological Analysis’. In The Social Construction of Technical Systems: New
  Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker,
 Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor J. Pinch. Cambridge, Mass. and
 London: MIT Press, 1987: pp: 83-103  
Callon, Michel and Bruno Latour. ‘Don’t throw the Baby out with the Bath school! A
 reply to Collins and Yearly’. In Science as Practice and Culture, ed. Andrew 
 Pickering. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992: 343-368. 
Callon, Michel and John Law. ‘Agency and the Hybrid Collectif’. South Atlantic
 Quarterly 94 (1995): 481-507. 
Callon, Michel and Vololona Rabeharisoa. ‘Gino’s Lesson on Humanity’. Paris Ecole
  des Mines de Paris, 1999. 
Callon, Michel and Vololona Rabeharisoa. ‘Articulating Bodies: The Case of 
 Muscular Dystrophies’. Body and Society 9 (2003). 
Clathworthy, Simon and Sidsel Bjørneby. BESTA. Human Factors Solutions, 1994. 
Clathworthy, Simon and Sidsel Bjørneby. ‘Smart house installations in Tønsberg’. 
 In Ethical Issues in use of Technology for Dementia Care, eds. Sidsel 
 Bjørneby and Ad van Berlo. The Akon series ‘Ageing in the contemporary
  society’, Volume 13, 1997: pp. 67-72.
Cockburn, Cynthia. ‘The Material of Male Power’. In The Social Shaping of 
 Technology”, eds. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, Open University 
 Press, Buckingham, Philadelphia, 1985/1999.  
Collins English Dictionary. HarperCollins Publishers, 2001 [1995].
Collins, Harry and Steven Yearly. ‘Epistemological Chicken’. In Science as Practice
 and Culture, ed. Andrew Pickering,. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
 1992: 301-326.
Collins, Harry. ‘What is Tacit Knowledge?’ In The Practice Turn in Contemporary
 Theory, eds. Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike von Savigny.
 Routhledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2001: 107-119. 
188
Corbin, Juliet M. and Anselm Strauss. ‘Unending Work and Care. Managing Chronic
  Ilness at Home’. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Franscisco, London, 1988. 
Corrigan, Oonagh. ‘Empty Ethics: The Problem with Informed Consent’. In Sociology
  of Health and Illness, Vol. 25 No.3, 2003: 768-792. 
Cronberg, Tarja. ‘Teorier om teknologi og hverdagsliv’. København: Nyt fra 
 Samfunsvidenskaberne, 1986. 
Cronberg, Tarja. ‘Ved skillevejen: det informasjonsteknologiske spillerum i 
 hverdagslivet’. København: Nyt fra Samfunsvidenskaberne, 1988.  
De Laet, Marianne and Annemarie Mol. ‘The Zimbabwe Bush Pump: Mechanics of a
  Fluid Technology’. In Social Studies of Science 30, no. 2, 2000: 225-263. 
Edge, David. ‘Reinventing the Wheel’. In Handbook of Science and Technology 
 Studies, eds. Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E Markle, James C Petersen and  
 Trevor Pinch. London: Sage, 1995. 
Eidem Krüger, Ragnhild M., Birger Lillesveen, Marit Nåvik, Anne Marie Rokstad,
 Kjersti Wogn-Henriksen og Allan Øvereng (red). Det går an! Muligheter i 
 miljøterapi. Forlaget Aldring og Helse, 2007. 
Elgesem, Dag. ’Trygghet, Personvern og Samtykke. Etiske spørsmål i BESTA- 
 prosjektet’. Senter for teknologi og menneskelige verdier (TMV), Universitetet i 
 Oslo, TMV-rapport nr 77, 1994. 
Ellul, Jacques. ’The technological society’. New York: Vintage Books, 1954/1964. 
Enebakk, Vidar. ’Mellom de to kulturer. Oppkomsten av vitenskapsstudier og 
 etableringen av Edinburghskolen 1966-76’. Doctoral thesis, University of Oslo,
  2005. 
Engedal, Knut. ’Utredning av demens og bruk av legemidler mot demens i sykehjem’.
  I: Tidsskrift Nor Lægeforening, 2005: 125: pp. 1188-1190. 
Engedal, Knut og Per Kristin Haugen. ’Aldersdemens – fakta og utfordringer’.
 Info-banken, 1996.  
Feil, Naomi. ‘Validation. The Feil method. How to help disoriented old-old’. Edward 
 Feil Productions, Cleveland, Ohio, 1988 [1982] 
Feil, Naomi. ‘The Validation Breakthrough. Simple techniques for Communicating
  with people with Alzheimer’s type Dementia’.Health Professions Press, 
 Baltimore, London, Toronto, Sydney, 1993. 
Finnema, R.M., C.H. Dröes, C.H. Van der Kooij, J. de Lange, H. Rigter, A.P.W.P.
 Van Montfort and W. Van Tilburg. ‘The Design of a Large-Scale Experimental
 Study into the Effect of Emotion-Oriented Care on Demented Elderly and 
189
 Professional Carers in Nursing Homes’. In Arch. Gerontol. Geriatr. Suppl. 6
 (1998): pp. 193-200. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. ‘Rationalitet og magt’. Bind 1. Akademisk Forlag A/S, 1992. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent. ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research’. In 
Qualitative Research Practice, eds. Seale, Gibo, Gubrium and Silverman.
  London: Sage, 2007. 
Foucault, Michel. ‘Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prision’. Harmonsworth:
  Penguin, 1979. 
Foucault, Michel. ‘The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction’. 
 Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1981. 
Foucault, Michel. ‘Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics’. University of Chicago, 
 1982.  
Garfinkel, Harold. ‘Studies in Ethnomethodology’. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
 Prentice Hall, 1967.  
Geertz, Clifford. ‘The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays’. Basic Books, Inc.
 1973. 
Gilligan, Carol. ‘In a different voice’. Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Goffman, Erving. ‘The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life’. Hammondsworth:
 Pengin, 1971 [1959]. 
Goffman, Erving. ‘Selections from Stigma’. In The Disability Studies Reader, ed. 
 Lennard J. Davis, Routledge New York and London, 1997. 
Grint, Keith and Steve Woolgar. ‘The Machine at Work. Technology, Work and 
 Organization’. Polity Press, 1997. 
Habermas, Jürgen.’Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns’, bind 1, Frankfurt am
  Main: Suhrkamp, 1980.
Haraway, Donna J. ‘Situated knowledges. The Science Question in Feminism and 
 the Privilege of Partial Perspective’. In Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The
 Reinvention of Nature, ed. Donna Haraway , New York, Routhledge, 1991: pp.
 193-201.  
Haraway, Donna J. ‘Modest Witness: Feminist Diffractions in Science Studies’. In
The Disunity of the Sciences: Boundaries, Contexts and Power, eds. Peter
 Galison and David J. Stamp. Stanford, California: Stanford University
 Press, 1996: pp. 428-441.
190
Harbers, Hans. ‘Introduction. Co-production, Agency and Normativity’. In Inside the 
Politics of Technology. Agency and Normativity in Co-production of 
Technology and Society, ed. Hans Harbers, Amsterdam University Press, 
2005.
Harbers, Hans. ‘Epilogue. Political Materials – Material Politics’. In Inside the Politics
  of Technology. Agency and Normativity in Co-production of Technology and 
 Society, ed. Hans Harbers, Amsterdam University Press, 2005. 
Harbers, Hans, Annemarie Mol and Alice Stollmeyer. ‘Food matters. Arguments for 
an Ethnography og Daily Care’. In Theory, Culture and Society, special issue 
on Sociality/Materiality. The status of the object in social science 19 (2002): 
pp. 207-226. 
Harding, Sandra. The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1986. 
Harding, Sandra. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s 
lives. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Heath, Deborah. ‘Bodies, Antibodies, and Modest Interventions’ In Gary Lee Downey 
and Joseph Dumit (eds.) Cyborgs &Citadels. Anthropological interventions in 
emerging sciences and technology. The school of American Research, Santa 
Fee, New Mexico, 1997.
Held, Virginia. The Ethics of Care. Personal, Political, Global. Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 25 (2005-2006). ’Mestring,
muligheter og mening. Framtidas omsorgsutfordringer. Omsorgsplan 2015’. 
Oslo, Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 2006. 
Hess, David. ‘Ethnography and the Development of Science and Technology 
Studies’, In Handbook of Ethnography, eds. Paul Atkinson, Amanda Coffey, 
Sara Delamont, John Lofland and Lyn Lofland, Sage Publications, London, 
Thousand Oaks, New Dehli, 2001: pp. 234-245. 
Hilden, Per Kristian og Anne-Lise Middelthon. ’Kvalitative Metoder i Medisinsk 
Forskning – Et Etnografisk Perspektiv’. Tidsskrift Nor Lægeforening 2002; 122: 
pp. 2473-6. 
Holthe, Torhild. ’Kan Nye Hjelpemilder Være til Nytte for Personer med Demens?’ I 
Demens Vol. 8/nr. 4 (14-17), 2004. 
Hughes, Thomas P. ‘The Evolution of Large Technical Systems’. In The Social 
 Construction of Technological Ststems. New Directions in the Sociology and 
191
 History of Technology. Eds. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor J.
  Pinch. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1987. 
Husbanken. ’Retningslinjer fra den norske stats husbank for oppstartingstilskudd til
  boliger tilrettelagt for heldøgns pleie og omsorg og sykehjem’. Husbanken, 
 1994-1998. 
Husbanken. ’Omsorgsboliger og sykehjem. En veileder for lokalisering, organisering
  og utforming’. HB 7.F.17. Husbanken, april 1998. 
Husbanken. ’Retningslinjer for tilskudd fra Husbanken til omsorgsboliger og 
 sykehjemsplasser, oppstartingstilskudd, og kompensasjonstilskudd til dekning
  av renter og avdrag på lån under handlingsplan for eldreomsorgen og 
  opptrappingsplan for psykisk helse’. Husbanken, HB 8.B.9, 1998-2003. 
Husbankens kvartalsrapport (4.kvartal, 2007). 
Huxley, Aldous. ‘Brave New World’. Flamingo HarperCollins Publishers, 1994 [1932]. 
Hyysalo, Sampsa. ‘Technology Nurtured – Collectives in Maintaining and  
  Implementing Technology for Elderly Care’. In Science Studies, Volume 17,
  Number 2, 2004: pp. 23-43.
Jasanoff, Sheila. ‘The Idiom of Co-Production’. In States of Knowledge. The Co-
 Production of Science and Social Order, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, Routhledge,
 Taylor & Fancis Group, London and New York, 2004. 
Jones, Gemma and Bere M.L. Miesen (eds). ‘Care-Giving in Dementia Care. Volume
 1’. Routhledge, London and New York, 1992. 
Kaasa, Karen. ‘Implications of Technology for the Health and Social Care Services’.
 In Ethical Issues in use of Technology for Dementia Care, eds. Sidsel 
 Bjørneby and Ad van Berlo. The Akon series ‘Ageing in the contemporary
  society’. Volmue 13, 1997: pp. 39-44. 
Kannus, P. , Parkkari, J., Koskinen, S. et al. ’Fall-induced injuries and deaths among 
 older adults’. In JAMA 1999; 281: 1895-1899. 
Kitwood, Tom. ‘Dementia Reconsidered. The person comes first’. Open University
  Press, 1997 
Knorr-Cetina, Karen. ‘The Couch, the Cathedral and Laboratory in Science’. In 
  Andrew Pickering (ed.) Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago, 1992. 
Kuhn, Thomas. ’The structure of scientific revolutions’. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 1962 
192
Laberg, Toril, Håkon Aspelund og Hilde Thygesen. ’Smarthusteknologi. Planlegging 
 og drift i kommunale tjenester’. Sosial- og helsedirektoratet, Deltasenteret, 
 Oslo, 2004. 
Laberg, Toril, Håkon Aspelund og Hilde Thygesen. ’Smarthome technology. Planning 
 and management in municipal services’. Directorate for Social and Health 
 Affairs, The Delta Centre, Oslo, 2005.  
Latour, Bruno. ‘Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
 Society’. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987. 
Latour, Bruno. ‘The Pasteurization of France’. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University
 Press, 1998a
Latour, Bruno. ‘The Politics of Explanation: an Alternative’. In Knowledge and 
 Reflexivity. New frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Steve Woolgar, 
 Sage Publications, 1988b.
Latour, Bruno. ‘Technology is society Made Durable’. In A Sociology of Monsters?
 Essays on Power, technology and Domination, ed. John Law, Routledge, 
 1991: pp. 103-131. 
Latour, Bruno. ‘We have never been modern’. Longman/Pearson Education, 1993. 
Latour, Bruno (Jim Johnson a.k.a Bruno Latour). ‘Mixing Humans and Non-Humans
  together: The Sociology of a Door-closer’. In Ecologies of Knowledge. Work 
 and knowledge in Science and Technology, ed. Susan Leigh Star. New York:
 State University of  New York, 1995. 
Latour, Bruno. ‘Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies’. Harvard
 University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1999a.
Latour, Bruno.’Fractures/fractures. From the concept of network to the concept of 
 attachment’. In Res 36, Anthropology and aesthetics, Autumn 1999b, pp. 20-
 31. 
Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar. ‘Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of
 Scientific Facts’. Beverly Hills and London, Sage, 1979. 
Law, John. ‘Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of the 
 Portuguese Expansion’. In The Social Construction of Technical  
 Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, 
ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch. Cambridge, Mass: 
 MIT Press, 1987: pp.111-134. 
Law, John. ‘Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network: Ordering, Strategy and 
 Heterogeneity’. Published by the Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster 
193
 University, Lancaster LA1 4YN, UK, at 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc=54jl.html, 1992.
Law, John. ‘Organizing Modernity’. Blackwell Publishers Oxford UK &Cambridge 
 USA, 1994. 
Law, John. ‘Traduction/Trahesion: Notes on ANT’. Centre for Technology and Human
  Values (TMV), University of Oslo, TMV working paper nr 106,1997. 
Law, John. ‘Networks, Relations, Cyborgs: on the Social Study of Technology’, 
 published by the Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster
  LA1 4YN, UK, at http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc042jl.html in 
 2000.
Law, John. ‘Ordering and Obduracy’. Published by the Centre for Science Studies, 
 Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YN, UK, at 
http://www.comp.lanca.ac.uk/sociology/soc068jl.html version: obduracy4.doc; 
 3rd January, 2001.  
Law, John. ‘Enacting Naturecultures: A Note from STS”’ Published by the Centre for
  Science Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YN, UK, at 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/law-enacting-naturecultures.pdf
 version 26th February 2004a.
Law, John. ‘Matter-ing: Or How Might STS Contribute?’, published by the Centre for 
 Science Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YL, UK at 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/law-matter-ing.pdf in 2004b.
Law, John. ‘After method. Mess in social science research’. Routledge Taylor and 
 Francis Group. London and New York, 2005. 
Law, John and John Hassard (eds.). ‘Actor Network Theory and After’. Blackwell 
 Publishers/The Sociological Review, 1999.  
Lee, Nick and Steve Brown. ‘Otherness and the Actor Network: The Undiscovered
  Continent’. In American Behavioural Scientist 36 (1994), pp. 772-790. 
Lopez, Daniel, Blanca Callen, Francisco J. Tirado and Miquel Domenech. 
 “Entangling security and care in Home Telecare”. In Care in practice, eds.
  Annemarie Mol, Ingunn Moser and Jeannette Pols, forthcoming.
Lopez, Daniel and Miquel Domenech. ‘Risky houses for independent elderly. The 
 question concerning immediacy in a Home Telecare Service’. Paper 
 presented at the EASST-Conference, Lausanne University, August , 2006. 
McMahon, Richard. ‘The ‘24-hour reality orientation’ type of approach to the 
  confused elderly: a minimum standard for care’. In Journal of Advanced 
  Nursing, 1988, 13, 693-700.
194
MacKenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar (eds.): ‘Relational Autonomy. Feminist 
 Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self’. New York and 
 Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
MacKenzie, Donald and Judy Wajcman (eds.): The Social Shaping of Technology.
 Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985/1999. 
Mäki, Outi, Pävi Topo, Marjo Rauhala and Marja Jylhä. ’Teknik för Människor med
  Demens. Etisk perspektiv på beslutsfattandet’. Stakes Forsknings- och 
 Utvecklingscentralen för Social och Hälsovården, Handböcker 41, 2001. 
Marcus, George E. ’Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-
 sited Ethnography’. In Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 24 (1995): pp. 95-
 117. 
Marshall, Mary (ed). ‘Astrid. A Social and Technological Response to Meeting the
  Needs of Individuals with Dementia and Their Carers. A Guide to Using 
  Technology Within Dementia Care’. Hawker Publications Ltd, Telematics 
  Applications Program, EC, 2000. 
Marshall, Mary (ed.): ‘Perspectives on Rehabilitation and Dementia’. Jessica Kingsley
  Publishers, London and Philadelphia, 2005. 
Martin, Emily. Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture from the Days
  of Polio to the Age of AIDS. Beacon Press, 1994. 
Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland. ‘Safe to Wander? Principles and guidance
  on Good Practice in caring for residents with Dementia and Related Disorders
  Where Consideration is Being Given to the Use of Wandering technologies in
  care Homes and Hospitals’. 
Miles, Ian. ‘Home informatics. Information Technology and the Transformation of 
 Everyday Life’. Pinter Publishers, London and New York, 1988. 
Miles, Ian. ‘A Smart House is Not a Home?’ In Technology and Everyday Life:  
 Trajectories and Transformations, eds. Knut H. Sørensen and Anne- 
 Jorunn Berg. Report nr 5. Proceedings from a Workshop in Trondheim, May
 1990. Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities. Oslo, 
 1991.  
Miles, Ian, Howard Rush, Kevin Turner and John Bessant. ‘Information Horizons. The 
 long-term social implications of new information technologies’. Edward Elgar, 
 1988.   
Moen, Elisabeth. ‘Mestring, muligheter og mening’. I Demens, Vol 10/nr.4: pp. 18- 21, 
 2006. 
195
Mol, Annemarie. ‘Missing Links, Making Links: The Performance of Some 
 Atherosclerosis’. In Differences in Medicine, eds. Marc Berg and Annemarie 
 Mol, Duke University Press, Durham and London,1998a: 144-165. 
Mol, Annemarie. ‘Lived Reality and the Multiplicity of Norms: A Critical Tribute to 
 George Canguilhem’. Economy and Society 27 (1998b): pp. 274-284.
Mol, Annemarie. ‘What Diagnostic Devices Do: The Case of Blood Sugar 
 Measurement’. In Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21, Kluwer Academic
 Publishers, 2000: pp. 9-22  
Mol, Annemarie. ‘The Body multiple. Ontology in Medical Practice’. Duke University
 Press, 2002. 
Mol, Annemarie. ‘The Logic of Care. Health and the problem of patient choice’. 
 Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, 2008.
Mol, Annemarie and John Law. ‘Complexities: An Introduction’. In Complexities.
 Social Studies of Knowledge Practices, eds. John Law and Annemarie Mol,
 Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2002: pp. 1-22. 
Mol, Annemarie and John Law. ‘Situated Bodies and Distributed Selves: Enacting
  Hypoglycaemia’. In Body and Society 9, 2003. 
Mol, Annemarie and John Law. ‘Embodied Action, Enacted Bodies: The Example of 
 Hypoglycaemia’. In Body and Society, Vol 10 (2-3), Sage Publications, 2004:
 pp. 43-62. 
Mol, Annemarie and Jessica Mesman. ‘Neonatal Food and the Politics of Theory: 
 Some questions of Method’. Social Studies of Science 26 (1996): pp. 419-444. 
Moody, Harry R. ‘Ethics in an Ageing Society’.The Johns Hopkins University Press,
 Baltimore and London, 1992. 
Moreira, Tiago. ‘Self, agency and the surgical collective: detacment’. In Sociology of 
 Health and Illness, Vol. 26 No. 1, 2004: pp. 32-49. 
Moreira, Tiago. ‘Incisions: A Study of Surgical Trajectories’. PhD-Thesis, University 
 of Lancaster, 2001. 
Mort, Maggie. Building the Trident Network: A Study of the Enrolment of People, 
 Knowledge and Machines. Cam Mass., MIT Press, Inside Techn. Studies, 
 2002. 
Moser, Ingunn B. ’Teknologi i samfunnsteori: Forskyvninger og forflytninger’. Senter 
 for teknologi og menneskelige verdier (TMV), Mag art thesis, Universitetet i 
 Oslo, TMV-rapport 4, 1993. 
196
Moser, Ingunn B. ’Fra blyant til data. Informasjonsteknologi for funksjonshemmede.
 En brukerundersøkelse’. Senter for teknologi og menneskelige verdier (TMV), 
 Universitetet i Oslo, TMV skriftserie nr 31, 1998.  
Moser, Ingunn. ‘Against Normalisation. Subverting Norms of Ability and Disability’.
  Science as Culture 9, no. 2, 2000: 201-240. 
Moser, Ingunn B. ‘Road Traffic Accidents: the ordering of Subjects, Bodies and
 Disability’. Dr.art thesis, Factulty of Arts, University of Oslo, 2003. 
Moser, Ingunn. ‘Disability and the Promises of Technology. Technology, subjectivity
  and embodiment within an order of the normal’, In Information, 
 Communication & Society Vol. 9, No 3, June 2006: pp. 370-392.
Moser, Ingunn. ‘Sociotechnical practices and difference: On the interferences 
 between disability, gender and class’. In Science, Technology & Human 
 Values, Vol. 31,No.5, 2006, pp. 537-565.
Moser, Ingunn. ‘Interventions in History. Maureen McNeil and John Law in 
 Conversation on the Emergence, Trajectories and Interferences of Science 
 and Technology Studies (STS). In: Technoscience. The politics of 
 interventions,  eds. Kristin Asdal, Brita Brenna and Ingunn Moser. Unipub, 
 2007. 
Moser, Ingunn. ‘Making Alzheimer’s Disease Matter: Enacting, interfering and doing 
 politics of nature’, Geoforum, Vol. 39, issue 1, Jan 08, pp. 98-110. 
Moser, Ingunn and John Law. ‘Good Passages, Bad passages’. In Actor Network
  Theory and After, eds. John Law and John Hassard, Oxford and Keele: 
 Blackwell and the Sociological Review, 1999: pp. 196-219. 
Moser, Ingunn and John Law. ‘Making Voices: New Media Technologies, Disabilities,
  and Articulation’. In Digital Media revisited. Theoretical and Conceptual 
 Innovationin Digital Domains, eds. Gunnar Liestøl, Andrew Morrison and Terje
  Rasmussen, Cambridge, Ma.: MIT-Press, 2003: pp. 491-520. 
Moser, Ingunn and John Law. ‘Fluids or Flows? Information and Qualculation in 
  Medical Practice’. In Information Technology and People, Vol. 19, No. 1, 
 2006, pp. 55-73.  
Nygård, Harald. ’Jeg tenker; altså er jeg. - Hjelp meg å huske. Muligheter med 
 pilleløse tiltak?’ I Det går an! Muligheter i miljøterapi, red. Ragnhild M. Eidem
  Krüger, Forlaget Aldring og helse, 2007: pp. 52-63. 
Nussbaum, Martha. ’Making Sense of Humanity and other Philosophical Essays’. In 
Bookreviews. Ethics, April 1997, pp: 526-529.
197
Nussbaum, Martha. ’Public Philosophy and International Feminism’. In Ethics 108,
July 1998; pp: 762-796.
OECD. ‘Long-Term Care Policies for Older People’. Report Draft 30.11.04. OECD,
  Health Division, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, France, 2004.
Oudshoorn, Nelly and Trevor Pinch. ‘Introduction. How users and non-users matter’. 
 In How Users Matter. The co-construction of Users and Technology, eds. Nelly 
 Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, 2003. 
Pickering, Andrew (ed). ‘Science as Practice and Culture’. Chicago and London: 
  University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Pols, Jeannette. ‘Enforcing Patient Rights or Improving Care? The interference of 
 Two Modes of Doing Good in Mental Health Care’. Sociology of Health and 
 Illness vol 25, no 4, 2003: pp. 320-347.
Pols, Jeannette. ‘Good Care. Enacting a complex ideal in long-term psychiatry’. PhD
 Thesis, Trimbos-instituut, Utrecht, 2004. 
Pols, Jeannette. ‘Which Empirical Research, Whose Ethics? Articulating Ideals in
 Long-Term Mental Health Care’. In Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry, eds. G.
 Widdershoven, T. Hope, L. Van der Scheer and J. McMillan. Oxford University
 Press, 2007. 
Rikstrygdeverket. ’Hjelpemiddelformidling – en del av et større system’ 
 Informasjonshefte, 2000. 
Ruyter, Knut W. og Arne Johan Vetlesen (red.). ’Omsorgens tvetydighet’. Gyldendal
  Akademisk, 2004. 
Schell. ‘Nurse’s perspectives of elderly patients’. (Editorial article) In Age and ageing
 2001, 30: pp. 367-368. 
Sejersted, Francis. ‘Teknologipolitikk’. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1998. 
Seale, Clive, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman (eds.): 
 ‘Qualitative Research Practice’. London: Sage, 2007. 
Singleton, Vicky. ‘Science, Women and Ambivalence: An Actor Network Analysis of
  the Cervical Screening Campaign’. PhD thesis, University of Lancaster, 1993. 
Singleton, Vicky. ‘Feminism, Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Postmodernism:
 Politics, Theory and Me’. Social Studies of Science 26 (1996): 445-468. 
Singleton, Vicky. ‘Stabilizing Instabilities: The Role of the Laboratory in the United
 Kingdom Cervical Screening Programme’. In Differences in Medicine, eds. 
 Marc Berg and Annemarie Mol, Duke University Press, Durham and 
 London, 1998: pp. 86-104.
198
Singleton, Vicky. ‘Training and Resuscitating healthy Citizens in the English New
 Public Health’. In Technoscience. The Politics of Interventions”,  eds. Kristin 
 Asdal, Brita Brenna and Ingunn B. Moser, Unipub, University of Oslo, 
 2007: pp. 221-246. 
Sismondo, Segio. ‘An introduction to Science and Technology Studies’. Blackwell
 Publishing, 2004. 
Sjöberg, Malena. ’Etik och hjälpmedel’. Handikappinstituttet, Rapport &  
  Dokumentation Nr 60, Stockholm, 1995. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 35 (1994-95).  
 ’Velferdsmeldingen’. Sosial- og helsedepartementet, 1995. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 50 (1996-97). ’Handlingsplan for 
 eldreomsorgen’. Trygghet – respekt – kvalitet.  Sosial- og helsedepartementet,
 1997. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 26 (1999-2000). ’Om verdiar for
  den norske helsetenesta’. Sosial- og helsedepartementet, 2000. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 28 (1999-2000). ’Innhald og 
  kvalitet i omsorgstenestene. Omsorg 2000’. Sosial- og helsedepartementet,
  2000. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 34 (1999-2000). 
 ’Handlingsplanen for eldreomsorgen etter 2 år’. Sosial- og 
 helsedepartementet, 2000. 
Sosialdepartementet. Norges Offentlige Utredninger (NOU 1992: 1). ’Trygghet –
 Verdighet – Omsorg’. Sosialdepartementet, 1992. 
Sosialdepartementet. ’Høringsnotat. Om lov om rettigheter for og begrensing og 
  kontroll med bruk av tvang m.v. overfor personer med demens’.
Sosialdepartementet, mai 2002.
Sosialdepartementet. Storingsmelding nr 31 (2001-2002). ’Avslutning av 
 handlingsplan for eldreomsorgen. Fra hus til hender’. Sosialdepartementet, 
 2002. 
Sosialdepartementet. Stortingsmelding nr 45 (2002-2003). ’Betre kvalitet i dei 
  kommunale pleie- og omsorgstenestene’. Sosialdepartementet, 2003.
Star, Susan Leigh. ‘Power, Technology and the Phenomenology of Conventions. On
 being allergic to onions’. In A Sociology of Monsters, ed. John Law,
 Routhledge, 1991. 
Star, Susan Leigh. ‘Epiolouge: Work and Practice in Social Studies of Science, 
 Medicine and Technology’. In Science, Technology & Human Values, Vol. 20,
199
  No. 4, Special Issue: Constructivist Perspectives on Medical Work: Medical
  Practices and Science and Technology Studies, pp. 501-507, Autumn 1995.
Star, Susuan Leigh. ‘Anselm Strauss: An Appreciation’. In Sociolocal Research 
  Online,  vol. 2, no. 1, http://socresoline.org.uk/socresonline/2/1/1.html, 1997. 
Stevenson, Olive (ed.): ‘Community Care for Very Old People. Technology for living 
 at home’. The Akon Series ‘Ageing in the contemporary society’, Volume 10, 
 Akontes Publishing, Knegsel, 1994. 
Stollmeyer, Alice. ‘The Ethics of care. Alzheimer’s Disease and the question of how 
 to give good care?’ Paper for the 4S/EASST Conference in Wienna, 
 September 2000. 
Stortingsforhandlinger, sesjon 1995-96, nr 8 (13-18 juni 1996). [Proceedings and
  debates of the Storting]. 
Struhkamp, Rita. ‘Dealing with disability. Inquiries into a clinical craft’. Ph-d Thesis,
 Amsterdam, 2004.  
Strum, Shirley and Bruno Latour. ‘Redefining the Social Link: From Baboons to 
 Humans’. In The Social Shaping of Technology, Second Edition, eds. Donald 
 MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999.
Suchman, Lucy. ’Practice Based Design of Information Systems; Notes from the
  Hyperdeveloped World’, in The Information Society, 18: 2002, pp. 139-144. 
Teknologirådet. ’Teknologirådets scenarieverksted om Eldre og omsorgsteknologi.
  Fremtidsbilder om bruk av informasjons- og kommunikasjonsteknologi i pleie
  og omsorg av eldre og demente’. Rapport, Nedre Eiker 29-30 mai, 2000. 
Thygesen, Hilde. ’Overvåking eller trygghet? En studie av teknologi i omsorgen for 
 aldersdemente’. Hovedfagsoppgave i sosiologi, cand. polit. 1992.  
 Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsgeografi, Universitetet i Oslo, 1998. 
Thygesen, Hilde og Marianne Skattum. ’Hjelpemidler og etikk’. Rikstrygdeverket, 
 2001. 
TIDE ASHoRED (Adaptable Smart Homes for Residents who are Elderly and 
 Disabled), Project founded by the European Commission. ’User requirements
  specifications’, Workpackage III, 1992. 
Tinetti, M.E., Baker D.I., McAvay et al.: ’A multifactorial intervention to reduce the risk 
 of falling among the elderly living in the community’. N. Engl. J Med, 1994; 
 331: pp. 821-827. 
Tronto, Joan C. ’Moral boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care’. New
 York: Routledge, 1993. 
200
Verkerk, Marian. ‘A Care Perspective on Coercion and Autonomy’. In Bioethics,
 Vol.13, Number 3/4: 358-368, 1999. 
Verran, Helen. ‘Science and an Africa logic’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
  2001. 
Vetlesen, Arne Johan. ‘Omsorg – mellom avhengighet og autonomi’, I Knut W. 
 Ruyter og Arne Johan Vetlesen (red.) Omsorgens tvetydighet, Gyldendal 
 Akademisk, 2001, s. 27-40. 
Vetlesen, Arne Johan. Hva er etikk? Universitetsforlaget, 2007. 
Vol, Rein and Dick L. Willems. ‘Technology in Medicine: Ontology, Epistemology, 
 Ethics and Social Philosophy at the Crossroads’. In Theoretical Medicine and 
 Bioethics 21, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000: pp. 1-7. 
Wackers, G.L. Constructivist Medicine. Ph-d thesis , Maastricht: Universitaire Pers,
 1994. 
Widdershoven, Guy A. M. ‘Alternatives to Bioethics: Phenomenology, Ontology or
  Hermeneutics?’ Paper presented at International Conference ‘Nach der 
 Kehre: Heidegger and Gadamer’, Heidelberg, 7 July, 1996. 
Widdershoven, Guy A. M. ‘Ethics and (Geron)Technology: A Plea for Integration’.
 Paper presented at International Gerontechnology Conference, Helsinki, 
 Finland, October 1996. 
Wild, Claudia and Andrea Kirschner (eds.): ‘Safety-Alarm Systems, Technical Aids 
 and Smart Homes’. The Akon Series ‘Ageing in the contemporary society’, 
 Volume 8, Akontes Publishing, Knegsel, 1994. 
Willems, Dick. ‘Managing one’s body using self-management techniques: Practicing
  autonomy’. In Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 21: pp. 23-38, Kluwer 
 Academic Publishers, 2000. 
Willems, Dick. ‘Moral Machinery – the ethics of home care high tech’. Unpublished 
 Report from Incentive Programme Ethics and Political Issues of the 
 Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW), September 2005.
Winance, Myriam. ‘Trying out the Wheelchair: The Mutual Shaping of People and 
 Devices through Adjustment’. In Science, Technology and Human Values,
 2006; 31: pp. 52-72. 
Winner, Langdon. ‘Autonomous technology. Technics-ot-of-control as a theme in
  Political Thought’. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1977. 
201
Winner, Langdon. ‘Do artefacts have politics? In The Social Shaping of 
 Technology’, eds. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, Open University 
 Press, Buckingham, Phildelphia, 1985/1999. 
Woods, Potnoy, Head and Jones. ‘Reminiscence and Life Review With Persons With
  Dementia: Which Way Forward?’ In Caregiving in Dementia, Volume 1, 1992:
 pp. 138.
Woolgar, Steve. ‘Configuring the User: The Case of Usability Trials’. In A Sociology
 of Monsters? Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, ed. John Law, 
 38, London: Routledge, 1991: pp. 57-99. 
Wynne, Brian. ‘SSK’s Identity Parade: Signing-Up, Off – and – On’. In Social
 Studies of Science, 26, no. 2, 1996.
Østlund, Britt. ‘Social Science Research on technology and the Elderly – Does it 
  Exist?’ In Science Studies, Volume 17, Number 2, 2004: pp. 44-62. 
Årsand, Eirik og Toril Laberg. ‘Studie av status i broken av og erfaringer med 
 smarthus i pleie- og omsorgstjenesten’. Nasjonal senter for telemedisin og
  Sosial- og helsedirektoratet/Deltasenteret, 2001. 
References to laws, law proposals and legal regulations: 
Forskrift for sykehjem og boform for heldøgns omsorg og pleie. 14.11.1988 nr. 932 
 [Regulations  relating to nursing homes and other forms of institutional 24-hour 
 care services]. 
Forskrift om kvalitet i pleie- og omsorgstjenestene. 27.06.2003 nr. 792 [Regulations 
 relating to quality in care services]. 
Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet. Odelstingsproposisjon nr 64 (2005-2006). ’Om lov 
 om endringar i pasientrettslova og biobanklova (helsehjelp og forsking – 
 personar utan samtykkekompetanse)’. Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet, 
 2006. 
Helsepersonelloven [The Act relating to health personnel]. 
Helsetjenesteloven [The Act relating to the provision of municipal health-care 
 services]. 
Lov om statlig tilsyn med helsetjenesten [The Act relating to the supervision of health
  care services]. 
Pasientrettighetsloven [The Act relating to patients’ rights]. 
202
Sosialdepartementet. ’Odelstingsproposisjon nr 55 (2002-2003). Om lov om 
 endringer i lov om sosiale tjenester m.v. og lov om helsetjenesten i 
 kommunene  (rettssikkerhet ved bruk av tvang og makt overfor enkelte 
 personer med psykisk utviklingshemning)’. Sosialdepartementet, 2003. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Beslutning O. nr 80. ’Jf Innstilling O. nr 79 (1995-96),
  Ot.prp. nr 58 (1994-95) og Ot.prp. nr 57 (1995-96)’. Sosial- og 
 helsedepartementet, 1996. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Innstilling O nr 79 (1995-96). ’Innstilling fra 
 sosialkomiteen om lov om endringer i sosialtjenesteloven og 
 kommunehelsetjenesteloven (begrensning og kontroll med bruk av tvang og
  makt m.v. overfor enkelte personer med psykisk utviklingshemning)’. Sosial- 
 og helsedepartementet, 1996. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Odelstingsproposisjon nr 57 (1995-96). ’Om lov om
  endringer i sosialtjenesteloven og kommunehelsetjenesteloven (begrensning
  og kontroll med bruk av tvang og makt m v overfor enkelte personer med
  psykisk utviklingshemming – tilleggsproposisjon til Ot.prp. nr 58 1994-95)’.
Sosial- og helsedepartementet, 1996. 
Sosial- og helsedepartementet. Odelstingsproposisjon nr 58 (1994-95). ’Om lov om
  endringer i sosialtjenesteloven og kommunehelsetjenesteloven (bruk av tvang 
 og makt m v overfor personer med psykisk utviklingshemming)’. Sosial- og 
 helsedepartementet, 1995. 
Sosialtjenesteloven [The law regulating the provision of social services]. 
Newspaper articles: 
Aftenposten. ’For å spare penger’ [For the sake of saving money], 21. January 1996. 
Aftenposten. ’Som kyr med kø-fri brikke’ [As animals with electronic tags], 1. 
February, 1996: pp. 7. 
Aftenposten. ’Lovbrudd på lovbrudd i Helse-Norge’ [Norwegian health-care violates 
the law again and again], 2. July, 2005: pp. 6. 
Agderposten. ’Håkons siste måneder ble et mareritt’ [Håkon’s last months became a 
nightmare], 28. December 2005: pp. 1 and 4-5. 
Dagbladet. ’Som fanger i eget hjem’ [As prisoners in own homes], 20. January 1996: 
pp. 14. 
Dagbladet. ’Trenger omsorg – ikke overvåking’ [Needs care – not surveillance], 31 
January, 1996. 
203
Dagbladet. ’Elektronisk overvåking av utviklingshemmede’ [Electronic surveillance of 
people with intellectual disabilities], 1. February, 1996: pp. 13. 
Dagsavisen. ‘Mer stoppeklokke i eldreomsorgen’ [More stop-watch care for the 
elderly], 24. November, 2005: pp. 1 and 6-7. 
Dagsavisen. ’Eldre får dusje annenhver uke’ [The elderly are allowed to shower every 
second week], 27 March, 2006: pp. 6-7. 
VG. ‘Slagrammede Rosa (88): kastet ut fra sykehjemmet’ [Stroke-victim Rosa (88): 
Thrown out of nursing home], 15 September, 2005: pp. 1 and 6-7. 
VG. ’Gjorde for mye for de gamle – fikk sparken’ [Did too much for the old – got fired], 
18 December, 2005: pp. 1 and 8-9. 
Journal articles:
’Urovekkende’ [Disquieting], Demens, vol. 4/nr. 3, 2000: pp. 5. 
‘Elektronisk overvåking: OK – eller? [Electronic surveillance: OK – or maybe not?], 
Demens, vol. 4/nr. 3, 2000: pp. 6. 
‘Hvert tilfelle må vurderes’ [Each case must be assessed separately], Demens, vol. 
4/nr. 3, 2000: 7.
‘Tvang i norsk eldreomsorg’ [Coercion in Norwegian dementia care], Demens, vol. 
5/nr. 1, 2001: 7-9. 
204
